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ABSTRACT 
 
FOLLOWING THE PRINCIPLES:  
CASE STUDIES IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 1945-1999 
 
by Kevin Joseph Dougherty 
 
December 2011 
 
 In the post-World War II-era, operations other than war (OOTW) were the types 
of conflict most commonly faced by the United States.  This term for what had previously 
been called by such names as small wars and low intensity conflict was incorporated in 
the Army’s capstone manual, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, in 1993.   Field 
Manual 100-5 also listed objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, 
and security as the six principles of OOTW.  An analysis of eight OOTWs that occurred 
between 1945 and 1999 indicates that the balanced application of these principles is a 
reliable predicator of the operation’s outcome and that there is a relationship among 
several of the principles themselves.  These findings suggest the principles of OOTW are 
a useful planning tool for military commanders and staffs. 
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    CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 After World War II, United States military forces increasingly found themselves 
involved in operations that have been described variously as small wars, low intensity 
conflicts, operations other than war, support and stability operations, and many other 
titles.  This study will call such actions operations other than war (OOTW), using the 
name that was common for much of the 1990s when an explosion of doctrinal material on 
the subject was published.  Among this material was the army’s capstone manual, FM 
100-5, Operations, which appeared in 1993 and listed six principles of OOTW: objective, 
unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security.   
FM 100-5 asserts that “while these [principles] are not immutable, they serve as 
guides for action.”1  The manual also states that “commanders must balance these 
principles against the specific requirements of their mission and the nature of the 
operation.”2  These statements suggest that there is a relationship between the balanced 
application of the principles of OOTWs and the outcome of the operation, as well as a 
relationship among the principles themselves.  This idea is grounded in the 
Enlightenment philosophy that emphasized rational objective analysis and the search for 
clarity in all fields.  A series of military theorists, perhaps most notably Baron Antoine-
Henri de Jomini, sought to uncover the natural scientific laws relating to the conduct of 
war, confident that the military art “like all others is founded on certain and fixed 
principles.”3  After twenty years of study, Jomini was convinced that “there exists a small 
number of fundamental principles of war, which could not be deviated from without 
danger, and the application of which, on the contrary, has been in almost all time 
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crowned with success.”4  It was pursuant to this theory that FM 100-5 presented its 
principles of OOTW. 
The research question associated with this dissertation is “In the era between 1945 
and 1999, is the balanced application of the principles of OOTW a reliable predictor of an 
operation’s success or failure?”  The alternate hypothesis is that FM 100-5 is correct, and 
a balanced application of the principles of OOTW will result in a successful operation.  
The null hypothesis is that there is not a causal relationship between an operation’s 
success and the balanced application of the principles of OOTW.   The research objective 
of the dissertation is to conduct a disciplined configurative case study of eight OOTWs 
(four that were successful and four that were failures) and then use the congruence 
method to test the hypothesis that a balanced adherence to the principles of OOTW 
contributes to a successful outcome.   
This study is important to the military because, when the army rewrote FM 100-5 
as FM 3-0 in 2001, it eliminated any specific principles of OOTW.  Instead, the manual 
stated that “the nine [traditional] principles of war provide general guidance for 
conducting war and military operations other than war at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels.”5  If the dissertation confirms the validity of the theory generated by FM 
100-5 that there is a causal relationship between the balanced application of a specific set 
of principles tailored to OOTW and the operation’s outcome, the army should reconsider 
its doctrinal move away from the principles of OOTW reflected in FM 3-0.  
This study is important to the international development community because of 
the strong consensus that security is a prerequisite for other development.6  If security can 
be facilitated by adherence to the principles of OOTW, then the development process can 
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be accelerated.  Additionally, one of the OOTW activities is nation assistance, and even 
OOTWs with other specific purposes often engage to some degree in this developmental 
endeavor. 
Literature Review 
United States military doctrine concerning OOTW in the last half of the twentieth 
century was sporadic.  In 1940, the Marine Corps, building on its vast experience in the 
Caribbean and elsewhere, published its classic Small Wars Manual, which addressed 
“operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined 
with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose 
government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of 
such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.”7  While the authors 
declared small wars to be “the normal and frequent operations of the Marine Corps,” 
World War II suggested to many others, particularly in the army, that the future would be 
based on big wars rather than small.8 
Thus, with the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the army set 
out to build a force structure and organizational culture that was European-based and 
conventionally oriented.  It was not until 1962 that the army began discussing a spectrum 
of war, in FM 100-5, Operations.  This spectrum progressed from Cold War through 
limited war to general war.  Such a structure made sense, given the work done by  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor to support President 
Dwight Eisenhower’s move away from the strategy of massive retaliation to one of 
flexible response. The 1962 FM 100-5 discussed unconventional warfare, military 
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operations against irregulars, and situations short of war.  In all these situations, FM 100-
5 astutely stressed that “political considerations are overriding.”9  
 Nonetheless, by the time the US became seriously involved in Vietnam, there was 
a dearth of published doctrine available to provide direction in other than conventional 
scenarios.  Max Boot laments, “the Small Wars Manual and its lessons had been all but 
forgotten.”10  The army rushed to fill the void with a host of specialized manuals such as 
FM 100-20, Counterinsurgency in 1964, which envisioned the employment of large 
formations of US troops with some reliance on indigenous forces.  In 1967, the manual 
was retitled Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) and updated to include lessons 
from the Vietnam experience.  These included the increasing role of civilian agencies and 
the host nation in a revolutionary or insurgent situation and a lessening of the US 
military’s role.11   
 A plethora of manuals and other literature was published during the Vietnam War, 
including the 1967 FM 31-33, Stability Operations, US Army Doctrine.  These stability 
operations were defined as the “full range of internal defense and development operations 
and assistance which we can employ to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order 
within which the Government under law can function effectively…”  The 1968 edition of 
FM 100-5 included a new chapter on stability operations, as well as a discussion of 
“nationbuilding” in which US forces would “assist in the planning and execution of 
military civic action and other aspects of internal development programs.”  The objective 
of nationbuilding was to assist in the prevention or suppression of insurgency by 
facilitating the modernization process.12  Also in 1968, the Handbook for Military 
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Support of Pacification was published “in view of the recent dynamic changes in the 
government of Vietnam and its pacification program.”13 
 As the realities of Vietnam set in and the Nixon Doctrine of 1969 marked a 
reluctance to commit ground forces to revolutionary conflicts, the 1972 edition of FM 31-
23 and the 1974 edition of FM 100-20 amplified the host nation’s responsibility for the 
conduct of the war and delineated the army’s role as providing logistics, training, and 
advice, along with a combat function limited to the protection of American forces and 
activities.14  The frustrating experience in Vietnam also prompted a new doctrinal term to 
describe the counterinsurgency, IDAD, and stability operations associated with Vietnam: 
“low intensity conflict” or LIC.15  A subtle distancing of the main army population from 
LIC also occurred as the latter's doctrinal proponency was placed under the purview of 
the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where it remained until 1984.  
An organizational culture began to develop that equated LIC with Special Forces.  Even 
as late as 1999, analysts bemoaned that LIC skills that were “beyond the capability of 
conventional forces… [were] business as usual for special-operations forces.”16  
Additionally, the American withdrawal from Vietnam and the higher intensity nature of 
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War resulted in an “element of the collective consciousness of the 
Army that relegated LIC to the arcane.”17 
 In fact, the 1976 version of FM 100-5 simply omitted any discussion of LIC “as 
the Army attempted to put behind it what had been the most traumatic and debilitating 
period in its existence.”18  What little scrutiny that was afforded the subject came from 
external sources such as Douglas Blaufarb’s (1977) The Counterinsurgency Era: US 
Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the Present.  Within the military, low intensity 
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conflict instruction at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the army’s year-
long professional education course for majors, had been declining since the withdrawal 
from Vietnam, and in academic year 1981-1982, the LIC instructional committee at 
CGSC was disbanded altogether.  The net effect was to convince a generation of soldiers 
that the US Army existed only to fight conventional wars and that their success as career 
soldiers lay in the mainstream concept of warfighting at the conventional level.  Writ 
large, “the Army… decided again that LIC was not its job.”19  Low intensity conflict and 
related tasks were consigned to a small minority of soldiers willing to step outside the 
mainstream with the knowledge that they did so at some peril to their careers.20 
The doctrinal needs of this limited community were addressed in the 1981 version 
of FM 100-20, which was retitled Low Intensity Conflict to reflect the recent change in 
terminology.  It described LIC as an “ambiguous environment” between peace and war 
where “the contribution of military force to the achievement of the strategic aim is 
indirect; that is, military operations support non-military operations which establish the 
conditions under which the strategic aim can be realized.”21  A contemporary study for 
the Pentagon prepared by Robert Kupperman added that LIC was “the limited use of 
force or the threat of its use, to achieve political objectives without the total commitment 
of resources and will that characterizes the wars of survival or conquest of nation-
states.”22  Thus FM 100-20 recognized the protracted and political-military nature of LIC 
and that LIC was waged by a combination of political, economic, informational, and 
military means.23  Some bemoaned LIC’s lack of a “precise definition” and noted that the 
“term has come to encompass every type of nonnuclear conflict ranging from the Korean 
War to terrorism.”24  Others worried that with such broad definitions and descriptions of 
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LIC, “the doctrine community may be creating a doctrinal foster home for orphaned 
warfare concepts.”25 
FM 100-20 noted that while LIC generally occurred in the “Third World,” it also 
had certain regional and global security implications.26  This nominal mention of LIC’s 
broader importance did little to offset the declining profile of LIC and was particularly 
troubling to some military leaders responsible for areas in the developing world that were 
the likeliest sites of LIC operations.  General Wallace Nutting, commander of US 
Southern Command, which included Central and South American hotspots such as El 
Salvador, complained to TRADOC in September 1982 about “our collective and 
institutional inability to meet that [Soviet] threat directly and where it is most effective—
the low intensity end of the conflict spectrum.”27  Army Chief of Staff General Edward 
Meyer had given credence to Nutting’s concern when he stressed in 1980 that “the most 
demanding challenge confronting the US military in the decade of the 80s is to develop 
and demonstrate the capability to successfully meet threats to vital US interests outside of 
Europe, without compromising the decisive theater in Central Europe.”28 
General Nutting’s assessment seems to have been a clarion call for a renewed 
interest in LIC.  In academic year 1983-1984, CGSC devoted twenty-three hours of its 
curriculum to LIC instruction, and in January 1983 it hosted a conference to examine LIC 
training requirements in the army school system.  It produced an instruction model for the 
army and led to the consolidation of LIC doctrinal proponency at Fort Leavenworth 
under the aegis of TRADOC’s Combined Arms Center (CAC) in July 1985.29  More LIC 
debate was generated by the publication of Harry Summers's (1982) On Strategy: A 
Critical Examination of the Vietnam War followed by Andrew Krepinevich’s (1988) The 
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Army and Vietnam, works that provided alternative reexaminations of the military’s most 
recent role in extended counterinsurgency.  As the army became less guarded in its self-
analysis of its Vietnam experience, the potential of the pacification campaign also 
received additional credibility. 
Some of this renewed attention was the result of the disastrous bombing of the 
marine peacekeeping force in Beirut in 1983.  While the successful yet imperfectly 
executed invasion of Grenada shortly thereafter depicted LIC in a more positive light, 
“the proper function and role the military forces play in promoting US security objectives 
[quickly became] the focus of ongoing policy debate.”30  In 1984, largely in response to 
the failure in Beirut, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger announced a set of six 
major tests for policymakers to consider before committing forces overseas.  The 
“Weinberger Criteria” enjoyed widespread credibility throughout the duration of the Cold 
War and served to limit eagerness to commit the military to the politically ambiguous 
situations often characterized by LIC. 
Doctrinal changes slowly began to emerge as TRADOC acknowledged that 
Beirut, Grenada, and other developments demonstrated that more emphasis on LIC was 
needed.  Its February 1986 TRADOC PAM 525-44, The US Army Operational Concept 
for Low Intensity Conflict, articulated an operational concept for LIC that expanded on 
initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization, the four tenets of AirLand Battle (ALB) 
doctrine the army had introduced in 1982, but promised a revision of FM 100-5 to 
specifically include LIC.31   While acknowledging direct confrontation with the Soviet 
Union as “the greatest potential danger to the United States,” the pamphlet argued “low 
intensity conflict represents the most probable challenge to United States interests.”32  
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The pamphlet also began a cautious articulation of a greater involvement of conventional 
forces in LIC, stating that “US combat forces are used only when and where they have a 
high probability of decisively altering the situation.  They must not be committed where 
the effect would be irrelevant or counterproductive to US interests and national 
prestige.”33  
In recognition of General Myers’s call for “unprecedented flexibility,” the army 
had begun testing and fielding light infantry forces in the early 1980s.34  TRADOC PAM 
525-44 specifically noted that these forces “can enhance the chance of success in combat 
operations through their ability to rapidly deploy with significant combat power.”35  It 
recommended definitive force requirements for both conventional and special operations 
forces be determined using LIC scenarios and that conventional forces earmarked for LIC 
establish habitual relationships with civil affairs, psychological operations, intelligence, 
medical, engineer, and other units that traditionally play significant roles in such an 
environment.36  Significantly, the pamphlet reported that “joint doctrine for low intensity 
conflict is nonexistent and needs to be developed” and was hopeful that the Joint Low 
Intensity Center planned to open in 1986 would be “the beginning of the solution.”37 
The 1986 version of FM 100-5 followed on the heels of TRADOC PAM 525-44 
in May.  The 1982 version had moved the army from an active defense strategy to the 
more balanced ALB doctrine, but the emphasis remained on applying conventional 
weapons and tactics on the European battlefield.  The 1986 FM 100-5, however, began to 
tentatively discuss operations at the lower end of the spectrum, recognizing that “Army 
forces must be capable of operating effectively in any battlefield environment, including 
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low intensity conflict…”38  The reprinting of the Marine Corps classic Small Wars 
Manual in 1987 was a clear indication of LIC’s reemergence. 
Meanwhile, TRADOC fulfilled its promise to deliver supporting LIC doctrine.  It 
published FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations, in August 1986, which, in addition to 
light infantry, addressed the use of infantry, airborne, air assault, mechanized infantry, 
armor, armored cavalry, and aviation in counterguerrilla operations.39  Low intensity 
conflict had clearly moved beyond the exclusive realm of the Special Forces. 
Likewise, the promised Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) 
began producing joint doctrine.  In part as a response to the problems with unity of effort 
among the services in Grenada, the 1986 Goldwater/Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act had required each of the service’s doctrines to be subordinate to and 
consistent with joint doctrine.   With the fielding of biservice Army FM 100-20/Air Force 
Pamphlet (AF Pam) 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict in 1990, one 
reviewer crowed, “The basic concepts of low-intensity conflict (LIC) have been around 
since the early 1960s, but they have never been so thoroughly incorporated into the 
doctrine of the US Armed Forces.”40  Also in 1990, CLIC wrote a test JCS Pub 3-07, 
Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict.  Because TRADOC served as the 
primary review authority of LIC doctrine in joint publications, joint LIC doctrine came to 
reflect the army’s quite closely.41  Reflecting its doctrinal leadership role, in 1992 the 
army published its own FM 7-98, Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, which included 
reference to political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and 
perseverance as “imperatives” for LIC.42 
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With the end of the Cold War, the army recognized it had entered “a new, 
strategic era” that would require that “Army forces operate across the range of military 
operations.”43  Observers began to speak of a “doctrinal renaissance of operations short of 
war.”44  By 1992, US forces were increasingly being tasked with non-warfighting 
missions, such as support during the Los Angeles riots and Hurricane Andrew, and were 
being pressured to assume peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in the 
Balkans.  The 1993 FM 100-5 responded to this changed operational environment by 
devoting an entire chapter to “operations other than war” (OOTW) and by adding the new 
tenet of “versatility” to the other four tenets of ALB. 
FM 100-5 distinguished between peacetime (routine interactions between nations) 
and conflict (hostilities to secure strategic objectives) and war (the use of force in combat 
operations against an armed enemy).  The manual classified activities during both the 
peacetime and conflict environments as “operations other than war.”45  Whereas FM 7-
98’s “operational categories” for LIC had included only support for insurgency and 
counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime 
contingency operations, FM 100-5 broadened the list of OOTW “activities” to include 
non-combatant evacuation operations, arms control, support to domestic civil authorities, 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, security assistance, nation assistance, support 
to counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, peace 
enforcement, show of force, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and 
attacks and raids.46   
Military theorists had long sought a set of principles upon which to base the 
military art, and the authors of the new FM 100-5 continued this tradition.  Drawing on 
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the works of Carl von Clausewitz and Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini, British military 
officer J. F. C. Fuller had developed a list of principles for use by the British Army in 
World War I.  The US Army modified Fuller’s list and published its first list of the 
principles of war in 1921.47  The nine principles of war are objective, offensive, mass, 
economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. 
 While these principles of war remained relevant to all military operations, the 
unique nature of OOTW, particularly its political considerations, suggested to many that 
a refined list of principles of OOTW separate and distinct from the traditional principles 
of war would be useful.  Thus, the 1993 edition of FM 100-5 delineated six principles of 
OOTW: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.48   
The first three of these principles were derived from the generic principles of war, and the 
remaining three were OOTW specific.49  
Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, was published later in 1993 with 
OOTW information largely consistent with that found in FM 100-5.  The addition of 
OOTW in these documents and elsewhere was met with mixed reviews.  Some saw its 
inclusion as a serious dilution of the military’s warrior ethos.  Others saw it as mere 
lipservice—seeing in its unique principles and special considerations reinforcement that 
OOTW was other than what the army should be doing.50   The protest against this 
expanded military role was represented in articles such as David Tucker’s (1993) “Facing 
the Facts: The Failure of Nation Assistance” and Charles Dunlap’s (1992-1993) “The 
Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012,” which lamented the day “we allowed 
the armed forces to be diverted from their original purpose.”51 
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Nonetheless, the army rushed to publish supporting OOTW manuals including 
FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, in 1993 and FM 100-23, Peace Support 
Operations, in 1994.  FM 100-19 identified disaster assistance, environmental assistance, 
law enforcement support, and community assistance as the four primary categories of 
domestic support operations.52  It emphasized that the army would conduct these 
operations in a joint and interagency environment by highlighting the non-Department of 
Defense (DoD), DoD, state, and local government agencies that might be involved.53  It 
also devoted a chapter to legal considerations and constraints including the posse 
comitatus act.54   
FM 100-23, Peace Support Operations, was written to acknowledge an 
operational environment that saw six separate peace operations conducted by the United 
Nations in the former Yugoslavia in 1993.55   The manual addressed the full range of 
peace operations, including support to diplomacy (peacemaking, peace building, and 
preventive diplomacy), peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.56  However, it 
acknowledged that even these precise terms “must be viewed in a world beset with 
imprecise and ambiguous situations.” 57  In fact, the very breadth of this range of peace 
operations would be a serious challenge, and critical studies such as Peacekeeping 
Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and US Interests by Frederick Fleitz soon 
appeared to bemoan this expansion of traditional peacekeeping.58 
Operations other than war appeared in all manners of military literature in 
addition to army field manuals.  The Center for Army Lessons Learned began publishing 
several OOTW related newsletters such as “Counterdrug Operations” in September 1993.  
In 1994, the Infantry School published “The Application of Peace Enforcement 
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Operations at Brigade and Battalion White Paper.”  The January 1994 edition of Military 
Review was devoted to “FM 100-5 and Operations Other than War.”  Finally, after a 
lengthy two-phased evaluation of its 1990 test version, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published 
JP 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations for Military Operations Other than War, in 
1995.59  While LIC’s proponents saw this new attention as being long overdue, others 
lamented the growing “cottage industry of anguished essays and doctrinal food fights.”60 
Even the name OOTW itself was a lightning rod for controversy.  In an effort to 
make it a little more palatable to military traditionalists, the recently unveiled JP 3-07 
reflected the new practice of preceding “operations other than war” with the word 
“military.”  As a testimony to the degree to which all such matters were being 
scrutinized, only somewhat tongue-in-cheek debates soon erupted as to how the new 
“MOOTW” acronym would be pronounced.61  This small change did little to pacify 
OOTW’s detractors, and even though David Fastabend notes, “It was the Army that sold 
the joint community and our multinational partners on OOTW,” it was also the army that 
determined the phrase had become obsolete.62   In October 1995, the commander of 
TRADOC released a message declaring,  
The term “OOTW” has served us well to provide increased visibility for new 
types of operations over the past several years.  We have reached a point in our 
post-Cold War doctrinal development so we can speak with more precision about 
Army operations in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, peacemaking, and 
other specific missions.  Since “OOTW” has served its purpose, we should begin 
to retire the term, while maintaining and enlarging the vital lessons learned in 
specific areas.63 
 
The message also explained that there was no intent “to replace the term with 
another buzz word, or eliminate it outright.  Simply want to let Army use of it fade away 
over a period of several years.”64  Nonetheless, “the Army instinct for categorization was 
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irrepressible.”65  The 2001 revision of FM 100-5 retained the use of the term “MOOTW,” 
but the army had already begun a shift to labeling such activities as “stability operations 
and support operations.”66  The April 1998 CALL Newsletter, for example, was called 
“Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Stability and Support Operations (SASO).”  
When the army rewrote FM 100-20 as FM 3-07 in 2003, the new manual was called 
Stability Operations and Support Operations.  With the 2006 version of Joint Pub 3-0, 
Joint Operations, joint doctrine also discontinued its use of the phrase “military 
operations other than war.” 
The principles of OOTW also had come under scrutiny.  On the one hand, they 
were considered to offer nothing new.  One critic derided them as “little more than 
warmed-over LIC imperatives.”67  Others found them part of a larger threat that the army 
was not “training our soldiers to be warriors,” but was instead “training them to be 
dispensers of humanitarian aid.”68  Deeming the entire concept flawed, two Air Force 
critics declared, “MOOTW fails to provide the fundamental principles required in joint 
doctrine.”69   
In an apparent effort to remove some of the perceived inappropriate uniqueness of 
OOTW from the doctrine, when the army rewrote FM 100-5 as FM 3-0 in 2001, it 
eliminated any specific principles of OOTW.  Instead, the manual stated that “the nine 
[traditional] principles of war provide general guidance for conducting war and military 
operations other than war at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.”70  Likewise 
FM 3-07 reiterated that “as in all operations, the principles of war outlined in FM 3-0 
apply to stability operations and support operations,” adding the small caveat that “the 
situation determines their degree of applicability.”71  The result was that although 
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Fastabend argues that “many of the valuable ideas associated with the 1993 principles of 
operations other than war were salvaged as imperatives in the appropriate stability or 
support operations chapters,” they appear in FM 3-0 only amid a much broader and 
diluted discussion of “considerations.”72 
Methodology 
Joel Quirk argues that there must be a “close relationship between history, theory, 
and method.”73  Pursuant to this requirement, the methodology associated with this 
dissertation consists of four phases.  The first phase, consistent with Jomini’s claim that 
any theory of the art of war must be “founded upon military history,” is historical 
research of the eight case studies.74  Disciplined configurative case studies such as these 
can be used to explain a historically important case or can use a case to exemplify a 
theory for pedagogical purposes.75  This phase of the research accomplishes both of these 
purposes.   In the second phase, the case studies are analyzed using John Stuart Mill’s 
methods of agreement and difference to identify a preliminary model for a balanced 
application of the principles of OOTW that results in a successful operation.76  This 
exercise is of particular utility in noting various combinations of principles that may work 
in concert or serve a “context-setting” function that will be examined in the next phase.  
It also represents the beginning of a data base that can be used in future research of a 
larger-n study.  The data for each OOTW in the case study was captured in a table 
patterned after Table 1, below: 
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Table 1 
Adherence to Principles of OOTW during (name of case study) 
          Strong   General  Neutral         General lack  Strong lack 
        adherence  adherence          of adherence  of adherence  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
             
Legitimacy 
Objective 
Perseverance 
Restraint 
Security 
Unity of effort 
 
 
 
      
________________________________________________________________________ 
Once this process was completed for all case studies, the congruence method was 
used to make the initial conclusion that there is a consistency between adherence to the 
principles and the outcome.  A causal relationship, however, cannot be established on the 
mere basis of consistency.77  Furthermore, because FM 100-5 admonishes commanders to 
“balance these principles against the specific requirements of their mission and the nature 
of the operation” and notes that “the relative application of each principle will vary 
depending on the specific situation,” the model not unsurprisingly presents certain 
tradeoffs and compromises in adherence to the principles and in the operation’s degree of 
success.78  The result is what Charles Ragin calls a “fuzzy set,” a set whose relevant 
objects have varying degrees of membership in the set in contrast to the conventional 
“crisp set” whose objects are either “in” or “out.”79   Fuzzy set analysis is particularly 
useful in studies such as this one in which the goal of the testing is in part to examine 
necessary conditions within an existing theory rather than to generate a new theory.80  
Thus, in the third phase, Ragin’s data analytic strategy of qualitative comparative analysis 
(QCA) is applied to test the validity and coherence of the principles of OOTW and the 
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model.81  A similar methodology was successfully employed by Sean Edwards in his 
“Swarming and the Future of Warfare” dissertation written pursuant to the requirements 
of the doctoral degree in public policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School.82 
The eight case studies collectively serve as a theory testing case study, using the 
application of the principles of OOTW as the independent variable and successful or 
failed outcomes as the dependent variable.  Theory testing case studies are useful in 
identifying the scope of conditions under which the theory applies.83  Assessing these 
conditions can be facilitated by process-tracking to identify a causal path that depicts how 
the independent variable leads to the outcome of the dependent variable.84  Ragin asserts 
that the “principle that ‘context matters’ is central to the configurational approach to 
cases.”85  He cautions that “it would very hazardous to equate” two cases that have 
identically “high” or identically “low” scores “without looking at each score’s context.”86  
For example, two military units employed in an OOTW may both exercise great restraint.  
In the one case, the unit’s tremendous display of size, firepower, and strength convinced 
potential opposition to submit without resistance, allowing the unit to exercise restraint 
because force was unnecessary.  In the other case, the intervening force was so weak that 
it had no other option but to practice restraint, even in the face of violent opposition.  To 
treat the two cases the same would be faulty analysis.   
“Process tracking” helps reduce this danger and others inherent in drawing 
sweeping inferences from Mill’s methods.87  This process involves the close examination 
of the observable implications of alternative hypothesized explanations for a historical 
case.  It requires the researcher to continually ask, “If this explanation is accurate in this 
case, what else must be true about the process through which the hypothesized causal 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
mechanisms unfolded in this case?”88 
In this study, the intent of process tracking is accomplished by using Ragin’s 
necessary conditions test to determine which, if any, of the principles are context-setting 
for others.  Fuzzy set analysis makes it “possible to gauge the degree to which a 
necessary condition is present and to make this variation a key part of the analysis.”89  
Specifically, the test for necessary conditions and an analysis of the context-setting 
function allow examination of the doctrinal insistence on the “balanced-application” of 
the principles.  In fact, one of the benefits of QCA is that it allows the examination of 
“complex patterns of causation.”90  The context-setting variables can also be used in 
future research to test hypotheses involving them as interaction terms.91 
For my initial run, a fuzzy set was inputted based on the assessment of how well 
each case adhered to the particular principles.  Based on the assessment of which 
principles could be considered context-setting, a model of hierarchy was established that 
proceeded thusly: objective, perseverance, security, unity of effort, legitimacy, and 
restraint.  Another run was then performed that calibrated each principle as having its 
weighted value as its fully in value, .1 or .2 less than that as its “crossover” value, and .1 
or .2 less than that as its fully out value.  An “analysis of necessary conditions” was then 
run to test whether or not the model of which principles were context-setting was valid.   
Ultimately, this study enables a policy recommendation that supports the doctrinal 
usefulness of the principles and is highly relevant in the current operational environment.  
Operations other than war—now called support and stability operations—will remain the 
US military’s most common missions in the foreseeable future.  The current nation 
assistance operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are OOTWs.  The evacuation of US 
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citizens from and the bombing campaign against Libya are OOTWs.  The disaster relief 
support to Japan after the tsunami is an OOTW.  The raid to kill Osama bin Laden was an 
OOTW.  Clearly, the military has a vested interest in these operations, and because this 
study suggests the principles are reliable predictors of success, the army, as well as the 
joint services, should consider making the appropriate doctrinal revisions.   
The Principles of OOTW 
FM 100-5 acknowledged that “Army warfighting doctrine has long been based on 
well-established principles of war that have withstood the tests of time and experience 
and remain embedded in our doctrine.”  However, it argued that “operations other than 
war also have principles that guide our actions.”  Part of the rationale for a separate set of 
principles of OOTW appears to have been based on OOTWs involving combat and 
noncombat actions.  For OOTWs involving direct combat, the FM stated that the 
traditional principles of war applied.  The principles of objective and security were 
considered to apply equally to combat and noncombat operations.  The manual contended 
the traditional principle of war of unity of command required modification to unity of 
effort to meet the demands of OOTW.  Three other principles--perseverance, restraint, 
and legitimacy--were added as being “more suited to the noncombat operations that 
comprise most operations other than war.”92 
A brief explanation of each of the six principles of OOTW follows: 
Objective  
The principle of objective requires commanders to “direct every military 
operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.”  Commanders 
must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims 
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and objectives contribute to unity of effort.  Inherent in the principle of objective is the 
need to understand what constitutes mission success and what might cause the operation 
to be terminated before success is achieved.93   
 The importance of political considerations in OOTW is very apparent in the 
principle of objective.  In many cases, the political objectives upon which military 
objectives are based may not specifically address the desired military end state.  
Therefore, commanders must translate their political guidance into appropriate military 
objectives through a rigorous and continuous mission and threat analysis.  They should 
carefully explain to political authorities the implications of political decisions on 
capabilities and risk to military forces.   
Although defining mission success may be more difficult in OOTW, it is 
important to do so to keep US forces focused on a clear, attainable military objective. 
Specifying measures of effectiveness helps define mission accomplishment and phase 
transitions, but objectively assessing progress is problematic.  Still, event-based 
objectives are far superior to time-based ones.  
Measuring and achieving objectives is further compounded by a phenomenon 
known as mission creep or mission change.  Changes to initial military objectives may 
occur because political and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation or 
because the situation itself changes.  Commanders must remain aware of shifts in the 
political objectives, or in the situation itself, that necessitate a change in the military 
objective.  These changes may be very subtle, yet they still require adjustment of the 
military objectives.  If this adjustment is not made, the military objectives may no longer 
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support the political objectives, legitimacy may be undermined, and force security may 
be compromised.94 
Adherence to the principle of objective can be assessed by examining the 
following issues: 
1. To what degree is there a clearly articulated national security 
policy or strategy to which the operation contributes? 
2. If there is such a policy, what is the extent of its legitimacy? 
 
3. Upon what level of national interest is the operation based? 
 
4. To what degree is there a clearly articulated military mission 
that is consistent with military capabilities, definable, and 
measurable? 
5. To what degree is there a clearly articulated end state for the 
operation? 
6. To what extent are measures of effectiveness (MOEs) used to 
capture progress toward that end state? 
7. To what degree is progress toward the end state hampered by 
mission creep and/or mission change? 
Unity of Effort  
The OOTW principle of unity of effort is derived from the traditional principle of 
war, unity of command.  It emphasizes the need for ensuring all means are directed to a 
common purpose.  However, in OOTW, achieving unity of effort is often complicated by 
a variety of international, foreign, and domestic military and non-military participants, 
the lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the 
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objective.  This dynamic requires that commanders rely heavily on consensus building to 
achieve unity of effort.95 
Soldiers very familiar with the hierarchical nature of the military chain of 
command may be more challenged by the less formal relationship inherent in working 
with coalition partners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civilian agencies, other 
governmental agencies, and local authorities that permeates OOTW.  The emphasis in 
such an environment is on unity of effort through cooperation rather than command.96   
Strong interpersonal skills usually are required to achieve this principle. 
Adherence to the principle of unity of effort can be assessed by examining the 
following issues: 
1. What is the degree of interagency cooperation?  
2. What is the degree of joint cooperation? 
3. What is the degree of coalition cooperation? 
4. What is the degree of cooperation between the US and the host 
nation? 
5. To what degree is there a functioning, understandable, and 
clear chain of command? 
6. In the absence of a traditional hierarchical structure, to what 
degree are ad hoc mechanisms in place to facilitate cooperation 
among actors? 
7. To what degree do participants agree on the objective? 
8. To what degree to participants agree on the tactical and 
operational conduct of the operation? 
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Security   
The oftentimes nebulous, confusing, and changing nature of the threat makes 
security a particular challenge in OOTW.  This OOTW principle requires commanders to 
never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage.  
In many OOTWs, this advantage comes from external support to an insurgent group.  
Commanders must be vigilant against complacency and be ready to counter activity that 
could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation.  All personnel should stay alert 
even in a non-hostile operation with little or no perceived risk.  Inherent in this 
responsibility is the need to plan for and posture the necessary capability to quickly 
transition to combat should circumstances change.97  
Operations other than war also pose particular operational security requirements 
based on media coverage as well as the need to provide security for civilians or 
participating agencies and organizations. The perceived neutrality of these protected 
elements may be a factor in their security.  Protection of an NGO or Private Volunteer 
Organization (PVO) by US military forces may create the perception that the NGO or 
PVO is pro-US.  Therefore, an NGO or PVO may be reluctant to accept the US military’s 
protection.   
Adherence to the principle of security can be assessed by examining the following 
issues: 
1. To what degree are considerations of force size, quality, and 
composition designed to enhance security? 
2. To what degree are considerations of tactics and force 
employment designed to enhance security? 
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3. To what degree do the rules of engagement allow the use of 
force? 
4. To what degree and how are the rules of engagement and force 
configuration adjusted once the operation begins? 
5. What is the role of the US force? 
6. How many casualties are incurred and under what 
circumstances? 
Restraint  
Restraint requires military capability be applied prudently.  Especially in OOTW, 
a single act, even at the tactical level, can cause significant strategic military and political 
consequences.  Restraint is closely tied to other principles of OOTW.  It requires the 
careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political 
objective.  Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the 
legitimacy of the organization that uses it while possibly enhancing the legitimacy of the 
opposing party.98 
Because of the importance of restraint, rules of engagement (ROE) in OOTW are 
generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war. 
Restraint is best achieved when ROE issued at the beginning of an operation address 
most anticipated situations that may arise.  Rules of engagement should be consistently 
reviewed and revised as necessary.  Additionally, ROE should be carefully scrutinized to 
ensure that the lives and health of military personnel involved in OOTW are not 
needlessly endangered.  Even within the strictest ROE, the soldier’s inherent right to self-
defense must always be maintained.99  
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Adherence to the principle of restraint can be assessed by examining the 
following issues: 
1. To what degree are considerations of force size, quality, and 
composition designed to enhance restraint? 
2. To what degree are considerations of tactics and force 
employment designed to enhance restraint? 
3. To what degree do the rules of engagement allow the use of 
force? 
4. To what degree and how are the rules of engagement and force 
configuration adjusted once the operation begins? 
5. What is the role of the US force? 
6. How many casualties are inflicted and under what 
circumstances? 
7. What is the policy and practice for treating civilians? 
8. To what extent are there documented cases of human rights or 
civil liberties abuses, violations of the laws of land warfare, or 
soldier misconduct? 
Perseverance   
Perseverance means preparing for the measured, protracted application of military 
capability in support of strategic aims.  Some OOTWs may require years to achieve the 
desired results. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to 
achieve decisive resolution.  It is important to assess possible responses to a crisis in 
terms of each option’s impact on the achievement of the long-term political objective.  
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This assessment does not preclude decisive military action but frames that action within 
the larger context of strategic aims.100  
Often, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, 
for as long as necessary to achieve them, is a requirement for success. This strategy will 
often involve political, diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to supplement 
military efforts.101  
Adherence to the principle of perseverance can be assessed by examining the 
following issues: 
1. What is the length of the operation? 
2. How does the length of the operation correspond to the scope 
of the objective? 
3. How does the level of commitment react to negative events? 
4. Is the stated end state based on time or events? 
5. What is the level of popular domestic support for continuing 
the operation? 
6. What is the level of congressional support for continuing the 
operation? 
7. What is the level of executive support for continuing the 
operation? 
Legitimacy   
Forces committed in a OOTW must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of 
the host government, where applicable.  Participants must be especially sensitive because 
legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, 
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morality, or rightness of a set of actions.  This perception may be completely different 
than the actual intention of the action.  If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is 
a strong impulse to support the action.  If an operation is not perceived as legitimate, the 
actions may not be supported and may be actively resisted.102  
 Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international 
community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in dealing 
with various factions.  It may be reinforced by restraint in the use of force, the type of 
forces employed, and the disciplined conduct of the forces involved.   
Domestically, the perception of legitimacy by the US public is strengthened if 
there are obvious national or humanitarian interests at stake, and if there is assurance that 
American lives are not being needlessly or carelessly risked.  The loss of domestic 
support can demand the termination of an operation, even in spite of battlefield success. 
Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a government through 
the perception of the populace that it governs.  Because the populace perceives that the 
government has genuine authority to govern and uses proper agencies for valid purposes, 
they consider that government as legitimate.103  
Adherence to the principle of legitimacy can be assessed by examining the 
following issues: 
1. Upon what level of national interest is the operation based? 
2. To what degree is there an international mandate to conduct the 
operation? 
3. How does the media frame and present the operation? 
4. How does the US public perceive the operation? 
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5. Is the operation pursuant to a strategic objective about which 
there is strong consensus of support? 
6. To what degree is the operation conducted with the support of 
the host nation? 
7. Is the operation conducted unilaterally or as part of a coalition 
and why? 
8. To what degree are the public diplomacy, psychological 
operations, and information operations campaigns successful in 
depicting the operation in positive terms? 
9. To what extent is there unity of effort among the participants 
that builds legitimacy? 
10. To what extent is there restraint among the participants that 
builds legitimacy? 
OOTWs Used in this Case Study 
With the renewed emphasis on OOTW-type operations generated by America’s 
involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, an abundance of works have emerged 
that capitalize on the topic’s current relevance.  Many have drawn on historical case 
studies such as Max Boot’s (2002) The Savage Wars of Peace, which cautioned against 
America ignoring the lessons of its past experience with “small wars.”  John Nagl’s 
(2005) Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam enjoyed special popularity and influence as the army underwent its most recent 
effort to revise its counterinsurgency doctrine.  The army also mobilized its own assets to 
reexamine its history with the Center for Military History publishing US Army 
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Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976 in 2006 and The 
US Army and Irregular Warfare, 1775-2007 in 2007.  The Combat Studies Institute also 
embarked on a dedicated effort to publish the “Long War Operational Historical Studies” 
and “The Long War Occasional Papers” series, which included such titles as the 2004 
“Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War” and the 2006 “The US 
Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005.” 
Other studies, especially those generated by the US military’s senior service 
colleges, have used the principles of OOTW as an analytical tool to examine historical 
operations.  For example, in his Naval War College study of Operation Earnest Will, the 
1987-1988 tanker escort mission in the Persian Gulf, Michael Gurley connects the 
operation’s success with his conclusion that “the operational commander effectively 
applied each principle of MOOTW.”104  Other authors who have used the principles of 
OOTW as a basis of analysis of case studies include Bernardo Negrete in “Grenada, A 
Case Study in Military Operations Other Than War” (Army War College, 1996), John 
Cowan in “Operation Provide Comfort: Operational Analysis for Operations Other Than 
War” (Naval War College, 1995), and Richard Brasel in “Operation Joint Endeavor: 
Operational Guidance from the Principles of Operations Other Than War” (Naval War 
College, 1996).105   While these descriptive case studies illustrate the utility of the 
principles of OOTW to analyze a specific operation, they have not proceeded to then 
place the operation in the context of other OOTWs.  This singular focus limits their 
ability to assess the overall utility of the principles as a predictor of mission outcome.  
Instead, their intent is largely to use the principles merely as an analytical framework to 
explain the given operation.  Descriptive case studies such as these typically are 
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underdeveloped in assessing linkages between the data and the theory and the criteria for 
interpreting the findings.106 
This study attempts to go beyond this limited objective and determine if a 
correlation exists between adherence to the principles of OOTW and the operation’s 
outcome, and if there is any meaningful relation among the principles themselves.  It also 
examines the era between 1945 and 1999, a time period not focused on by other studies, 
but which encompasses the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War 
environment.  The sample for this study includes eight OOTWs, representing four 
successful (Greek Civil War, Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua/Honduras) 
and four failed (Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, and Haiti) operations.  Success or failure was 
determined based on the operation’s ability to achieve the immediate US objective.  In 
addition to a mix of successful and failed operations, selection criteria sought to represent 
the entire period.  Two case studies come from the  early Cold War period (Greek Civil 
War and Lebanon), two from the middle of the Cold War (Dominican Republic and 
Vietnam), two from the latter part of the Cold War (Beirut and Nicaragua/Honduras), one 
from the heady early days of the post-Cold War period (Somalia), and one from the more 
sober post-Somalia days (Haiti).  The final criteria for case selection was the availability 
of research materials and researcher expertise. 
Determining the exact number of overseas OOTWs in which the US was involved 
during this period is problematic.  Daniel Bolger records eighty-one such operations, but 
he includes each individual action within the same geographic area.  Therefore, for 
example, Somalia appears three separate times on Bolger’s list.  Bolger is also extremely 
inclusive, counting such incidents as the accidental Israeli attack on the USS Liberty in 
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1967.107  Another source that includes only the most highly visible operations arrives at a 
more conservative figure of fifteen OOTWs during the same time period. 108  Suffice it to 
say that the US was involved in between thirty and forty significant overseas OOTWs 
between 1945 and 1999, and this study examines eight, or approximately 23 percent.   
A brief introduction to each case study follows: 
Greek Civil War (1947-1949) 
In the chaos of World War II, a communist insurgency developed in Greece that 
threatened democracy there in the post-war era.  In response to the Truman Doctrine, the 
United States established the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group 
(JUSMAPG), a group of 350 advisors led by Lieutenant General James Van Fleet.  As a 
result of the efforts of the JUSMAPG and the Greek Army, the communist insurgency 
was defeated, and Greece remained democratic.  This OOTW will be considered a 
success in this case study. 
The Greek Civil War by Edgar O’Ballance (1966) remains the classic study of this 
OOTW.  The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1949 by C. M. Woodhouse (1976) is also highly 
regarded.  Both are largely political-military treatments, with Woodhouse’s work 
reflecting a strong British perspective.  “Without the Need of a Single American 
Rifleman: James Van Fleet and His Lessons Learned as Commander of the Joint United 
States Military Planning and Advisory Group During the Greek Civil War, 1948-1949” 
by Robert Mages (2008) highlights the American contribution. 
Lebanon (1958).   
In 1958, Lebanon was plagued by an internal crisis resulting from its factionalized 
society and from superpower regional competition.  The pro-Western government of 
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President Camille Chamoun was threatened and requested US assistance under the 
Eisenhower Doctrine.  The US responded with a deployment of some 14,000 army troops 
and marines.  This massive show of force quelled the unrest, and this OOTW will be 
considered a success in this case study. 
“Not War But Like War”: The American Intervention in Lebanon by Roger 
Spiller (1981) is an excellent overview, particularly of army operations.   The US 
Intervention in Lebanon, 1958: A Commander’s Reminiscence by David Gray (1984), 
commander of the army contingent, provides a first-hand army perspective.  For the 
marine experience, Jack Shulimson’s (1966) Marines in Lebanon, 1958 is excellent.  
Diplomat Among Warriors by Robert Murphy (1964) provides a brief firsthand account 
of the diplomatic effort, but a comprehensive treatment of this important aspect of the 
intervention remains unwritten. 
Dominican Republic (1965-1966) 
On September 25, 1963, a coup deposed democratically elected Juan Bosch 
Gavino, president of the Dominican Republic, and replaced him with a civilian junta 
known as the Triumvirate, which came to be led by Donald Reid Cabral.  Dissatisfaction 
with Reid and lingering loyalties to Bosch plunged the Dominican Republic into 
revolution in April 1965.  The US intervened with a force of over 40,000 army troops and 
marines to safeguard American lives and prevent the Dominican Republic from 
becoming communist.  In 1966, former President Joaquin Balaguer, with the support of 
the US government, was elected president, and the Dominican Republic entered a period 
of relative stability.  This OOTW will be considered a success in this study. 
Although Power Pack: US Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966 by 
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Lawrence Yates (1988) is a US Army publication, it provides an in-depth treatment of 
political as well as military subjects.  It strongly emphasizes the important role played by 
Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, whose own Intervention in the Caribbean: The 
Dominican Crisis of 1965 (1989) is a very balanced and well-written memoir.  Details 
from the army operational perspective are covered in depth in United States Army 
Unilateral and Coalition Operations in the 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention by 
Lawrence Greenberg (1987).  “The Dominican Republic: Intervention in Perspective” by 
John Costa (1968) is an excellent firsthand tactical army perspective.  The marine 
experience has been less-widely reported, but is covered by US Marine Corps Operations 
in the Dominican Republic, April-June 1965 by Jack Ringler (1970).  The Dominican 
Intervention by Abraham Lowenthal (1972) and Intervention and Negotiation: The 
United States and the Dominican Republic by Jerome Slater (1970) focus more on the 
political situation, but both are well balanced in their treatment of all aspects of the 
operation. 
Vietnam (1967-1973) 
Although, the US formally had ground combat troop involvement in Vietnam 
from 1965 to 1973, this study will focus on the American pacification efforts in Vietnam.  
Accordingly, it will emphasize the period beginning in 1967 when the Civil Operations 
and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) was established in an effort to 
coordinate all pacification efforts.  Pacification was viewed by many as a secondary 
effort that drew resources away from the “big war.”  It never was able to achieve its 
objectives of strengthening peasant support for the South Vietnamese government and 
seriously weakening the Viet Cong infrastructure.  The US withdrew from Vietnam in 
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1973, and North Vietnam ultimately defeated South Vietnam in 1975.   This OOTW will 
be considered a failure in this study. 
The definitive study of CORDS and the pacification effort is Thomas Scoville’s 
(1982) Reorganizing for Pacification Support.  Robert Komer’s (1970) “Clear, Hold, and 
Rebuild” and “Pacification: A Look Back… And Ahead” are excellent perspectives from 
the architect of CORDS.  Among the numerous personal accounts from advisors 
associated with the pacification, More Than a Soldier’s War by Edward Metzner (1995) 
is one of the more scholarly.  A plethora of authors have studied CORDS in search of 
lessons to be learned in ongoing pacification efforts.  “CORDS/Phoenix: 
Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future” by Dale Andrade and James 
Wilbanks (2006) and “Revisiting CORDS: The Need for Unity of Effort to Secure 
Victory in Iraq” by Ross Coffey (2006) are good examples.  One of the more promising 
pacification initiatives was the Marine Corps’ Combined Action Program, and “A Feather 
in Their Cap? The Marines’ Combined Action Program in Vietnam” by Lawrence Yates 
(1991) provides a good overview and assessment of this effort. 
Honduras and Nicaragua (1980-1990)  
In 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation Front overthrew pro-US President 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle and initiated a leftist regime in Nicaragua with close ties to 
Cuba.  Prohibited from direct combat action by a strong public sentiment to not enter into 
“another Vietnam,” President Ronald Reagan executed a prolonged indirect campaign to 
strengthen Honduras and eliminate the communist threat in Nicaragua.  The sustained 
pressure eventually persuaded the Sandinistas to agree to a cease fire, and President 
Daniel Ortega was forced to liberalize his government.  He consented to hold a 
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presidential election on February 25, 1990, and was defeated by Violeta Chamorro.  
Although Ortega was elected President again in 2006, this OOTW will be considered a 
success in this study because it thwarted the threat of Nicaraguan-supported communist 
expansion in Central America during the 1980s. 
Roy Gutman’s (1988) Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in 
Nicaragua, 1981-1987 is a reliable source, especially concerning the military’s indirect 
role in the effort.  Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention by Peter Kornbluh (1987) and 
Washington’s War on Nicaragua by Holly Sklar (1988) focus more on the political 
aspect and are often critical of the Reagan administration’s policies.  “Exercise Golden 
Pheasant” by Ned Ennis (1989) is a detailed account of one example of the military’s 
contribution to pressuring Ortega. 
Beirut (1982-1983) 
On September 29, 1982, the 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) arrived in 
Beirut, Lebanon as part of a multinational peacekeeping force.  The initial contingent 
received a warm welcome, but subsequent MAU’s became caught up in the regional 
geopolitical rivalries and lost their perception of neutrality and legitimacy with segments 
of the local population.  Pursuing a nebulous objective to “establish a presence,” the 
adjustments made to the marines’ mission, location, rules of engagement, force protection 
measures, and security posture were inadequate in light of the changing situation and 
made the Americans a vulnerable target.  On October 23, 1983, 241 US servicemen died 
in a terrorist attack on the marines’ headquarters and barracks.  This OOTW will be 
considered a failure in this study. 
The US government conducted two investigations of the Beirut bombing: the 
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House Armed Services Committee’s Review of the Adequacy of Security Arrangements 
for Marines in Lebanon (1983) and the Report of the Department of Defense Commission 
on the Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 (1984).  Both reports 
provide critical assessments of the actions of the chain of command.  Robert Jordan’s 
(1984) “They Came in Peace” offers a personal account of the marine experience.  Eric 
Hammel’s (1985) The Root: The Marines in Lebanon, August 1982-February 1984 is an 
extremely useful source of information about the marine peacekeeping routine in 
Lebanon as well as the bombing. 
Somalia (1992-1995) 
Ethnic violence, drought, and famine created a humanitarian crisis in Somalia, 
and in December 1992 the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 794, 
which established Unified Task Force (UNITAF), a large, US-led peace enforcement 
operation.  UNITAF generally avoided provocative actions with the rival Somali 
warlords and succeeded in ending the humanitarian crisis.  In mid-February 1993, US 
Army forces began withdrawing, and on May 4, UNOSOM II took over operations from 
UNITAF.  UNOSOM II attempted to take on a more ambitious mandate than UNITAF, 
despite having fewer and lower quality troops.   In October 1993, a failed US effort to 
capture warlord Mohammed Farrah Hassan Aideed ended in eighteen American deaths.  
The fiasco led to the Clinton administration’s decision to withdraw US troops by March 
1994.  The US withdrawal compelled the UN to terminate UNOSOM II and withdraw all 
peacekeepers by March 1995.  Somalia quickly returned to the chaotic state it had been in 
during mid-1992, and this OOTW will be considered a failure in this study. 
“My Clan Against the World”: US and Coalition Forces in Somalia, 1992-1994 
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by Robert Baumann and Lawrence Yates (2004) is a very readable and complete 
explanation of the evolution of the international intervention in Somali.  Kenneth Allard’s 
(1995) Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned uses the military’s Joint Universal Lessons 
Learned system to analyze the operation in terms of tactics, techniques, procedures, 
battlefield operating systems, and doctrine.  Mark Bowden’s (1999) Black Hawk Down is 
unmatched in depicting the chaos of the pivotal Battle of Mogadishu and the bravery of 
the soldiers who fought it. 
Haiti (1993) 
On September 30, 1991, a military coup ousted Jean-Betrand Aristide, Haiti’s first 
democratically elected president, and replaced him with Lieutenant General Raoul 
Cedras.  Thousands of Haitians, seeking relief from Cedras’s repressive regime as well as 
greater economic opportunity, fled in rickety boats seeking asylum in the United States.  
The United States began developing plans for either a forcible invasion to defeat the 
Haitian army or a deployment into a more permissive environment based on negotiations.  
As a result of the flawed Governor’s Island Accord of July 3, 1993, a joint task force was 
deployed to Haiti to help facilitate a peaceful transfer of power from Cedras back to 
Aristide.  On October 11 an unruly mob at Port-au-Prince prevented the USS Harlan 
County from unloading United Nations troops intended to retrain the Haitian Army and 
police.  Unprepared to enter a non-permissive environment, the Harlan County withdrew, 
and the mission was abandoned.  Although in October 1994, Cedras finally agreed to 
allow Aristide to return rather than face an imminent invasion, this study focuses on the 
Harlan County incident, which will be considered a failure. 
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Peter Riehm’s (1997) “The USS Harlan County Affair” is a concise, easy to read, 
and indispensable account of this event.  Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”: A 
Concise History of the US Army in Operation Uphold Democracy by Walter Kretchik, 
Robert Baumann, and John Fishel (1997) is a comprehensive account of the US 
involvement in Haiti.  “JTF Haiti: A United Nations Foreign Internal Defense Mission,” 
by James Pulley, Stephen Epstein, and Robert Cronin (1994) provides the prospective of 
the joint task force commander.   
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CHAPTER II
THE GREEK CIVIL WAR: A PRETTY GOOD BALANCE 
With the end of World War II, erstwhile allies the United States and the Soviet 
Union entered a Cold War in which both competed to expand their influence.  Greece 
proved to be the first battleground in this new era, and the Truman Doctrine articulated 
the US interests there.  Pursuant to these national security objectives, on February 7, 
1948, Lieutenant General James Van Fleet was appointed commander of the Joint United 
States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) and sent to Greece to help the 
Greek government battle a growing communist insurgency.  This intervention highlights 
the OOTW principle of security because of the necessity of isolating the insurgents from 
their external bases of support.  It also demonstrates the effective application of the 
principles of objective, unity of effort, and perseverance, as well as the satisfactory 
application of legitimacy and restraint.  As a result of this OOTW, the US accomplished 
its objective of securing Greece from the communist threat. 
Background 
The aftermath of World War II left Greece and many other European countries 
destitute and ideologically confused.  The three and a half years of German occupation of 
Greece were ones of despair, collaboration, inflation, hunger, and oppression.  In the 
process, the population suffered social, economic, and political disintegration.  It was a 
situation that left Greece very vulnerable to the spread of communism.1 This problem was 
exacerbated by the inadequate size of the 26,500-man British liberation force and 
Greece’s proximity to countries that had fallen into the Soviet satellite system.  The small 
size of the British force meant that it could physically station soldiers only in Athens, 
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Piraeus, and a handful of other cities and communications centers to “show the flag.”  
Otherwise, the country remained under the control of existing guerrilla armies.2  The key 
communist organization that had developed during the German occupation was the EAM 
or National Liberation Front.  The military arm of the EAM was the ELAS or National 
People’s Liberation Army.  As the Germans withdrew, ELAS had seized large quantities 
of arms and ammunition that were left behind.3 
The ELAS benefited greatly from the Red Army’s presence and Soviet influence 
around Greece.  On the Albanian border, ELAS made contact with Albanian Communist 
Party resistance leader Enver Hoxha’s guerrillas.  In exchange for ELAS handing over 
some Albanian war criminals, a unit of Albanian guerrillas was placed under ELAS 
command.  On the Yugoslav frontier, the ELAS moved forward into the old frontier posts 
and buildings wherever it could.  To the east, four divisions of the ELAS northern corps 
moved into Thrace and Macedonia when the Bulgarian Army departed.  Edgar 
O’Ballance notes that with these developments, “ELAS was in effective control of the 
greater part of northern Greece.”4 
At the time of liberation, ELAS strength was roughly 50,000 armed fighters.  The 
communists quickly noted the inadequate size of the British liberation force and were 
successful in seizing physical possession of practically the entire countryside of 
continental Greece.  The British were only able to control those cities where they could 
physically station troops.5 
With this upper hand, the KKE, or Communist Party of Greece, decided that the 
time to strike for power had come, and it switched its strategy from one of infiltration and 
political intrigue to one of force.  A massive EAM demonstration against the government 
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was called for in Athens to be followed by a general strike.  The demonstration took 
place on December 2, 1944, and two days later, ELAS and British troops were involved 
in shooting clashes in the streets of Athens.  The British were woefully outnumbered, and 
within weeks they became isolated in the center of Athens.6 
 The desperate situation required Britain to send reinforcements, and, with the 
influx of this additional strength, conditions stabilized.  By the arrival of the new year in 
1945, the tide had turned in the British favor in Athens and Piraeus.  The guerrillas’ 
military setback was followed by a political one as two prominent socialist leaders in the 
EAM broke away from the coalition and formed their own parties.7 
Thus weakened, the EAM was in a poor bargaining position when it met with 
British delegates in Varkiza on February 2.  The Varkiza Agreement of February 12 
included a provision to completely demobilize and disarm the ELAS.  The main body of 
the ELAS was peacefully disarmed and disbanded, but thousands of ex-ELAS extremists 
escaped across the border into Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria.  These embittered ex-
ELAS leaders were the inspiration for and the nucleus of the DAS or Democratic 
People’s Army which came into being as the result of a Politburo-level meeting in 
Bulgaria in December 1945.  At this meeting, members of the Central Committee of the 
KKE and representatives of the Yugoslav and Bulgarian general staffs agreed to 
reorganize an insurgent army to fight the Greek government.8 
Initial actions centered in the north, especially in Macedonia and Thrace, where 
the rugged mountains favored guerrilla tactics.  The communist forces, which never 
surpassed 28,000, were overwhelmingly outnumbered by the 265,000 troops of the Greek 
National Army (GNA) and Gendarmerie, or national police force.  To partially offset this 
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numerical inferiority, the DAS received substantial military aid and advice from 
Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria.  With this assistance, the guerrillas had an advantage 
in morale, tactics, terrain, and, to some extent, talent.  They also benefited from the GNA 
pursuit of a static defensive strategy, which was inappropriate against a guerrilla enemy, 
and the often ineffective GNA leadership.  Within seven months, the DAS claimed to 
dominate three-fourths of Greece, and the GNA was left in disarray.9 
 To achieve this string of victories, the guerrillas had made full use of their cross-
border sanctuaries.  They would often attack the Greek Army and then flee to Yugoslavia 
or Albania, while the GNA would dutifully halt their pursuit at the border.  The guerrillas 
would then reappear only after the army had evacuated the area.  In an even more 
dastardly exploitation of their sanctuaries, the guerrillas abducted as many as 30,000 
Greek children in order to force villagers to follow them as they retreated across the 
frontier.10 
The problem was clearly beyond the resources of Britain, which was suffering 
from its own post-war economic shortages.  On February 21, 1947, the British informed 
the US that they were pulling out of Greece, and on March 3 the Greek government 
formally requested US aid.  On March 12, President Harry Truman announced the 
Truman Doctrine, which stated that “it must be the policy of the United States to support 
free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures.”  On May 22, Truman signed a bill authorizing $400 million in aid to Greece 
and Turkey.  Additional authorizations followed, and by 1952, Greek forces had received 
$500 million in US aid.11  The Greek insurgency had also been defeated. 
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Analysis of the Principles 
Objective 
The principle of objective is applicable at the strategic, operational, and tactical 
levels of war.  At the strategic level, military activities are planned to support national 
security objectives--in this case, the containment of communism as articulated by the 
Truman Doctrine.   The American interest in Greece was understood to be vital.  
Secretary of State George Marshall explained, “The crisis has a direct and intimate 
relation to the security of the United States.… If Greece should dissolve into civil war it 
is altogether probable that it would emerge a communist state under Soviet control.”  
After explaining the effect of this outcome on neighboring countries, Marshall concluded, 
“It is not alarmist to say that we are faced with the first crisis of a series which might 
extend Soviet domination to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.”12  
However, in spite of the urgency of the situation in Greece, the Truman 
administration was committed to securing this objective without committing US combat 
troops.  In fact, one poll showed that only 25% of Americans favored dispatching troops 
to Greece, even “if it appeared that Russia might get control” of Greece.13  An American 
invasion of Greece was never considered a viable option. 
Because accomplishment of the US strategic objective was so influenced by the 
principle of restraint, Van Fleet’s tactical objective was to train and reorganize the Greek 
Army to be an effective fighting force.  Realizing that no significant progress could be 
made until this transformation was accomplished, Van Fleet made it his first objective to 
correct what C. M. Woodhouse, the British Army officer who had served as the 
commander of the Allied Military Mission to the Greek Resistance, described as a 
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situation characterized by a mixture of “defeatism and complacency.”14  The British had 
incorrectly assumed a long period of peaceful transition in which most security problems 
could be handled by the police.  Van Fleet would have to reverse what Woodhouse 
assessed as the resulting “half-hearted and misdirected” British training effort.15   In the 
process, however, Van Fleet had to be extremely sensitive to the principle of legitimacy 
in order to avoid charges that the US was merely using the Greeks to fight for US 
interests.  Once the Greek Army had been improved, Van Fleet could turn his attention to 
his operational objective of isolating the communists from their external support across 
the border.  Van Fleet had astutely identified this capability as the communist center of 
gravity, and success in eliminating this situation would lead to ultimate victory. 
Restraint 
The US adopted a pragmatic approach to the principle of restraint in Greece.  The 
decision to dispatch just 350 advisors rather than a large combat force was an obvious 
reflection of restraint.  Robert Mages boasts that JUSMAPG accomplished its mission 
“without the need of a single American rifleman.”16  It should be noted, though, that as 
the civil war proceeded, American advisors found themselves increasingly active and 
were often on the front lines.  Van Fleet himself was twice lost in enemy territory, and an 
American pilot flying a reconnaissance mission was shot down and killed.17  Still the US 
made a conscious decision not to commit sizeable numbers of ground troops to Greece. 
One reason for this restraint was the fear that the Soviets would feel compelled to match 
any large US presence, with the end result being “a big war.”18   In fact, the initial US 
response was so restrained as to be ineffective.  Major General William Livesay, the first 
JUSMAPG commander, was not allowed to even provide operational advice to the Greek 
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Army.  The US effort became a largely logistical one, causing Queen Frederica to 
complain to Secretary of State Marshall that Greece needed a “fighting general” rather 
than a “supply sergeant.”19 
On other matters, the US showed less adherence to restraint, such as its toleration 
of aggressive Greek population control measures.  Before the US arrival, Greek officials 
had begun effective but harsh tactics to separate the guerrillas from the people.  
Government-backed paramilitary organizations had alternately protected and terrorized 
the population to isolate it as a source of aid to the communists.  Communist supporters 
were arrested by the thousands, and some were executed while others were sent to remote 
internment camps, often without trials.  In areas of particular insurgent activity, entire 
populations were forcibly evacuated to eliminate the communists’ base of support.20 
The application of the principles of OOTW must be properly balanced, and in 
some cases trade-offs must exist among the principles.  Many Greek military officials 
were willing to make some sacrifices regarding restraint in order to enhance security.  
After the watershed battle of Konista, which ended in a hard-fought government victory 
on January 4, 1948, there was a “moment of awakening” that resulted in “a total 
mobilization of resources.”  Men who thus far had evaded military service were 
conscripted, and communists were ruthlessly hunted down.  Some fifty were executed in 
February alone.21  By November, the Greek representative at the United Nations 
acknowledged that some 1,500 executions had occurred in the past two years.22 
A good example of these strict measures is Operation Pigeon, which was initiated 
on December 19, 1948, to help curb the growing guerrilla presence in the Peloponnese.  
During the operation, the Greek corps commander “made his most decisive move” in 
47 
 
 
 
 
ordering the arrest of some 4,500 suspected communist collaborators in the area.  While 
the move showed little in the way of restraint, it had immediate positive effects on 
security.  Freed from fears of guerrilla reprisals, the loyal local population began 
providing information to the Greek armed forces.  Likewise, the arrests deprived the 
communist forces of their principal source of supplies and logistics.23 
During the American Revolution, British officials believed that a similar 
circumstance existed in the Southern Theater.  They assumed that a sizeable loyal Tory 
population was being intimidated by a small oppressive group of rebels, and if those 
rebels could be suppressed, the loyalists would publicly support the Crown, and 
pacification would accelerate.  James Simpson reported to the British commander, “I am 
of the opinion whenever the King’s Troops move to Carolina they will be assisted by 
very considerable numbers of the inhabitants…. If the terror [the rebels] have excited was 
once removed, a few months would restore this country to its former good government.”   
However, Simpson cautioned, “Unless the government was to be so firmly established as 
to give security to them without protection of the Army…the success would be far from 
complete.  And if upon a future emergency, the Troops were withdrawn…they should 
suffer.”24   
After some initial success, the British commander Lieutenant General Henry 
Clinton failed to heed Simpson’s advice about maintaining a continued troop presence 
and departed South Carolina on June 5, 1780, returning to New York and taking about 
one-third of his force with him.  He left Lieutenant General Charles Cornwallis behind 
with about 8,000 troops; far too few to control the large area.25  To make matters worse, 
British excesses, such as those of Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton at the May 29, 
48 
 
 
 
 
1780 Battle of Waxhaws, alienated the local population and violated the principle of 
restraint.  As a consequence, the insurgency grew rather than declined. 
The Greeks and US avoided these pitfalls in obtaining an effective balance 
between security and restraint.  Like the British in the American Revolution, the Greeks 
suffered from a paucity of forces, but they solved the problem by conducting Operation 
Pigeon in two sequential phases, clearing the Peloponnese region systematically from 
north to south in a deliberately slow and methodical manner.  Furthermore, the Greeks 
resisted the temptation to divert units away from the Peloponnese to other areas such as 
Karpenissi in central Greece.26 
Nonetheless, these efforts to improve security entailed some lack of restraint.  
Frank Abbott notes, “The mass arrests preceding the Peloponnese operation were 
certainly not in the best traditions of a democratic society.  The arrests, however, were 
necessary for the people’s sense of security, and thus necessary for the success of the 
operation.”27  The Greek people apparently were willing to accept the Greek 
government’s taking some liberties with restraint in order to provide security, thus 
allowing the government to “reassert its control over the principal instruments of state.”28 
As far as the Americans were concerned, they were able to reap the benefits of 
this enhanced security at the expense of restraint without the loss of legitimacy that the 
British had suffered from the atrocities committed by Tarleton.  Because the Americans 
practiced restraint in not involving their own troops in combat operations, they did not 
become the target of backlash that the British did.  Instead, the US enjoyed the best of 
both worlds, officially protesting the use of terror, mass arrests, and population 
relocation, but in many ways condoning the actions in the belief that drastic situations 
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required drastic measures.  Secretary of State Marshall, for example, felt “that stern and 
determined measures, although of course not excesses, may be necessary to effect the 
termination of the activities of the guerrillas and their supporters as speedily as 
possible.”29   Major General Stephen Chamberlin, whom the Pentagon had detailed to 
study the situation in Greece, believed that the “ruthless removal or destruction of food 
and shelter in the mountain villages would compel all but insignificant guerrilla forces to 
either retire to the frontiers or accept combat in the valleys and plains under adverse 
conditions.”30  Van Fleet was of the opinion that “the only good communist is a dead 
one,” and he approved of mass arrests and population relocations.31  The US restrained 
itself by limiting the size and function of JUSMAPG and was able to disassociate itself 
from the less restrained actions of the Greek Army while still benefiting from the 
increased security.  It was a delicate balance that had eluded the British when they were 
battling the American insurgency. 
Legitimacy 
  The legitimacy of the US intervention in Greece benefited from the presence of 
the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), the first attempt by 
the UN to deploy an observation mission in the midst of an armed conflict.  For the US, 
the UNSCOB was “a valuable opportunity to expose communist subversion and provide 
political support for the recently communicated Truman Doctrine.”32  Indeed in his 
March 12, 1947 message, President Truman attempted to give legitimacy to his policy by 
saying, “A Commission appointed by the United Nations Security Council is at present 
investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece, and alleged border violations along 
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the frontier between Greece on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on 
the other.”33 
 Throughout its existence, the UNSCOB was the source of controversy between 
the democratic and communist UN members.   The original proposal to establish an 
investigative commission to look into the violence along the Greek-Albanian border was 
vetoed by the USSR in August 1946.  Then in December, Greece brought the complaint 
before the Security Council, and the US repeated the earlier proposal.  For reasons that 
remain unclear, this time the USSR acquiesced to the commission.  C. E. Black 
speculated that Soviet acceptance “may have been regarded as a necessary concession to 
public opinion.”34  In spite of this acquiescence, the USSR proceeded to repeatedly veto 
resolutions based on the commission’s findings of Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian 
support to the Greek guerrillas. 
 In the ongoing diplomatic battle, the US was able to move the matter from the 
Security Council to the General Assembly to avoid a Soviet veto, and on October 21, 
1947, the UN created the eleven-member UNSCOB.   The organization’s legitimacy 
remained an issue as two of the nations appointed to the body, Poland and the USSR, 
refused to participate, and it was plagued by a lack of cooperation from the neighboring 
communist governments, which refused to allow it to operate in their territories.  
Nonetheless,  
UNSCOB observers demonstrated conclusively that Yugoslavia, Albania, and 
Bulgaria not only provided the Greek guerrillas with arms, ammunition, food, and 
other equipment and supplies, but that they also opened their borders to the 
guerrillas and permitted the [DAS] to conduct tactical maneuvers and even to 
support their operations by fire from positions located inside their territory.35   
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Such testimonies from a neutral international body served to validate the legitimacy of 
the American support for Greece in the face of external aggression.  The UNSCOB 
functioned until December 7, 1951, when it was dissolved by the General Assembly and 
replaced on January 23, 1952, by a Balkan Sub-Commission of the standing Peace 
Observation Commission.36 
While the UNSCOB helped the US establish its international legitimacy, the latter 
also had to contend with legitimacy within Greece itself.  In any civil war, the legitimacy 
of the government is being challenged by a rival internal group, and any assistance to the 
government that undermines its legitimacy, strengthens the rival’s challenge to that 
legitimacy.  The US had to be careful, as it extended assistance, that it did not give the 
impression that Greece was merely a means to a larger American Cold War national 
security end.   This potential threat to legitimacy was expressed by a Greek lieutenant 
who said, “This war in Greece is a battle between the United States and Russia.  It 
happens that it’s being fought here.  That’s our bad luck.”37 
Such opinions notwithstanding, from the very outset, the US had a measure of 
legitimacy because its involvement came at the behest of the Greek government.  Once 
Britain notified Greece that it could not provide the level of support the situation 
required, the Greek government formally asked American Ambassador Lincoln 
MacVeagh for US support in March 1947.  It was a delicate transition as the Greeks had 
become “accustomed to the British” and now faced the prospect of “an uncertain 
quantity” in the Americans.38  Dwight Griswold, chief of the American Mission for Aid 
to Greece, assured Greece that, although the US would be extending operational advice, 
American officers would “not be taking command” of Greek forces and that the 
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American intent was to assist the Greeks “so that they can pick up the job and do it 
themselves.”39   Still, Woodhouse believed that, relative to the British, the Americans 
were “more inflexible, less adaptable, less willing to make allowances, more inclined to 
impose American methods regardless of national characteristics.”40  These tendencies 
would be a constant threat to legitimacy. 
Realizing this situation, Griswold always considered legitimacy to be critical.  He 
had the delicate task of making discreet recommendations to the Greek government while 
giving the outward impression that the Greeks themselves were the source of any policy 
reforms.  Griswold had to be especially subtle concerning personnel actions.  He would 
put quiet pressure on the Greeks to remove uncooperative and incompetent senior 
officials, but he had to avoid the public perception that he was subsuming Greek 
authority.41 
When JUSMAPG was established on December 31, it was given the mission “to 
assist the Greek Armed Forces in achieving internal security in Greece at the earliest 
possible date.”42  The clear emphasis was on the US effort supporting the Greek effort, 
rather than the US assuming authority and responsibility for the situation.  Forrest Pogue 
noted that “Van Fleet could observe and give advice, but he had no authority to 
command.”43 
Thus, Van Fleet recognized from the very beginning that the war had to be waged 
in such a way that victory would come from the efforts of the Greeks themselves.  He 
facilitated the legitimacy of the Greek government in the eyes of its people by arguing 
that civil affairs programs had to be included in the anti-guerrilla effort.  Even more 
specifically, he refused to build the Greek Army to be a miniature American Army, 
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instead maintaining the character of the indigenous force while at the same time being 
sensitive to its inherent capabilities and limitations.44 
Van Fleet’s emphasis on civil affairs reflected a recognition of the importance of 
“winning the hearts and minds” of the Greek people.  He believed it was critical that the 
Greek government “generate a furious love of freedom, a high morale among the 
civilians on the home front as well as within the armed forces…at the front.”45  Van 
Fleet’s assessment was consistent with a joint British/US report from November 1947 
that concluded “greater attention must be paid to the rapid rehabilitation of liberated 
areas, so that the people in these areas feel that the government has their well-being at 
heart.”46  Consequently, JUSMAPG recommended that once the Greek Army cleared an 
area of guerrillas, a robust civil affairs program follow to bring economic and social 
assistance to the area.  With US aid, the Greek government initiated a series of public 
works projects that provided employment and assistance to refugees.  While the programs 
sometimes lacked the necessary scope and coordination to truly transform the Greek 
countryside, they did serve as a visible sign to the people that the government was acting 
on their behalf.47 
In his care to create a Greek Army suitable for the specific conditions in Greece 
rather than modeling it after the US Army, Van Fleet avoided a mistake made later by US 
advisors in Vietnam.  There, Lieutenant General John O’Daniel, the first chief of the 
American advisory effort, insisted on a US-style organization in order to facilitate 
American logistical support.  The result was “a nifty miniature copy of the US military 
establishment.”48  This early emphasis on “Americanization” did not prove beneficial to 
the later requirement for “Vietnamization” and illustrated the dangers of assuming that 
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what worked for the United States would also work for the nation the United States was 
assisting.   A RAND Note entitled “Countering Covert Aggression” would indicate that 
this was not an isolated problem.  The report cited general assistance shortcomings such 
as  
the US propensity to shape Third World forces too closely in the 
image of US forces, which have not been designed for 
counterinsurgency warfare; to provide Third World forces with 
high-technology weapons and equipment that are too costly for and 
ill-suited to local capabilities and likely battlefield requirements; 
and to make Third World a situation that could seriously impair 
local capabilities in the event of US aid cutbacks.49 
 
Instead, in Greece, the US provided mortars, machine guns, and pack artillery, 
which were suitable for mountainous operations, rather than tanks and heavy artillery, 
which would be of only limited utility.  Van Fleet eschewed technology for its own sake 
and took such measures as reducing the number of motorized vehicles assigned to 
infantry battalions in order to prevent combat units from being road-bound.  To facilitate 
the type of mobility needed in the particular environment of Greece, he equipped seven 
horse cavalry squadrons.  In fact, the US Army gave its Greek counterpart more mules 
than trucks.50  Such actions indicate Van Fleet’s careful adherence to the principle of 
legitimacy while assisting the Greek Army. 
Unity of Effort 
For some observers, the open-ended nature of the Truman Doctrine’s commitment 
to Greece posed a threat to unity of effort.  Shortly after replacing MacVeagh as US 
Ambassador to Greece, Henry Grady noticed an assumption among the Greeks that they 
could “expect to live indefinitely on American bounty.”  When asked if he thought the 
Greeks were “holding back” in their war efforts “in order to get more dollars from the 
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US,” Grady tellingly replied, “No comment.”51  Woodhouse explained the Greek 
perspective as being that the need for resources and capabilities was so great, “the Greeks 
were tempted to meet them by demanding more aid from the USA, and by resigning the 
management of their affairs into American hands.”52 
Many Americans saw a similar situation in Iraq in 2007.  As the Senate prepared 
to vote on a withdrawal timeline, Senator Ted Kennedy argued not only that the US 
military “should not police Iraq’s civil war indefinitely,” but also that a deadline to 
withdraw US troops was “the only realistic way to encourage the Iraqis to take 
responsibility for their future.”53  As did some observers in Greece, Kennedy saw an 
open-ended US commitment in Iraq as being a disincentive to unity of effort, specifically 
to the Iraqis doing their share. 
While Grady dealt with the problem of the Greeks’ willingness to contribute, Van 
Fleet set out to improve their capability to do so by retraining and reorganizing the Greek 
Army.54  To accomplish this objective, Van Fleet attached American officers to the Greek 
General Staff, to each corps headquarters, and to the headquarters of each fighting 
division.  A major benefit of this dispersion was to ensure that general staff orders were 
being carried out.  A contemporary report noted that previously, top level plans 
“invariably have been changed by politicians somewhere along the line.  Political control 
of the 132,000-man army has been so great that members of Parliament often have vetoed 
military orders, had army units stationed in their own areas regardless of military need 
elsewhere.”55  This phenomenon had contributed to the defensive strategy thus far 
employed by the Greeks.  Van Fleet and his men retrained the Greeks “to fight a mobile, 
offensive war instead of simply garrisoning key towns and villages--a policy which in the 
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past had left most of the countryside at the mercy of hit-and-run raids.”56  His charge to 
the Greeks was “Get out and fight!”57 
Van Fleet also endeavored to reorganize the GNA at the highest levels in order to 
decentralize command and to encourage greater initiative on the part of field 
commanders.  The field army was reorganized into five corps instead of three.  In the 
past, each corps commander had been directly responsible to the National Defense 
Council for operations.  Now they would come under the control of the Chief of the 
General Staff.  Van Fleet was “quick to see which of the Greek commanders were 
competent and which owed their appointments to political intrigue.”58  He was able to 
help generate a reshuffling of senior Greek officers, involving the gradual replacement of 
less efficient and less energetic commanders and staff officers. 59  In facilitating these 
changes, Van Fleet maintained the same inconspicuous but influential role pioneered by 
Griswold.60 
The most notable of these personnel moves occurred on February 25, 1949, when 
“with Van Fleet’s hearty approval,” General Alexander Papagos, the hero of the Greek 
victories in the Albanian campaign of 1940, became Greece’s Commander-in-Chief.61  
Part of Papagos’s conditions for accepting this post was a streamlining of the National 
Defense Council.  With Papagos firmly in charge, GNA operations could proceed 
according to a coordinated central strategy that would allow “the country to be treated as 
a whole and to be swept through from south to north.”62  
Van Fleet also discovered that it was not just the hierarchy of the Greek Army 
that required attention.  There was also a shortage of trained junior officers, and to correct 
this problem he set up training schools to increase the supply.  In so doing, Van Fleet had 
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to massage the Greek sense of pride, which was slow to admit that more training was 
needed.63  To obtain unity of effort, Van Fleet would also have to maintain legitimacy, 
and through diplomatic yet persistent measures, he was able to build a Greek fighting 
force with which the Americans could cooperate.  Woodhouse overstated the case, but it 
was a credit to Van Fleet’s sensitivity to legitimacy that Woodhouse assessed that the 
Greek Army’s tactical reformation was “devised by Greek initiative, with no more than 
moral support from JUSMAPG.”64 
Security 
As a result of these efforts, Edward Wainhouse concluded that by the end of 1948, 
“the initiative had passed to the GNA and a confident, more experienced, and better 
trained national army was ready to launch its offensive in the spring of 1949.”65  With 
this improved Greek fighting force, Van Fleet could pursue his operational objective of 
moving to seal off the guerrillas from their lines of communication on Greece’s northern 
border.66  Such external support has historically been a condition essential to the success 
of an insurgent movement.67  The ability of the communists to move freely back and forth 
to their cross-border sanctuary represented a failure to adhere to the principle of security.   
To correct this situation, Van Fleet and the Greeks launched an offensive in the fall of 
1948, which involved clearing operations beginning in the south and moving northwards.  
This process would drive the guerrillas back to their main base in the Grammos-Vitsi 
region, where the final blow would be struck.68  The campaign began with Operation 
Pigeon when Greek army, navy, and police forces cleared much of the Peloponnese and 
deprived the communists of critical logistical and intelligence support.69  The operation 
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was conducted with the utmost secrecy, including such precautions as cutting telephone 
wires to Athens and arresting 4,500 suspected communists.70 
With this development, the Greek Army could now secure its lines of 
communication and prevent the enemy from re-infiltrating areas that had already been 
cleared.71  The results were dramatic.  By March 16, 1949, the Greek government was 
able to announce that the Peloponnese was completely clear of guerrillas and the Greek 
Army could thus be released for operations on the mainland.  This capability was first 
exercised in the mountain ranges to the north and northwest of Athens.  The GNA units 
were used to seize and hold passes and peaks while the LOK (mountain commando 
companies) and other infantry battalions trained in antiguerrilla warfare spread outwards 
in movements to contact.72  As a result, the Peloponnese to the south and the Roumeli 
region of central Greece were now “cleared…once for all.”73 
In the meantime, the conflict between Yugoslav President Josip Tito and Soviet 
Premier Joseph Stalin greatly benefited the Greeks, so much so that Andreas Papandreou 
calls it “the turning point in the civil war.”74  As soon as it became clear that Moscow 
was in control of the Greek Communist Party, the independent-minded Tito wanted no 
part of the fight.  On July 10, 1949, he announced his intention to progressively close his 
borders with Greece, a decision that greatly reduced the guerrillas’ freedom of maneuver 
and caused Nicholas Zakhariadas, head of the KKE, “to turn from insurgent tactics to 
positional warfare.”75  Papandreou writes that this development “more than anything else 
doomed the guerrillas.”76  Zakhariadas’s decision was actually the end result of a long 
struggle between Zakhariades and military leader Markos Vafiadis.  While Vafiadis 
wished to align the Greek communists with Tito, Zakhariades favored an association with 
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Stalin.  However, underlining their political differences was also a longstanding dispute 
over tactics.77  Vafiadis favored waging a guerrilla war using hit and run tactics and 
avoiding decisive combat while Zakhariades advocated converting the DAS into a 
conventional force.  The disagreement led to the relief of Vafiadis and six other high 
ranking DAS officials in January 1949.78  While unity of effort was increasing among the 
Greeks and Americans, serious internal and external fissures were developing on the 
communist side. 
  With the departure of Yugoslav support, the guerrillas received increased 
assistance from Bulgaria and Rumania, but the main center of DAS activity was Albania.  
Given this situation, Zakhariadas massed 7,000 troops in the Vitsi Range region and 
another 5,000 to the south in the Grammos Range, hoping to launch offensive operations 
from these positions.79  But since most of the other parts of Greece were now clear, the 
Greeks were able to concentrate six of their eight field divisions against the guerrillas in 
these areas.  Sensing the changing circumstances, Van Fleet stated on June 23 that he was 
“very optimistic” about the situation and that he was “confident that [the Greek Army] 
can do the job by winter.”80 
 On August 5, the Greeks initiated their attack on the Grammos Range, and on 
August 10 they attacked the Vitsi.  Initially there was little progress.  Then, slowly but 
surely, and largely thanks to fifty-one Curtiss Helldivers supplied by the US to the Greek 
Air Force, the guerrillas fell back.  By August 16, the last organized resistance in the 
Vitsi area had been overrun.  On August 19, with support from the Helldivers, the GNA 
attacked the Grammos.   
 There the Greek communists had built a virtual “state of Grammos” with its own 
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system of administration, education, justice, and communications.81  The area was 
absolutely critical to the insurgency.  Key to the attack was the seizure of the Starias and 
the Baroukas, the two main passes from the Grammos into Albania.  These routes had 
been used so extensively by the communists during the previous few months that they 
were nicknamed the “Twin Boulevards to Athens.”  Placing blocking positions along 
likely avenues of approach to fix the guerrillas, on August 28 the Greeks seized the 
Starias and the Baroukas, and by August 30 they controlled the Grammos.  Nonetheless, 
some 8,000 communists managed to escape into Albania.82 
 Although this victory was incomplete, the changing political landscape began to 
greatly benefit the Greeks.  With Yugoslav aid drying up, the guerrillas had become 
dramatically dependent on Albania.  However, Albania now had on its border a Greek 
Army that  
with US aid... had been converted over-night from an ill-equipped, dispersed, and 
not-too-efficient army, into a formidable, well-equipped, competently led fighting 
force with guns, trucks, tanks, and over fifty modern aircraft.  If Greece chose to 
swoop into Albania to try and encircle the Greek insurgent elements sheltering 
there, there was nothing the tiny, rag-tag Albanian Army could do to stop her.83   
 
Being a pragmatist, Enver Hoxha, who by this time was the Albanian Prime Minister, 
announced on August 26 that all Greeks found in Albania would be disarmed and 
detained.84  With their once formidable external support gone, on October 16, 1949, from 
a secret radio station in Rumania, Greece’s communist guerrilla leaders announced a 
“cease-fire” in order to “prevent the complete annihilation of Greece.”85   
Perseverance 
This outcome reflected a US willingness to persevere where the communists 
would not.  As the communist insurgency had grown in Greece, the Soviet Union had 
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been confident that, given time, the situation would deteriorate to the point where it was 
beyond the Greek government’s ability to control.  Often in an insurgency, time is on the 
side of the insurgents, who need merely to practice a strategy of exhaustion to wear out 
the limited government resources.  Stalin understood this advantage, advising, “If it 
cannot be done today, it can be done tomorrow.”86  However, the decisive American 
action, articulated by the Truman Doctrine and practically manifested by JUSMAPG, 
played havoc with the Soviet timetable.  The US understood the Soviet attempt to use 
perseverance as a delaying tactic in the United Nations and thwarted the communist 
design by American perseverance.87   
For Stalin, the Greek Civil War was one small battle in a larger Cold War and 
also was a subordinate concern in the Balkans to his power struggle with Tito.88   Stalin 
was unwilling to commit excessive resources to an unsure endeavor, and pragmatically 
confided to Yugoslav leaders in early 1948, “What do you think, that Great Britain and 
the United States—the United States, the most powerful state in the world—will permit 
you to break their line of communication in the Mediterranean!  Nonsense.  And we have 
no navy.”  Stalin was willing to pluck low hanging fruit, but not willing to risk Soviet 
security in an uncertain and dangerous confrontation with the US.89   When it came time 
to determine priorities, Yugoslav communist leader Svetozar “Tempo” Vukmanović 
contended that the Soviet Union “had no interest whatever in a victory of the people’s 
revolutionary movement in Greece.”90  In fact, Woodhouse concludes his history of the 
struggle for Greece from 1941 to 1949 saying, “The rank and file of the KKE, and in 
particular its leaders, were expendable.  Without a trace of compunction, Stalin let them 
go to their doom.”91  On the other hand, the Truman Doctrine had made Greece a priority, 
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and by perseverance, the US was able to sustain a commitment that the communists 
would not. 
This is not to say that the American will to persevere was never in doubt.  The 
most tenuous period occurred after the two principal operations of the spring and summer 
of 1948, Operations Dawn and Crown, failed to destroy the communist forces operating 
near Rumeli in central Greece and in Grammos near the northern border.  When the bulk 
of the enemy was able to withdraw into Albania, both American and Greek enthusiasts 
had to count it as a “bitter disappointment.”92   
In the wake of this setback, many in Congress began calling for significant cuts in 
US aid to Greece.  Van Fleet knew the GNA still needed improving, but he also knew 
that he did not have the time to proceed slowly.  It was this recognition that US support 
would not be indefinite that led Van Fleet to develop his decisive strategy to isolate the 
guerrillas from their cross-border base in Albania with his attacks on the Grammos and 
Vitsi ranges in August 1949. 93  While the US was willing to support Greece via the 
Truman Doctrine, it also wanted to see results.  Van Fleet was politically aware enough 
to know that there were limits to the US perseverance, and he developed a timetable that 
could accommodate US resolve. 
Conclusion 
The US intervention in Greece was a successful OOTW.   It represents a mix of 
consistently strong adherence to some OOTWs and satisfactory adherence to others.  It 
contained no cases of strong failure to adhere to any one principle.  Because the 
JUSMAPG mission was advisory only, much of the adherence to the principles was 
dependent on the host nation.  The combined effort of the Americans and the Greeks 
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presents a strong case for a relationship existing between the balanced application of the 
principles of OOTW and operational success.  
American and Greek forces during the Greek Civil War exhibited strong 
adherence to the principles of objective, security, unity of effort, and perseverance.  The 
US strategic objective was clearly articulated by the Truman Doctrine, and General Van 
Fleet and JUSMAPG adeptly derived operational and tactical objectives from it.  With 
American support and advice, the Greek Government exhibited strong adherence to the 
principle of security by conducting military operations that, in conjunction with political 
developments in Yugoslavia, isolated the insurgents from their external support.  The US 
forces also adhered to the principle of security by eschewing a combat role themselves 
and maximizing force protection.  General Van Fleet displayed exceptional interpersonal 
skills in establishing unity of effort between the advisors and their hosts, as well as 
encouraging the Greeks to make the personnel and tactical adjustments necessary to 
coordinate meaningful action.  Because of the clearly stated national interest at stake and 
the acceptable cost of the American contribution, the US was able to adhere to the 
principle of perseverance and sustain its commitment in Greece longer than the Soviets. 
Adherence to the principles of legitimacy and restraint was satisfactory.  Because 
the US objective in Greece was so clearly based on US interests, the intervention was 
subject to perceptions of illegitimacy in some circles in Greece.  Van Fleet mitigated this 
vulnerability by conscious efforts to limit the US role to an advisory one and ensure all 
actual decisions were made by the Greeks themselves.  While the US practiced restraint 
by not committing combat troops and by encouraging moderate behavior on the part of 
the Greeks, the Greeks themselves were willing to infringe on the population’s civil 
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liberties in pursuit of military operational expediency.  Because the aggressive behavior 
came from the host nation and because most of the Greek citizens were willing to make 
sacrifices for the cause, there were few negative consequences associated with this loose 
application of restraint.  
This analysis suggests relationships among several of the principles, both in terms 
of correlation and balanced application.  The clearly stated and accepted strategic 
objective and the acceptable costs generated by restraint facilitated perseverance.  The 
strongly US-centric objective posed a challenge to host nation perceptions of legitimacy, 
but this threat was mitigated by a deliberate emphasis on unity of effort within Greece.  
The Greek forces made sacrifices with regard to restraint in order to enhance security.  
The US experience in the Greek Civil War strongly supports the utility of the principles 
of OOTW as a planning and analytical tool, and predictor of operational outcome.  Table 
2 indicates the level of adherence to the principles of OOTW in the Greek Civil War.  
Table 2  
Adherence to Principles of OOTW during US Intervention in Greek Civil War 
 
 Strong 
adherence 
General 
adherence 
Neutral General 
lack of 
adherence 
Strong lack 
of 
adherence 
Legitimacy  x    
Objective x     
Perseverance x     
Restraint  x    
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Table 2  (continued). 
Security x     
Unity of 
effort 
x     
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CHAPTER III 
LEBANON: FOLLOWING THE PRINCIPLES, BUT BY CHANCE OR DESIGN? 
Arab nationalism and the threat of communist expansion posed a threat to stability 
and US interests in the Middle East.  When Lebanon appeared ready to collapse into civil 
war, the Eisenhower Doctrine provided the justification for the deployment of a US force, 
beginning on July 15, 1958.  This intervention highlights the OOTW principle of security 
because the massive show of force served to thwart any significant unrest before it had a 
chance to develop.  It also demonstrates the effective application of the principle of 
restraint.  Adherence to the principles of objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, and 
perseverance were mixed.  As a result of this OOTW, the US accomplished its objective 
of preventing a civil war in Lebanon. 
Background 
The Suez Crisis of 1956 served both to diminish Western influence in the Middle 
East and to strengthen the forces of Arab nationalism led by Egypt’s president, Gamal 
Abdul Nasser.  When Nasser began accepting Soviet aid, Cold War sensibilities 
demanded an American response.  The resulting diplomatic counteroffensive produced 
the Eisenhower Doctrine, a geographic extension of the Truman Doctrine that promised 
military and economic assistance to nations in danger of a communist-sponsored invasion 
or subversion. However, anti-Western and Pan-Arab sentiment were so high that the new 
policy received a decidedly cool reception in the Middle East.  Only Lebanon agreed to 
the American offer, and even this acceptance was not without controversy.  Many felt 
Lebanese President Camille Chamoun’s support of the Eisenhower Doctrine was 
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motivated more by a desire to facilitate an extra-constitutional move to succeed himself 
as president than by a genuine fear of foreign threat to Lebanon.94 
 Lebanon had a history of religious and ethnic divisions, and the current political 
suspicion certainly was nothing new.  When Lebanon gained its independence in 1943, 
the republic’s new leaders had hoped to accommodate its sectarian diversity with a 
“confessional system” by which popular representation was based on religious affiliation.  
Out of this arrangement emerged the traditional practice of selecting a Maronite Christian 
president, a Sunni Moslem premier, and a Shi’ite speaker of parliament.  Allocations of 
parliamentary seats were likewise derived from the relative numerical strength of the 
religious communities in each electoral district.  However, the system was based on 
percentages calculated from obsolete census data that did not reflect current increases in 
the Moslem population.  The result was an over-representation of the Christian 
population that created a considerable imbalance of power and left any sitting 
government vulnerable to the major factions.95  The Chamoun government was not 
immune to this dynamic and faced a serious challenge from the National Union Front 
(NUF), which was powerful enough to be considered “another government, existing side-
by-side with the legally constituted authorities.”96 
 After the Suez crisis, the Middle East continued to be rocked by a series of 
developments that were contrary to American interests.  On April 13, 1957, within a 
month of Congress approving the Eisenhower Doctrine, King Hussein of Jordan thwarted 
a pro-Nasser coup attempt.  On February 1, 1958, Nasser and President al-Quwwatli of 
Syria announced the merger of their countries with Yemen to form the United Arab 
Republic (UAR), and Pan-Arabism rallies and riots broke out throughout the region, 
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including Lebanon.  On July 14, Iraq’s King Faisal and Crown Prince Abdul Illah were 
assassinated in a coup led by General Abdel Karem Kassem, an Arab nationalist and 
UAR sympathizer.  Simultaneously, rumors began circulating that another plot against 
King Hussein was developing.  Fearing that he might be the next target, Chamoun 
appealed to Ambassador Robert McClintock to invoke the Eisenhower Doctrine.  At 6:43 
p.m. that same day, President Eisenhower directed that the initial marine contingent of a 
US intervention force arrive at Beirut no later than 9:00 a.m. on July 15.  Army troops 
would follow, and the total force on the ground would eventually number over 14,000 
men. 
Analysis of the Principles 
 
Objective   
The Eisenhower Doctrine provided the general strategic objective for the 
deployment of US forces to Lebanon.  In his January 5, 1957 message to Congress, 
Eisenhower had identified the need to provide “assistance and cooperation to include the 
employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial 
integrity and political independence of [the nations of the Middle East], requesting such 
aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International 
Communism.”97  Beyond this overarching objective, however, there was little in the way 
of a specific operational objective to help direct military action. 
 The deployment launched by President Eisenhower on July 14 was based on 
CINCAMBRITFOR OPLAN 1-58.  This contingency plan was codenamed Operation 
Bluebat and had two versions: The first involved American and British ground forces 
operating in concert and the second substituted US Marines for the British contingent.98  
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However, the planning emphasis of Bluebat appears to have been largely focused on 
building and deploying the force.  “Beyond that,” according to historian Roger Spiller, 
“little attention had been paid to what specific missions the force might be called upon to 
accomplish.”99  Such a mentality was not unusual at the time.  Walter LaFeber puts the 
specific Bluebat situation in the larger Cold War context by arguing, “The problem would 
always be less a proper choice of the military means than a wise understanding of the 
objectives.  In postwar American foreign policy, the debate over the nature of the 
communist threat usually lagged behind the debate over which weapons to use against the 
threat.”100  The result, according to Lawrence Yates, was that the “American troops [that] 
intervened in Lebanon… had no clear mission.”101  Initial planning envisioned 
establishing a beachhead south of Beirut, seizing the international airport, and advancing 
on the capital.  “What would follow,” surmises Yates, “would be anyone’s guess.”102   
Indeed at one point, Brigadier General David Gray, the commander of Army Task Force 
(ATF) 201, was left confiding to one group of infantrymen from the 187th Airborne 
Infantry, “At this time I cannot tell exactly what our future mission may be.”103 
 The imprecise understanding of objective was not limited to the military.  Even 
after a high-level meeting in June, US Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot 
Lodge was left asking Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, “How are we going to get 
our troops out once we have got them in?  How long shall they remain?  What will the 
formula be for getting them out?  What will the formula be for holding elections in 
Lebanon while our troops are there?  What happens if the elections should go definitely 
against us?”104  Lodge’s queries today would be called questions of end state, exit 
strategy, and measures of effectiveness, and they continue to beguile OOTW planners.  In 
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May, Dulles already had pointed out to President Eisenhower, “Once our forces were in, 
it would not be easy to establish a basis upon which they could retire and leave behind an 
acceptable situation; that might create a wave of anti-Western feeling in the Arab world 
comparable to that associated with the British and French military operation against 
Egypt, even though the circumstances were quite different.”105   Now, on the eve of the 
deployment of US forces to Lebanon, all Dulles could tell Lodge was that these “hard 
questions” had been given a great deal of thought but remained unanswered.106  Thus, 
according to Spiller, Bluebat was a plan “innocent of the political nuances” that shape the 
objective of any mission, especially an OOTW.107 
Ambassador Robert Murphy also reported an ambiguous and loose definition of 
the operation’s objective.  President Eisenhower dispatched Murphy to serve as an 
advisor to Admiral James Holloway, who as the Commander in Chief, Specified 
Command, Middle East (CINCSPECOMME), was in overall command of the US forces 
deployed to Lebanon, but Yates argues, “Eisenhower himself had little idea of what the 
troops would be required to do.”108  Thus it is not surprising that Murphy describes his 
instructions from Eisenhower as being “conveniently vague, the substance being that I 
was to promote the best interests of the United States incident to the arrival of our forces 
in Lebanon.”  Murphy writes that when Eisenhower “elaborated a little on his purpose in 
ordering US Marines to land in Lebanon,” the President explained that a sentiment had 
developed in the Middle East that the US was “capable only of words, [and] that we were 
afraid of Soviet reaction if we attempted military action.”  Thus Murphy felt Eisenhower 
“believed that if the United States did nothing now, there would be heavy and irreparable 
losses in Lebanon and the area generally.”  In language similar to that about a later 
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generation of marines’ mission to “establish a presence” in Lebanon in 1983, Murphy felt 
Eisenhower “wanted to demonstrate in a timely and practical way that the United States 
was capable of supporting its friends.”109  Details of what that practical support might 
entail were conspicuously underdeveloped.  The result of the operation may have been 
success, but according to Yates, it was “success without a plan.”110 
Perhaps the best explanation of this ambiguity surrounding Bluebat’s objective 
stems from the fact that President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles viewed “Lebanon 
almost completely in terms of the global communist threat and largely ignored the 
development of Arab nationalism.”111  In reality, however, based on their perspective 
from on the ground, both Ambassador Murphy and Admiral Holloway ultimately 
concluded “that much of the conflict concerned personalities and rivalries of a domestic 
nature, with no relation to international issues.  Communism was playing no direct or 
substantial part in the insurrection.”112  Eisenhower and Dulles certainly understood that 
America had a vital interest in the region, but they did not comprehend the true threat to 
that interest.  Thus, “they tended to attribute the troubles they were facing to the wrong 
causes, and, as a result, may have sought the wrong remedies.”113 
Security  
If the object of the US intervention was to defeat the internal Lebanese resistance 
movement, the size of the US force appears completely out of proportion to the threat.  
Although Saeb Salem (alternately “Saib Salam”), the rebel leader in Beirut, had boasted, 
“You tell those Marines that if one Marine sets foot on the soil of my country, I will 
regard it as an act of aggression and commit my forces against them,” the Americans had 
little to worry about.  The total rebel force consisted of some 10,000 irregulars, but they 
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were dispersed throughout the country in groups of 400 to 2,000 lightly armed men.  
There was no central leadership, and each band owed its loyalty to an individual 
personality like Salem.114  The day before the marine landings, General Fuad Chehab 
(alternately “Shihab”), the neutral and broadly respected commander of the Lebanese 
Army, had met with rebel leaders and was confident they had no plans to initiate new 
actions against the government.115 
Instead, the “only immediate effective threat” was from outside Lebanon in the 
form of the Syrian First Army which consisted of 40,000 soldiers and over 200 Russian-
built T-34 medium tanks.  To guard against interference from this direction, securing the 
airport and the approaches to the north of Beirut was critical.116   Indeed, the original 
plans to defend Beirut by blocking off the main roads suggest that rather than any rebel 
uprising, the Americans considered “the real threat was going to reveal itself in the rather 
conventional form of a foreign, communist-dominated army, probably from Syria, 
marching from Damascus to invest Beirut.”117  Any intervention from Egypt was 
considered much less likely.118  In the end, all fears of outside invasion proved to be 
highly exaggerated, leading one observer to quip that the Americans “had effectively 
secured the country from a Syrian invasion that never was.” 119 
Thus, in many ways the intervention in Lebanon achieved security, just as it 
achieved objective, in spite of itself.  Spiller concludes his study of the operation by 
noting, “Virtually every official report opens with the caveat that had Operation Bluebat 
been opposed, disasters would have occurred.”120  For example, Lieutenant Colonel 
Henry Hadd, who commanded the initial marine landing force, reported that “the delay in 
the breaching of the causeway and the unloading of the LSTs would have been disastrous 
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if the landing had been opposed.”121  Spiller goes so far as to say the disjointed nature of 
the American organization would “have been welcomed by a determined and 
professional enemy.”122  Instead, the “deployment of large numbers of troops…created a 
climate of intimidation conducive to the reduction or cessation of hostilities.”123   The 
result was that, given the lack of serious opposition, the US forces “quickly found 
themselves in a role limited to showing force instead of using it.”124   
In part, the large force committed to Lebanon was a result of the prevailing 
attitude of “massive retaliation” among the Joint Chiefs of Staff.   President Eisenhower 
and General Maxwell Taylor were in the process of creating a Strategic Army Corps 
which would provide a light strike force to give the military a “flexible response” 
capability, but this transformation was not complete in time for the Lebanon crisis.125   
President Eisenhower had initially sought to avoid intervention at almost any cost, but he 
now settled on a plan “to send in everything we’ve got and this thing will be over in 
forty-eight hours if we do so.”126  There seemed to be few options in between the two 
extremes. 
Another reason for the large force was the Cold War context in which Lebanon 
unfolded.  President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles intended to send the Soviet 
Union a clear message that the US would “meet head-on the challenges of the new 
Middle East.”127  American military forces were placed on worldwide alert in the event 
the Soviets tried to interfere with the operation.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Nathan Twining assured President Eisenhower the military could deal with any 
such threat, crowing, “The Russians aren’t going to jump us.  If they do jump us, if they 
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do come in, they couldn’t pick a better time, because we’ve got them over the whing 
whang and they know it.”128 
The uncertainty of the initial situation, to include the unpredictable response of 
other nations in the Middle East, also suggested the need of a force strong enough to meet 
any contingency.129  However, the initial marine battalion landing teams met little 
opposition, and joint Lebanese-American jeep patrols soon calmed whatever tension had 
existed in Beirut.  With the situation on the ground now defying the dire assumptions that 
predicated the creation of the large Marine-Army force, one correspondent felt that, given 
this new development, “the best course might be to sit down with some ice packs and 
think out a realistic objective for the operation.”130  Spiller agrees that at this point, prior 
to the commitment of the Army contingents, “local circumstances certainly warranted no 
more ground troops.”131   
Instead, decision-makers remained wedded to the original plan that called for the 
deployment of General Gray’s ATF 201 of some 8000 men, currently prepositioned at a 
forward staging base at Adana, Turkey.  Spiller suggests there may have been a mentality 
that “now that the Army had moved a task force 2,100 miles, it had to have a part to play 
in the intervention,” and ATF 201 was ordered forward.  Likewise marine battalions 
continued to arrive on schedule until July 20, when, Spiller reports, “reason triumphed” 
and additional marines were considered unnecessary.  Nonetheless, five days after the 
initial landing, there were more than 10,000 men concentrated in less than four square 
miles south of Beirut.132  The Army of Lebanon boasted only 6,000 men.133  
By July 22, General Gray had determined ATF 201 had reached its saturation 
point, and he attempted to halt the planned deployment of a battalion of seventy-two 
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medium tanks from Bremerhaven, Germany.  While insisting at least a company of armor 
was needed for mounted patrolling, Admiral Holloway’s staff agreed to request that 
United States Army Europe (USAREUR) reduce the contingent, but USAREUR felt 
sending the whole battalion was necessary in order to preserve “tactical integrity.”  
Spiller laments that Gray was forced to accept the fact that “the armor was coming, 
whether he needed it, wanted it, or not.”134 
The same “worst-case planning” impacted logisticians as well.  In anticipation of 
heavy fighting, supplies were pushed forward automatically.  Andrew Birtle asserts, 
“Zealous logisticians soon buried the small intervention force under nearly 50,000 tons of 
supplies.”135  Because the fighting never materialized, the supplies were not consumed as 
rapidly as planned, creating “waste and piles of unused supplies.”  In his logistical study 
of the operation, Gary Wade concludes only “the lack of fighting (a best-case situation) 
freed manpower to handle massive resupply shipments.136  Still, the “tooth-to-tail” ratio 
was staggering, with 47.1% of the Army troops involved in support activities.137  
Security is not merely a function of numbers, and in spite of the large size of the 
Bluebat force, there were numerous potential security disasters.  The rapid decision to 
intervene in Lebanon found the US Sixth Fleet geographically unable to support 
Bluebat’s plan of landing three marine battalions simultaneously.  Instead only the 2nd 
Battalion of the 2nd Marine Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harry Hadd, 
was sufficiently close to Beirut to arrive with the required alacrity.  The result was “the 
Marine contingent [was] committed piecemeal into an altogether confused—and 
therefore very dangerous—situation.”138  Birtle has the benefit of hindsight when he 
chides the initial troops “faced nothing more dangerous than bikini-clad women and boys 
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aggressively hawking bottles of soda pop,” but the fact remains that had the Lebanese 
Army chosen to defend Lebanon’s territorial sovereignty, Hadd would have been in a 
tight spot.139  According to the Marine Corps’ official history of the operation, this 
vulnerability had occurred because military security had been sacrificed for political 
expediency in order to meet President Eisenhower’s promise of a rapid deployment.  This 
decision “dramatized the political nature of the Lebanon operation,” a common 
characteristic of OOTWs.140 
Aircraft also flowed into the forward staging base in Adana, Turkey in a 
piecemeal and poorly synchronized fashion that threatened security.  The result, 
according to Spiller, was that “unarmed, fully loaded transport aircraft [closed] at an area 
of potential combat before fighter squadrons had established air superiority, certainly a 
violation of the most basic canon of air strategy.”   It made Adana “a wonderful target for 
anyone who wished to take advantage of it.”141   
The combination of the large size of the force and the successful conclusion of the 
Lebanon intervention in 1958 has been used to explain the decision to commit a similarly 
large force to the Dominican Republic in 1965.142  However, observers should be careful 
in drawing a direct correlation between the large force and the security outcome in 
Lebanon.  It is true that throughout the 102-day operation, only one American soldier was 
killed by hostile fire, but this result was largely a function of the lack of resistance.143  
Proponents of large forces will certainly argue that the impressive show of force was 
instrumental in keeping opposition low, but  Birtle is also correct in his conclusion that “a 
good deal of luck” also played a big part.144 
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Restraint 
The low threat allowed the Bluebat forces to adhere to the principle of restraint so 
much so that Ambassador McClintock could boast the intervention proved to be “that 
rarest of military miracles: the making on an omelet without breaking the eggs.”145  In a 
situation that one Pentagon spokesman described as “not war, but like war,” American 
troops and their commanders, as well as diplomats like McClintock, sought to tread 
cautiously.  In the final analysis, they were rewarded for their disciplined and measured 
approach that eschewed military action in favor of a political settlement.146   
James Shulimson describes the landing on Red Beach as “perhaps one of the most 
colorful in the long history of Marine Corps landings.”  Bikini-clad sunbathers, horseback 
riders, soft drink vendors, and beach workmen waved and some even cheered as “fully 
armed Marines charged over the sand.”  A few young boys even offered to help the 
marines carry their heavy equipment ashore.  One marine described the strange reception 
as being “better than Korea, but what the hell is it?”147 
As the initial marine battalion landing teams made their way inland, they were 
subjected to only a few instances of harassing fire around the airport and only in one case 
felt compelled to open fire themselves.  The situation was calm enough that when two 
marines became lost and were taken captive in the Basta, the Arab quarter of Beirut and 
center of government opposition, they were released unharmed.  Even their weapons 
were soon returned.148 
Amid such conditions, strict rules of engagement were possible and practical.  Of 
equal note, Ambassador McClintock recognized that the spectacle of American troops 
killing Moslems could inflame the already volatile Middle East.  While Chamoun pressed 
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the US to not only stabilize Lebanon but also to militarily eliminate threats in Iraq, Egypt, 
and Syria, Secretary of State Dulles countered that there would be no “preventive war,” 
and that the Lebanese situation would be resolved by “patience.”  Likewise, the 
recommendation of Vice Admiral Charles Brown, commander of the US Sixth Fleet, to 
have forces fan out from the capital to other areas of the country was dismissed by 
Admiral Holloway and Ambassador McClintock as being “counterproductive.”149  This 
exercise in geographic restraint also was influenced by the need to foster legitimacy.  
President Eisenhower explained the decision by saying if the Lebanese Army could not 
control the countryside, “I felt we were backing up a government with so little popular 
support that we probably should not be there.”150 
Even before the deployment, General Gray had impressed upon his soldiers his 
intent that they “conduct themselves in such a restrained, alert, highly professional 
manner that they would not inadvertently involve themselves, and the Lebanese would 
not want to get involved with them either.”  He made it clear that the mission would 
require “strict discipline.”151  Once the low nature of the threat became apparent, 
American soldiers were prohibited from firing unless they were fired upon, and then only 
if they could clearly identify the source of the shooting and engage it without unduly 
endangering noncombatants.152 
Shulimson explains that such precautions were useful counters to attempts by the 
rebels to use harassment “to provoke the Marines into rash retaliation.”  However, like 
their army counterparts, “The Marines were under strict orders to maintain fire discipline, 
and to shoot only in self-defense.”153  Lieutenant Colonel Hadd testified to the delicacy 
and wonder of the situation, saying, 
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The conduct of the individual Marine in holding his fire when he can see who is 
shooting in his direction must be mentioned.  When a youngster lands all prepared 
and eager to fight and finds himself restricted from firing at a known rebel who he 
sees periodically fire in his direction and in every instance restrains himself from 
returning fire, it is felt this is outstanding and indicated good small unit discipline.  
The situation had to be thoroughly explained to the individual Marine and they 
understood why the restriction on fire was necessary.  Many innocent people 
could have been killed.154 
 
Additionally, detailed codes of conduct minimized the likelihood of negative 
contacts with Lebanese citizens, and property owners were compensated for any damages 
or inconveniences.155  General Gray went so far as to eliminate calling cadence during 
physical fitness training once he learned “that the local inhabitants didn’t particularly 
appreciate being awakened at 0500 every morning to the sound of pounding feet and the 
airborne chant.”156  The results were worth the effort.  Shulimson concludes, “This 
successful restraint of the troops proved to be an important stabilizing feature of the 
American intervention.”157 
The lone American casualty to hostile action occurred on August 1 when Sergeant 
James Nettles was killed by sniper fire near the Basta.  On August 21, another soldier was 
wounded close to the Basta.  The next day, employees at the American Embassy were 
pinned down by machine gun fire from the same part of the city, but there were no 
casualties.  In a remarkable testimony to the restraint demonstrated by the Bluebat forces, 
there was no military reaction to any of these incidents.158 
American restraint was tested again after September 23, the day General Chehab 
was inaugurated as the new president of Lebanon.  In response to the inclusion of former 
rebel leaders in the cabinet, supporters of former President Chamoun called for a general 
strike and the dissolution of the new government.  Rather than intervening, the US forces 
established a contingency force to meet any emergency and allowed President Chehab to 
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deal with the present situation.  On September 24, the Lebanese Army effectively broke 
up a clash between Chamoun loyalists and rebels.  Shulimson concludes, “Both sides, 
impressed by the determination of the Lebanese Army to end the fighting, commenced 
negotiations to end the political stalemate.”159 
Nonetheless, in early October, the Phalange, a right-wing Maronite Christian 
militia group associated with Chamoun, launched a series of demonstrations.  After 
several US soldiers were captured and released near the Basta, the Americans sent an 
armored show of force to the edge of the opposition stronghold.  There was no fighting, 
and the warning seemed to have the desired calming effect.160  In these instances and 
throughout Operation Bluebat, restraint served the US forces well. 
Unity of Effort 
Although one branch of the Bluebat contingency plan envisioned a cooperative 
American and British effort, little progress was made in pursuing the combined option.  
British sources allude to participating in some “unobtrusive planning” with the 
Americans, but there is scant evidence of active British participation.161  Bluebat was 
destined to be a unilateral US operation. 
British reluctance to become more involved may have been a function of their 
perception that the Eisenhower Doctrine and the US response to the situation in Lebanon 
represented hypocrisy.  Prime Minister Harold Macmillan complained, “The new 
American policy could hardly be reconciled with the Administration’s almost hysterical 
outbursts over Suez.”162  Macmillan also expressed some concern that direct British 
action might result in attacks on British oil installations which would “inflict great loss 
upon the international companies and particularly upon us who depend on sterling oil.”163  
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For whatever the actual reason, when it came time to act, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
directed execution of only “the US portion of Bluebat.”164   President Eisenhower felt the 
US force would be sufficient and that the 3,700 British troops in Cyprus would form a 
formidable reserve if necessary.  Ultimately, Britain responded to a request from King 
Hussein and dispatched troops to Jordan on July 17.165   
The unfolding drama quickly made its way to the UN Security Council.  On July 
17, the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution by which the Council would call upon 
Britain and the United States “to cease armed intervention in the domestic affairs of the 
Arab States and to remove their troops from the territories of Lebanon and Jordan 
immediately.”  The proposal was rejected by majority vote.   The United States proposed 
its own draft resolution, which would request the Secretary General “immediately to 
consult the Government of Lebanon and other Member States as appropriate with a view 
to making arrangements for additional measures, including the contribution and use of 
contingents, as may be necessary to protect the territorial integrity and independence of 
Lebanon and to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms 
or other matériel across the Lebanese borders.”  This proposal was vetoed by the Soviet 
Union.166  Bluebat would remain a unilateral US operation, but that did not mean it would 
be without unity of effort challenges. 
As an early joint operation, Bluebat experienced some difficulties in achieving 
unity of effort among the services.  On the other hand, although the US military entered 
Lebanon without a status of forces agreement, the American and Lebanese forces quickly 
settled into a mutually cooperative relationship.  This remarkable development was 
realized in no small part by the efforts of seasoned diplomats like McClintock and 
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Murphy.  Political-military unity of effort rose to the occasion in Lebanon’s fluid and 
uncertain environment. 
At the operational level, joint unity of effort in Bluebat was frustrated but what 
Spiller calls “a wave of ‘provisionalism’ which dominated military planning as well as a 
certain parochialism in the services.”  The result he claims, in spite of several joint 
planning conferences, was three separate marine, army, and air force organizations rather 
than a unified task force.167  Attempts at coordination were further frustrated by high 
security classifications that “impeded planning and made execution even more vexatious 
than it would have been otherwise.”168  It would be a fair assessment that the lack of unity 
of effort among the services in Operation Bluebat was reflective of an era when joint 
operations had not yet become the order of the day. 
Nonetheless, in spite of the absence of the joint protocols that have by now 
become routine, cooperation among the services was established.  As Commander in 
Chief, Specified Command Middle East, Admiral James Holloway had authority over all 
US forces in the area. The maritime component was commanded by the commander of 
the US Sixth Fleet, Vice Admiral Charles Brown, and the air component was commanded 
by Brigadier General James Roberts.   Command of the land component was slightly 
more complicated.  On the day of the initial landings, marine Brigadier General Sidney 
Wade had been designated the Commander, American Land Forces.  When Brigadier 
General David Gray arrived with ATF 201, a decision had to be made as to how best to 
coordinate the marine and army activities.  Admiral Holloway had requested the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff provide an army or marine corps major or lieutenant general for this 
purpose, and the marine corps had expected their Lieutenant General Edwin Pollock to be 
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tapped for this assignment.  Instead, on July 23, army Major General Paul Adams was 
designated Commander in Chief, American Land Forces, Lebanon.  General Wade was 
then relegated to Commander, US Marine Corps, Troops Assigned, Lebanon.  The 
appointment of an army land component commander was likely based on the fact that 
army troops in Lebanon would soon outnumber their marine counterparts.  Although the 
decision came as somewhat of a disappointment to the marines, Wade confessed, “I think 
that General Adams, as commander, was as fair to the Marine Corps as any Army general 
I’ve ever dealt with.”169 
Unity of effort between the American and Lebanese militaries was still another 
issue requiring attention.  The fact that President Chamoun had requested the US 
intervention did not ensure cooperation, and although General Chehab was, like 
Chamoun, a Maronite Christian, the Lebanese Army was plagued by the same sectarian 
divisions that epitomized the country.  Chehab was determined to keep the army out of 
the political dispute.  “If the army moved against the rebels,” he declared, “it would have 
little difficulty in reestablishing order… But if it cleared the Moslem quarters of Beirut 
and Tripoli, knocking down a few houses in the process, the army—which is 
predominantly Christian—would in fact be destroying the structure of Lebanon as a 
political entity.”170  Thus, Chehab intervened only to keep certain essential lines of 
communication open and to prevent rebel forays from their strongholds in Tripoli, the 
Chouf, and the Basta area of Beirut.171  Although the Lebanese Army would take no sides 
and act as what Spiller describes “as a passive sort of constabulary,” this outcome could 
not have been predicted as the marines came ashore.172  The marines had been instructed 
to treat all Lebanese Army units as friendly unless proven otherwise, but Ambassador 
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McClintock worried the Lebanese Army might oppose the marines’ line of march simply 
as a matter of honor.173   
McClintock’s fears almost came to fruition as Lieutenant Colonel Hadd’s 
battalion advanced on Beirut.  After landing at Red Beach, the marines had taken control 
of the international airport.  The Lebanese Army troops that Hadd encountered there 
offered no resistance, and the Americans and Lebanese worked out liaison relationships 
and arrangements for both guarding the airport and air traffic control.174  After this 
promising beginning, however, the next morning when the marines started moving to 
Beirut proper, they ran into a roadblock of Lebanese tanks with gun barrels pointed 
directly at the lead vehicles of the marine column.175  Ambassador McClintock reached 
the roadblock just in time to superintend arrangements with General Chehab to have the 
Lebanese Army escort the marines into town.   With McClintock, Chehab, and Holloway 
riding together in the same vehicle to lead the way and a jeep carrying Lebanese Army 
officers at the head of each section of marine vehicles, Ambassador Murphy reported that 
“what might have been a tragic episode was narrowly averted.”176   Instead, McClintock 
and Chehab began to develop plans for future cooperation between the American and 
Lebanese military forces.177  McClintock was astute in determining Chehab to be key to a 
peaceful solution in Lebanon, believing if “General Chehab decided to throw in the 
sponge, the Lebanese army will fall apart.”178  Fortuitously for the Americans, 
McClintock was able to secure Chehab’s cooperation, and Yates credits this action with 
setting the stage “for US forces and the Lebanese army to work together as partners.”179 
Building on this positive encounter, it was mutually agreed that most Americans 
would remain outside Beirut, with Lebanese forces assuming positions between the 
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Americans and the parts of the city controlled by radical Moslem elements.  General 
Wade felt this arrangement gave General Chehab improved peace of mind, and, with this 
matter settled, “the tension was lifted and he was more or less cooperative.”180  The 
resulting buffer zone did much to reduce conflict and allowed the Americans to confine 
their activities to garrisoning key facilities.  An integrated military police force was 
formed composed of Lebanese, and American army, navy, and marine personnel, and 
combined Lebanese and American patrols maintained security and communication 
between American outposts.  Lebanese Army liaison officers were attached to battalion 
headquarters, and one, Major Alexander Ghanem, proved especially effective.  According 
to one marine colonel, after a phone call of “only a few seconds,” Ghanem could make a 
rebel roadblock “melt away.” 181  In other cases, Lebanese guides pointed out rebel 
positions to marine battalions.182  In spite of these instances of operational cooperation, 
however, the Lebanese politely declined most American offers of training assistance.183  
Overall, Birtle calls the Lebanese Army’s support “indispensable,” and, on this level, 
unity of effort during the intervention in Lebanon was exceptional.184 
Cooperation between the American diplomatic and military efforts also ended up 
being a positive aspect of the operation.  A pre-deployment agreement between the 
Department of State and the Pentagon had declared, “In case of difference between the 
military commander and the local United States diplomatic representative in regard to 
political matters relating exclusively to Lebanon, the views of the latter shall be 
controlling.”185  Still, an early misunderstanding between Ambassador McClintock and 
Lieutenant Colonel Hadd caused some consternation, and to ensure unity between the 
American military and diplomatic efforts, President Eisenhower dispatched Deputy 
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Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy to Lebanon as his special representative.186  
Murphy was billed a “five-star diplomat,” which allowed him to oversee both 
Ambassador McClintock and Admiral Holloway who carried four-star rank.  Murphy 
found “close cooperation between the diplomatic and military sides of the American 
house,” a fact that he believed “contributed greatly to the success of our Lebanese 
undertaking.”187  Since McClintock and Holloway had already established a cooperative 
rapport, Murphy was free to immerse himself in the intricacies of Lebanon’s internal 
crisis, and he met once or twice daily with President Chamoun as well as with leaders 
representing other Lebanese factions such as Moslems Saeb Salaam and Rashid Karami, 
Christian Raymond Edde, and Druze Kamal Jumblatt.188  Murphy believes his diplomatic 
tour de force among Lebanese leaders “contributed in the end to the peaceful settlement” 
of the crisis, and Birtle credits Murphy with “unifying the politico-military effort.”189  It 
was an effective combination.  With the strong military show of force providing the 
needed motivation, American diplomats were able to encourage the contending factions 
to reach a negotiated solution.190 
Legitimacy 
The American intervention was afforded a small amount of legitimacy by the fact 
that on May 22, the Lebanese government had requested a meeting of the United Nations 
Security Council to consider its complaint “in respect of a situation arising from the 
intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the 
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security.”  On June 11, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 128, which formed the 
basis of the establishment of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon 
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(UNOGIL).  The first UNOGIL members arrived in Beirut on June 12 and began their 
mission “to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or 
other matériel across the Lebanese borders.”  However, UNOGIL was not tasked to 
interdict illegal infiltration.  Instead, it was hoped that its presence alone might deter any 
such traffic.191 
UNOGIL had little time to make an impact and proved to be unable to salvage the 
deteriorating situation.  It did not obtain full freedom of access to all sections of the 
Lebanese frontier until mid-July.  In the meantime, however, the coup in Iraq had 
exacerbated the situation, leading President Chamoun to request US intervention.192  As 
the crisis unfolded, UN Secretary General Dag Hammerskjold had cautioned Secretary of 
State Dulles against US action, but he had conceded that if the UN or Lebanon failed to 
resolve the matter, Western intervention at the request of the Lebanese government 
would be “legal.”193 
Such a tepid UN endorsement carried little international resonance, and from its 
very inception, Operation Bluebat faced a challenge to its perceived legitimacy from 
those who saw it as “meddling in Lebanon’s internal affairs.”194  President Eisenhower 
offered some slight defense against this argument in citing the need to protect the 2,500 
Americans living in Lebanon, but it was debatable if these citizens were really in 
immediate danger that exceeded the capabilities of local authorities.195   
By far the “thorniest” problem regarding legitimacy for Eisenhower was to 
prevent an overthrow of the Lebanese government without committing American forces 
to directly supporting any of Lebanon’s political factions.196   Allaying fears that the 
Americans were exclusively tied to President Chamoun was high on Ambassador 
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Murphy’s agenda during his personal meetings with the leaders of the various segments 
of Lebanese society.  He assured them the US military was not in Lebanon to keep 
Chaumon in power, and he felt this effort “cleared away much information about 
American intentions.”197   
An even more definitive demonstration of legitimacy occurred when the US 
refused to endorse Chaumon’s bid for a second term.198  Ambassador Murphy astutely 
ascertained that the best solution to the current unrest was to form a new government.199   
Focusing on this task had the added benefit of indirectly enhancing Bluebat’s legitimacy 
by diverting the attention of some Lebanese Parliament members away from protesting 
the American intervention and instead redirecting their efforts to the problem of electing 
a new president.200   
The US contributed to this process by helping persuade Chaumon to not only step 
aside but also lend his support to his rival General Chehab, whose family background, 
Maronite religious affiliation, conciliatory attitude, and reputation for neutrality while 
commanding the Moslem-Christian army made him a logical candidate.  Chehab was 
elected president on July 31 and took office on September 23.  Ambassador Murphy 
contends Chehab did not seek the position and accepted it “only as a compromise 
essential to peace in Lebanon.”201  As a testimony to this character, the Chehab 
government included many members that would have previously been considered 
“rebels.”202 
A second challenge to Bluebat’s legitimacy was that, with their country’s long 
history of foreign invasion, some Lebanese were “deeply opposed to the presence of 
foreign troops on their soil” and saw the American forces as an army of occupation.203  
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To combat this perception, within days of the initial landings, American planes dropped a 
million leaflets all over Lebanon that bore a picture of President Eisenhower and his 
message that the troops had come at the request of the Lebanese government to protect 
the country and that the US forces would withdraw as soon as security was ensured.204   
At General Chehab’s request, special care was taken to position the marines so they 
“would not give the appearance of being occupation troops.”205  Indeed, Shulimson quips, 
“The American forces were in the unusual predicament of having to negotiate in order to 
establish their positions in lieu of seizing them.”206  The result was that, as Spiller notes, 
“the Americans showed no inclination to stay very long in Lebanon and so gave hope to 
all that their influence would be fleeting.”207  In fact, the marines began withdrawing 
toward the end of August, and all American forces had left Lebanon by October 15.   
Perseverance 
Such a brief intervention was never intended to resolve Lebanon’s deep social and 
sectarian fissures.208  Operation Bluebat averted the immediate crisis, and Lebanon 
remained at peace for seventeen years, but as a later generation of American marines 
would learn, the underlying causes of the conflict remained.  This broader reality was not 
lost on US officials in 1958.  Even as he praised the successful conclusion of the 
American intervention from Lebanon, Secretary of State Dulles noted that the overall 
problem in the Middle East was not solved.209 
Perhaps in recognition of this situation, Ambassador Murphy was dispatched on a 
tour of the Middle East after his departure from Lebanon.  He visited Jordan, Israel, Iraq, 
and Egypt, hoping to “convince leading officials that our intervention would exercise a 
stabilizing effect in the Middle East.”210  There were, in fact, some positive developments 
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in the region.  Robert Divine believes Eisenhower’s “determination to make Lebanon a 
display of America’s resolve in the Middle East impressed Arab leaders,” adding that 
Iraq’s General Abdul Karim Kassem “was quick to reassure the European leaders that 
there would be no interruption in the flow of oil.”211  
Even of greater note, shortly after the crisis, Nasser became alienated from the 
new Iraqi leadership, the Soviet Union, and his Syrian partner in the UAR.  These 
setbacks caused Nasser to seek better relations with the US, and the Eisenhower 
administration, realizing it could not destroy Nasserism, was willing to settle for an 
accommodation with it.  This conciliatory tone on both sides allowed for improved US-
Egyptian relations throughout the remainder of Eisenhower’s presidency and into the 
1960s.  If John Marlowe’s argument is accepted that the Eisenhower Doctrine was aimed 
not just at communism, but was also “directed…in appearance and in effect against 
Egyptian imperialism,” Operation Bluebat can be viewed as part of a larger adherence to 
the principle of perseverance.212  However in the specific context of the operation, Yates 
is quick to note that the US “had not planned for all this at the time American troops 
intervened in Lebanon.”213  It would be incorrect to attribute too much “perseverance” to 
an operation that lasted only 102 days, but Operation Bluebat did last long enough to see 
Lebanon through its immediate crisis. 
Conclusion 
The US intervention in Lebanon was a successful OOTW.  It represents a mix of 
consistent adherence to some OOTWs and evolving adherence to others.  It contained no 
cases of strong failure to adhere to any one principle. 
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Operation Bluebat adhered to the principle of security by both chance and design.  
The massive size of the force was designed to handle any eventuality, but it was by 
chance that no resistance developed to challenge the marines during Bluebat’s early 
awkward moments.  As a result of the large force and low threat, the Americans were 
able to adhere to the principle of restraint.  Admiral Holloway captured the effective 
combination of potential strength and practiced restraint in noting that “patience, 
consolidation of strength, acclimating the Lebanese to our presence, and restraint 
characterized our actions accompanied by our great potential military strength are paying 
dividends.”214 
Adherence to the principles of legitimacy and unity of effort began 
problematically but progressed to satisfaction.  Initial fears of US imperialism, meddling, 
and occupation were quickly allayed by tangible signals of intent to withdraw as soon as 
possible.  Early miscommunications between US diplomatic and military entities were 
overcome by the dispatch of Ambassador Murphy and the interpersonal skills and efforts 
of a number of individuals.  The early uncertain status of relations between the American 
and Lebanese militaries was quickly reversed by personal effort, notably by General 
Chehab, and routine liaison at all levels.  Most certainly, American ongoing restraint and 
improved legitimacy helped foster unity of effort and cooperation with the Lebanese, 
suggesting a relationship among those principles. 
Adherence to the principle of objective was initially flawed but ultimately not 
detrimental to the operation.  The overarching objective to thwart the threat of communist 
expansion pursuant to the Eisenhower Doctrine proved to be irrelevant.  Ambassador 
Murphy helped focus a more appropriate objective by concentrating on the forming of a 
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new government, and the American security presence helped provide the stability needed 
for this process.  The refocused objective also served to enhance Bluebat’s legitimacy. 
Adherence to the principle of perseverance was a qualified success.  The 
American forces remained in place long enough to facilitate the immediate objective of a 
transfer of power to the new Chehab government but certainly not long enough to address 
the underlying cause of instability in Lebanon, let alone the Greater Middle East.  Part of 
this outcome may be attributed to the imprecise assessment of the original situation, 
which framed the objective in terms of responding to a communist threat that never 
materialized.  Had the intervention been based on a more nuanced understanding of Arab 
nationalism and been designed to address this much broader phenomenon, a much more 
significant commitment than Bluebat’s 102 days would clearly have been required.   
This analysis suggests relationships among several of the principles, both in terms 
of correlation and balanced application.  The emphasis on security represented by the 
large force size allowed the Americans to practice restraint.  The strategic objective’s 
being based on miscalculations about the external communist threat generated some 
challenges to legitimacy, which were mitigated by a concerted military and diplomatic 
emphasis on unity of effort within Lebanon.  This case study also suggests that 
perseverance is a function of objective in that perseverance must be assessed in the 
context of being directed toward a specific objective.  This US experience in Lebanon 
strongly supports the utility of the principles of OOTW as a planning and analytical tool 
and a predictor of operational outcome. 
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Table 3  
 
Adherence to Principles of OOTW during US Intervention in Lebanon 
 
 Strong 
adherence 
General 
adherence 
Neutral General 
lack of 
adherence 
Strong lack 
of 
adherence 
Legitimacy  x    
Objective   x   
Perseverance   x   
Restraint x     
Security x     
Unity of 
effort 
 x    
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CHAPTER IV 
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: SECURITY ALLOWS RESTRAINT 
A civil war in the Dominican Republic threatened American citizens there and 
also generated fears of communist expansion in an area of traditional American 
influence.  In response to these twin threats, particularly the latter one, the United States 
began the deployment of a substantial invasion force on April 27, 1965.   This 
intervention highlights the OOTW principle of restraint because US forces demonstrated 
remarkable discipline that helped facilitate a negotiated solution to the crisis.  It also 
demonstrates the effective application of the principles of security and perseverance.  
Adherence to the principles of objective, unity of effort, and legitimacy were mixed.  As 
a result of this OOTW, the US accomplished its objective of preventing communism 
from gaining another foothold in the Caribbean, and increasing the stability of the 
Dominican Republic.  
Background 
Rafael Trujillo ruled the Dominican Republic like a feudal lord for thirty-one 
years from 1930 until his assassination in 1961.  When Trujillo was killed, his puppet, 
President Joaquin Balaguer Ricardo, remained in office, but his association with the 
dictatorship of Trujillo made him unpopular and weak.  The country soon fell unto 
general unrest, and Balaguer was forced from office by a coup.  The coup, however, 
could not establish the authority necessary to rule because of popular protest in the 
Dominican Republic and opposition from the United States.  An election was held on 
December 20, 1962, and, with significant support from the urban lower class, Juan Bosch 
Gavino, a scholar and poet, became president. 
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 The Bosch Administration represented something new to the Dominican 
Republic, and its moves toward liberalization, secularization, and concern for the poor 
soon placed it at odds with the traditional elites.  There was also concern that Bosch’s 
leadership was making the Dominican Republic vulnerable to communism by such 
actions as legalizing the previously outlawed communist parties.  Amid the backdrop of 
Fidel Castro’s rise to power in Cuba in 1959, such seemingly innocent gestures were 
highly scrutinized.   On September 25, 1963, a coup deposed Bosch and replaced him 
with a civilian junta known as the Triumvirate, which came to be led by Donald Reid 
Cabral.  However, the Triumvirate failed to establish its authority over competing 
conservative factions both inside and outside the military or to convince the majority of 
the population of its legitimacy.  Dissatisfaction with Reid and lingering loyalties to 
Bosch plunged the Dominican Republic into revolution in April 1965. 
 Bosch’s supporters and like-minded revolutionaries took the name 
Constitutionalists in reference to their support for the 1963 constitution.  The 
Constitutionalists also came to be known as the rebels.  Conservative forces who called 
themselves Loyalists struck back under the leadership of General Wessin y Wessin, 
commander of the elite Armed Forces Training Center (CEFA).  On April 28, the United 
States intervened in what had become a civil war.   
 Operation Power Pack, as the US intervention was named, began with the 
deployment of the US Marines to protect Americans in the Dominican Republic.  
Portions of the 82nd Airborne Division soon joined the marines, and the situation 
expanded beyond its initial nature as a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) to 
become part of the Cold War struggle against communism.  In all, the operation lasted 
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sixteen months, and it serves as a useful case study of the interaction among the various 
principles of OOTW, especially security and restraint. 
Analysis of the Principles 
 
Objective   
 As the situation in the Dominican Republic deteriorated into civil war, rebel 
paramilitary groups descended on the grounds of the Hotel Embajador, where US citizens 
had gathered in anticipation of evacuation.  Rebels lined up Americans outside the hotel 
and fired shots over their heads.  Other rebels riddled the building’s upper stories with 
bullets.1   By this point the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already begun contingency planning 
to protect American lives.2  Shortly after noon on April 27, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff General Earle Wheeler received President Lyndon Johnson’s order to begin the 
evacuation.3   
 Because Power Pack began as a NEO, the objective of the original marine 
landings was expressed solely in terms of “protecting American lives,” and President 
Johnson broadcast that message to the nation in a television address the night of April 
28.4   However, from the very beginning the operation had the ulterior motive of 
preventing a “second Cuba.”5  This agenda was in part facilitated by John Bartlow 
Martin, former US Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, whom President Johnson 
dispatched to Santo Domingo as his special emissary early in the crisis.  Martin quickly 
became convinced that the rebellion had taken a communist turn, and his reports to 
Johnson reflected this assessment.6  Thus, General Wheeler informed Lieutenant General 
Bruce Palmer, the newly appointed Power Pack commander, “Your announced mission is 
to save American lives.  Your unstated mission is to prevent the Dominican Republic 
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from going communist.  The President has stated that he will not allow another Cuba... 
You are to take all necessary measures...to accomplish this mission.”7   
 It was not until May 2, when it became necessary to justify additional troop 
deployments, that President Johnson publicly revealed his fears of a second Cuba by 
announcing that “the American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the 
establishment of another communist government in the Western Hemisphere.”8  Thus, 
from early in the operation, the American intervention suffered from an ambiguous 
objective that presented some challenges to its legitimacy.  Additionally, Palmer was not 
provided the unequivocal mission statement routinely sought by military commanders. 
 A contributing factor in this failure was President Johnson’s decision to rely more 
on Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara than the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for 
military advice.9  While this technique reinforced the national value of civilian control of 
the military, it also contributed to inadequate representation of the military point of view 
on the Dominican Republic.  Such a state of affairs led Palmer to lament that political 
decisions were made “without taking into account important military considerations.”10   
 One aspect of the objective that was clear was that tactical control of Santo 
Domingo was critical to success.  The city lay on the south central coast and was the 
country’s capital and largest city.  Moreover, Palmer considered it “the heart and brain of 
the republic.”  An old saying proclaimed, “As goes Santo Domingo, so goes the 
Dominican Republic.”11  As Beirut was for Operation Bluebat in 1958, Santo Domingo 
would be the site of almost all of Power Pack’s activity. 
Legitimacy   
 The base issue of legitimacy associated with Power Pack was overcoming the 
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stigma of America’s history of interventions in the Caribbean, none of which, Palmer 
knew, had “ever claimed general approbation.”12  President Theodore Roosevelt’s 
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine had provided the justification for America assuming 
control of Dominican financial and political affairs, and in 1916, the US even established 
a military government under a navy and marine occupation that lasted eight years.  
President Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy had led to the last of the American 
forces in the region being withdrawn in 1934, but the legacy of American imperialism 
remained.13  This phenomenon caused the Organization of American States (OAS) to 
proceed cautiously with any measure that could “lend legitimacy to a US return to an 
interventionist policy and be interpreted as one Latin nation acting against another at the 
behest of the United States.”14   
 Palmer found that one development that helped take some of the edge off the 
latest American intervention was the fact that black soldiers comprised about 30 percent 
of the average battalion in the 82nd.   He felt that this demographic, as well as some 
Spanish-speaking soldiers, “helped establish friendly relations between our troops and the 
people of Santo Domingo” that survived “even the sustained efforts of the rebel 
opposition to arouse the people against us.”15 
 In contrast to Palmer’s good fortune in establishing legitimacy at the tactical level 
was the impact of Power Pack’s ambiguous objective on its perceived operational and 
strategic legitimacy.  The guise of US neutrality and the focus on the objective of 
securing American citizens could be maintained tenuously as long as the operation was 
limited to the marines.  However, the introduction of the 3rd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne 
destroyed this fiction by appearing unrelated to the NEO.  Specifically, the brigade 
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landed at San Isidro Airfield, a location nominally held by Loyalist forces, while the 
marines were in Santo Domingo, the site of the US Embassy and the American citizens 
that the deployment was supposed to safeguard.  These developments led some observers 
to characterize Power Pack as “a political-military intervention... disguised... behind a 
humanitarian act.”16  In fact, 76 percent of the American population initially supported 
the marine NEO, but less than half supported the subsequent introduction of the army.17   
Even the 82nd had to admit that “the current and planned disposition of... [its] forces did 
not appear to substantiate the stated mission of protecting American and foreign 
nationals.”18   
 Another part of the problem with legitimacy was that President Johnson’s abrupt 
announcement of a communist threat in the Dominican Republic had little evidence to 
support it.  Johnson had hoped that establishing a link to communism would win him 
support both domestically and abroad, but his claims were so spurious that they only 
weakened his case.  For example, when Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn told Johnson 
there were not many “commies” in the Dominican Republic, the president replied that 
Rayburn “just wasn’t looking hard enough.”  Then when the CIA released to the press 
lists of “Current Rebels Who Had Cuban Training” and “Rebels Who Are Known Leftist 
Activists,” the lists were found to contain several people with only loose associations 
with the communists, as well as duplicate names within each list.  Such incidents 
damaged President Johnson’s credibility with both Congress and the press.19 
        Regarding the ambiguity of the operation’s purpose, the JCS ordered that “Military 
commanders should respond to press queries relative to deployment of 82nd Airborne 
troops that they are to reinforce Marines for the purpose of protecting lives of Americans 
100 
 
 
 
 
and other foreign nationals.  No other response or conjecture should be offered.”  This 
inconsistency initiated difficulties with what had heretofore been a friendly news media.20 
 In fact, problems with the press had begun to develop even before the 82nd was 
deployed.  The military shared the political arm’s value of thwarting communism, but 
some commanders were less attuned to the requirement for legitimacy.  Commodore 
James Dare, the naval task group commander, told reporters that the marines would stay 
ashore as long as necessary to “keep this a non-communist government,” just one day 
after President Johnson had justified the landings solely in terms of “protecting American 
lives.”  Similarly, military briefers soon began referring to the Loyalists as “friendlies” 
and the Constitutionalists as “unfriendlies.”   The press reported the discrepancy between 
such statements and the official proclamations of US neutrality, and a credibility gap 
developed.21  This failure to provide accurate information created the first crack in the 
bipartisan consensus that had provided the underpinning of US foreign policy thus far in 
the Cold War.22   In fact, a report issued by the Center for Strategic Studies concluded, 
“The reasons for US landings were ineptly explained to the public.  The failure to 
communicate effectively the rationale for its actions had damaging effects in the United 
States and throughout Latin America.”23   It also set the stage for even greater difficulties 
for the administration and the military in their dealings with the media during the 
Vietnam War, a war in which the legitimacy of US military actions was fiercely 
attacked.24 
Unity of Effort 
 In addition to problems with legitimacy on the domestic front, the US struggled 
with international perceptions as well.  Several hours before the OAS passed a resolution 
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calling for a ceasefire and the establishment of an International Security Zone (ISZ) 
through the diplomatic quarter of Santo Domingo, US Marines had already entered the 
area of the proposed ISZ.   Moreover, President Johnson also had already committed the 
82nd, elements of which were in the process of landing at San Isidro at the time of the 
OAS resolution.25   
 Although Palmer noted that “the timing of these troop movements…would prove 
awkward at best for the US government, particularly in its Latin American relations,” the 
initial urgency of the NEO aspects of Power Pack largely justified the US taking 
unilateral action rather than working through the OAS.26   As Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk explained, “As presently organized, the OAS does not have standby forces or the 
political machinery for the immediate decisions required to deal with such 
contingencies.”27  However, even such necessary unilateral action clashed with the 
American values of collective security and nonintervention, and threatened the legitimacy 
of the operation in international eyes.28  As the US military build-up continued and the 
mission took on a more and more anticommunist nature, charges of “gunboat diplomacy” 
made unity of effort within the context of the OAS necessary to legitimize the 
operation.29   Realizing that unity of effort can provide “an organizational dimension to 
military legitimacy,” President Johnson instructed Secretary of State Rusk “to make it 
look good” in the OAS; a remark Palmer interpreted as meaning “to get OAS acceptance 
and participation.”30        
 The Latin American ambassadors to the OAS had been informed of the unilateral  
US action on the evening of April 28, after the order had been issued to land the 
first contingent of marines.  American diplomats were now playing catch-up to bring the 
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OAS on board.  Meetings and negotiations continued, and on May 6, the day after the 
corridor between the marines and the 82nd was secured as a buffer zone, the Tenth 
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States passed a 
resolution creating the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF).  The IAPF was established to 
act  
       in a spirit of democratic impartiality, that (purpose) of cooperating in the  
 restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the  
 security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and in the 
       establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the 
  functioning of democratic institutions.31 
 
 Ultimately a Brazilian general, Hugo Panasco Alvim, assumed command of the 
IAPF, with Palmer serving as his deputy.  Although Palmer reported that the two “soon 
established a warm and close relationship,” he nonetheless felt that turning over field 
command of US combat forces to a foreign officer was a “serious error,” and from a 
purely military point of view, his argument makes sense.32  Diplomatically, however, an 
international peacekeeping force under OAS control was far more palatable in Latin 
America than one under US control.  Conveniently, the IAPF would also be working 
toward the same goals as the United States: to end the violence and to prevent a 
communist takeover.33   In effect, the move simultaneously reinforced the principles of 
objective, legitimacy, and unity of effort. 
 One factor that facilitated cooperation among the IAPF’s combined staff was that 
many of the Latin American officers were graduates of the US Army’s Command and 
General Staff College or the US Army-operated School of the Americas, then located in 
the Panama Canal Zone.  Palmer reports these shared experiences “gave us a common 
understanding with respect to military terms and procedures, and accelerated our progress 
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as an effective and reliable staff.”34  At the same time, Palmer applauded General 
Alvim’s decision to organize the Latin American troops into a separate brigade in order 
to “preserve the integrity of [the Latin American] troops as an entity, which was 
important psychologically and enhanced their pride and spirit.”35 
 With the creation of the IAPF, the legitimacy of US intervention was enhanced.36  
The military’s need for security wrought by unilateral action and US command was 
forced to accommodate the US government’s need for the legitimacy that could be gained 
by international unity of effort.  In spite of his concerns, Palmer understood the bigger 
issue.  “On the balance,” he wrote, “the 6 May resolution was timely and useful.  It 
clearly came as a relief to many nations of the hemisphere and provided the United States 
an umbrella of legitimacy.”37 
 Such an understanding was achieved in large part because of Palmer’s 
acknowledgement of the need for the diplomatic and military efforts to “work hand in 
glove.”38  He understood the principle that “in any given operation, one individual should 
be charged with planning and carrying out approved actions and programs, especially in 
the field,” and in the Dominican Republic, Palmer recognized that “Ambassador Bunker 
was clearly in charge.”39  When Palmer received his initial assignment, the only advice 
General Wheeler gave him was “to seek out the US ambassador and stick to him like a 
burr.”  Palmer noted “it was good advice that was to pay off.” 40  As the operation 
progressed, he had a direct phone line installed between his desk and Ambassador 
Bunker’s to provide secure and private access.41  The two men soon established an 
excellent working relationship. 
 Wheeler’s assessment and Palmer’s response are especially noteworthy given the 
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lack of reciprocity in some political circles.  President Johnson, for example, excluded all 
military officials, to include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the executive 
deliberations in the first five days of the developing the crisis.42  Palmer mused, “It seems 
obvious that a responsible senior military individual should have participated in those 
earlier decisions.”43  Still, he recognized “an integration of effort means that there must 
be close civilian-military relations at high decision-making levels.” 44  Since that 
appeared unlikely at the presidential level, Palmer actively pursued a synergistic 
relationship with Ambassador Bunker.45  Rather than creating a power struggle between 
the diplomatic and military agendas, Palmer submitted to civilian authority, and, largely 
thanks to his professionalism, the US achieved unity of effort. 
Security   
 While the political and military communities had some trouble coordinating the 
issues of legitimacy and unity of effort, they did agree on the principle of security as it 
applied to the wisdom of the initial introduction of sufficient combat power.  
Nonetheless, motivations for the large force structure varied, and not all can be explained 
by purely operational military necessity.  Michael Grow argues President Johnson 
intended “to send an unmistakable message to multiple audiences, foreign and domestic: 
that under the Johnson administration, and under Lyndon Johnson’s personal presidential 
leadership, the United States was fully prepared to project its power internationally in 
defense of its interests.”46  The end result was that, for a variety of reasons, security was a 
major initial planning concern. 
 The operational problem in the Dominican Republic was that, before the US 
intervention, whichever side thought itself to have the military advantage showed little 
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inclination to submit to negotiations.47  President Dwight Eisenhower had been faced 
with a similar situation in the early phases of the 1958 Lebanon crisis, and his decision to 
deploy a large number of troops had succeeded in creating a powerful show of force that 
encouraged a negotiated settlement.  It seemed like a good example to follow.  
Conversely, the recent Bay of Pigs fiasco showed the dangers of a less resolute course, 
and Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, and other veterans of the Kennedy administration appear 
to have been affected profoundly by that experience.  Palmer, too, felt that a large force 
was justified because “in the beginning no one was sure what the internal situation might 
bring, especially whether the revolt might spread to the countryside.”48  Thus President 
Johnson “urged the relevant military advisors to review the Dominican Republic 
contingency plan to assure that there would be enough troops in Santo Domingo to deal 
with any foreseeable eventuality.”49   
 Palmer concurs with the wisdom of a decisive response.  “Sending too small a 
force,” he explains, “can backfire by accomplishing only a stalemate or, worse, failing 
the mission entirely…. The presence of ample force is more likely in the end to result in 
fewer human casualties, combatant and noncombatant, and less material damage as well; 
sending an inadequate force is more likely to have the opposite effect.”  Once the 
decision to intervene has been made, Palmer cautions against “sending a boy to do a 
man’s work.”50   The results, he argues, speak for themselves.  “It was clearly 
demonstrated,” according to Palmer, “that the rapid troop buildup in the Santo Domingo 
area allowed us to stabilize the situation on land quickly, which in turn permitted a 
significant and rapid phasedown of US troop strength.”51 
 Domestically, Johnson had other incentives to provide a decisive force because he 
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feared that a setback in the Caribbean would weaken his political base and endanger his 
Great Society program.  Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., warned Johnson that failure “to avert a 
communist takeover” in the Dominican Republic would “probably” mean “losing the 
House of Representatives next year.”52  Moreover, any weakness against communist 
expansion would alienate the powerful congressional conservatives who were critical to 
the passage of Johnson’s civil rights, anti-poverty, and medical care reforms.  Peter 
Felten believes Johnson, by his strong response in the Dominican Republic, was likely 
trying “to appease conservatives on foreign policy in order to win their tolerance of 
reform at home.”53  
 Strategically, the looming crisis in Vietnam helped recommend a strong response 
as well.  Criticizing what he calls a case of “Texan overkill,” Undersecretary of State 
George Ball claims, “Johnson’s excessive use of power and effort in the Dominican 
Republic reflected a wider preoccupation.  We were just on the verge of committing large 
numbers of American combat forces to Vietnam and the President feared that a disaster 
close to home might lead more Americans to challenge our adventure ten thousand miles 
away.”54  Palmer dismisses such criticisms, writing, “In my opinion the hindsight 
judgment of too much force is neither fair nor accurate, because the use of overwhelming 
force, properly controlled, can save lives and reduce collateral material damage.”55 
 Johnson obviously agreed with Palmer, and the president had even considered 
sending a more robust force, initially authorizing the commitment of not just the 4th 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade and the entire 82nd, but the 101st Airborne Division as 
well.56  However, Johnson later opted against deploying the 101st in order to lend 
credibility to his desire for a negotiated settlement.57  Reducing the size of the force 
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helped Johnson shore up the weakness the operation had regarding legitimacy.  It was a 
relatively easy decision.  Even without the 101st, the US contingent was adequate for the 
task at hand, and the principle of security was met in terms of available forces.            
Restraint    
 This accommodation of the principle of security, however, would be mitigated by 
considerations regarding restraint.  The large force would not be allowed to act with a 
free hand.  Palmer astutely described Operation Power Pack as being “more political than 
military,” and early in the operation, he recognized that it was “inevitable that 
Washington is going to take direct control.” 58  Sensing President Johnson’s sensitivity to 
casualties, Palmer ensured that “in all our operations the minimizing of loss of life and of 
property damage was an integral part of our planning.”59  That the US military could 
successfully perform its mission under these circumstances is a testimony to the 
military’s outstanding discipline, a characteristic so prevalent that Lawrence Yates 
describes it as “the critical element in the performance of the US troops in the Dominican 
intervention.”60   
 The marines initially established an ISZ around the American and other embassies 
in western Santo Domingo, and the 82nd secured the San Isidro Airfield, the San Isidro 
Highway, and the Duarte Bridge.  The area between the two forces, however, was firmly 
in the hands of the rebels.  On May 3, the 82nd established a line of communication 
(LOC) linking the marine and army forces.  Palmer directed the operation be conducted 
in darkness, in part to “minimize civilian noncombatant casualties and property damage.” 
61  With the establishment of the LOC, the ever-present political concerns became even 
more pronounced, and the principle of restraint began to eclipse the principle of 
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security.62   
 The most obvious manifestation of these considerations was in the tactical rules of 
engagement (TACROE).  Because one of President Johnson’s stated goals for Power 
Pack was “to save the lives of all people,” the initial TACROE for the Dominican 
Republic served both a humanitarian and political purpose.63  The main battleground was 
Santo Domingo, which was a congested and explosive city with a population of half a 
million people.  Former Ambassador Martin increasingly was concerned with the danger 
of “a US ‘Hungary’- a frontal assault on the ‘rebel’ stronghold in Ciudad Nueva, with US 
troops slaughtering thousands of Dominicans, including innocents.”64  Thus the military 
was limited in its use of tanks and indirect fire to prevent collateral damage.  With this 
consideration in mind, the 82nd redeployed all but one of its artillery batteries by the end 
of May 1965 and did not even bring its tanks.  The marines did, in fact, bring tanks but 
did not use them.  Few argued the merits of these restrictions.65 
 Less palatable was the injunction not to fire unless fired upon.  However, this too 
proved to be a necessary measure because of the initial difficulties in friend or foe 
identification, an aggressive spirit amongst the troops, and imperfect fire discipline.  
Needless casualties caused by any of these factors would have seriously hindered the 
conclusion of a diplomatic solution and the legitimacy of the operation.66 
 However, as the intervention progressed, control from Washington became even 
more complex and confusing to the soldier on the ground.  The general rule not to fire 
unless fired upon gradually became stricter and stricter until the end result was a 
prohibition against firing unless the soldier’s position was in imminent danger of being 
overrun.  Of course, the rebels took full advantage of this situation.  It was not 
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uncommon for an openly armed sniper to stroll down the middle of the street past an 
American position, fire his weapon, and then depart as nonchalantly as he came--often 
pronouncing his exit with an obscene gesture directed at the Americans.67  American 
soldiers also were subjected to frequent harassing fire from a tall hospital building, 
conspicuously draped in Red Cross flags.68  Under these conditions, sniper fire eventually 
accounted for the majority of the American casualties in the Dominican Republic.69  In 
other cases, soldiers were required to watch passively as rebels unloaded a freighter of 
ammunition within plain view of the American positions.70  Obeying such rules 
endangered both soldier safety and morale, but disobeying them would violate the 
sanctity of the chain of command and risk court martial.  Many commanders developed 
ingenious ways of walking a thin tightrope between compliance and military necessity, 
but in general, they followed the rules.71 
        Higher headquarters were involved in all details of the TACROE to include 
restrictions on the use of tear gas and flamethrowers, and the designation of no-patrol 
areas.   When one unit emplaced a string of lights on their perimeter to deter nighttime 
sniper attacks, the Constitutionalists protested, resulting in an order to remove the lights.  
Such circumstances moved Army Chief of Staff General Harold Johnson to remark, “One 
thing that must be remembered...is that the command of squads has now been transferred 
to Washington and is not necessarily limited to the Pentagon either.”72         
 The astute Palmer called the more restrictive TACROE a “logical step,” because 
he understood that although the situation was a difficult one, restraint actually served the 
ultimate objective.73  The US military’s goal was an effective ceasefire, but Palmer knew 
“a quiet, stabilized situation in Santo Domingo was the last thing the rebels wanted.”  
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Fomenting unrest and continuing the fighting met their political agenda.  Thus, Palmer 
endeavored “to improve our own discipline and discourage firing on the part of our 
troops unless there was sufficient and good provocation.”74 
 Palmer’s philosophy received perhaps its toughest test when the rebels made one 
last effort to expand out of their Ciudad Nueva stronghold on June 15.  Elements of the 
82nd quickly checked the rebel progress and were in the midst of a counterattack, but 
Palmer knew that “wiping out the rebel zone would leave the OAS and the United States 
open to the charge of perpetuating ‘the Budapest of the Western Hemisphere.’”75  Calling 
it “the most disagreeable task I ever had to do,” Palmer halted the successful operation 
midstride and ordered the 82nd to consolidate its position “in the most defensible 
locations available.”76 
 The Ciudad Nueva operation presented the IAPF an opportunity to “take matters 
into its own hands,” but instead it acted with political sensitivity and military restraint.  
The IAPF used enough force to halt the uprising and seriously weaken the rebels 
militarily, but it remained “responsive to OAS political guidance and control.”  As a 
result, Palmer reports, “the negotiating position of the OAS Ad Hoc Committee was 
immeasurably strengthened.”  Because a negotiated outcome is what was ultimately 
desired, Palmer was confident “we did the right thing.”77 
 As much operational sense as this approach made, for many soldiers such a 
situation was highly unnatural.   According to Sam Sarkesian, “Once committed, the 
military professional expects to employ the resources at hand to quickly prevail; it is 
unconscionable not to use the most effective weaponry and tactics to subdue the 
enemy.”78  In the Dominican Republic, the military would not be allowed to act in 
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accordance with this expected premium on security.  Nonetheless, the US soldiers 
conducted themselves in concert with the situation’s political demands for restraint.  
When Palmer issued the difficult order to halt the Ciudad Nueva operation, he reports, 
“To their great credit, the division leaders understood and accepted the orders without 
complaint.”79 
 A variety of observers share Palmer’s assessment of the exceptionally measured 
conduct of the American soldiers.  For example, Yates notes that “if restraint provided 
the key to a political solution to the crisis, discipline provided the key to restraint.”80  
Peter Chew, after observing a rifle platoon from the 82nd, noted that “the ‘don’t fire until 
fired upon’ conditions require[d] the sternest discipline.”81  Likewise, Charles Moskos, 
Jr., who also accompanied elements of the 82nd, noted that “their exceptional personal 
discipline had been a major factor in the successful accomplishment of their mission.”82  
Moskos cited examples in which soldiers resisted taunts from young Dominicans, took 
steps to avoid injuring noncombatants though this “consideration was not conspicuously 
evident within the opposing ‘rebel’ and ‘junta’ forces,” and ignored enemy efforts to 
“provoke US  soldiers into creating incidents that could be used for propaganda 
purposes.”83   Echoing Moskos’ remarks, Chew relates having observed a Dominican 
woman openly giving instructions to a concealed sniper.  The woman chanced such 
blatant belligerence because, as one paratrooper explained, “I guess she knows we don’t 
shoot women.  We don’t play by those rules.”84  Moskos concluded that the Americans 
“exhibited grace under pressure.”85  Soldier discipline and Palmer’s political awareness 
were critical to this process, but without the operation’s inherent adherence to security 
afforded by the large force size, such restraint would have been much more difficult to 
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achieve.  Still, of all the principles, restraint was the one most required in the Dominican 
Republic, and one the American soldiers executed quite admirably. 
Perseverance   
 This high degree of restraint worked hand in hand with the principle of 
perseverance.  Palmer knew that the Washington-imposed rules clashed with military 
expediency, and he was a tireless advocate for the military’s point of view.  Still he 
appreciated the need for perseverance in stability operations and recognized that, in the 
long-run, a negotiated political settlement, rather than a heavy-handed military one, was 
in the best interests of both the US and the Dominican Republic.86  “Diplomacy and force 
are not black-and-white alternatives,” he explained, “but must be closely intermeshed for 
the best prospects of success.”87   Rudolph Barnes contends that mission success in 
OOTW “requires military leaders who can combine military proficiency with the finesse 
of a diplomat,” and to this end, Yates describes Palmer as one of a handful of US officers 
who truly grasped the “political-military” nature of Power Pack.88  As a testimony to 
Palmer’s character, Yates speculates that. “had a general officer not possessed of 
Palmer’s ‘political sensitivity’ been in charge of the US forces, the outcome of the crisis 
might have been decidedly different.”89 
 One of Palmer’s initiatives to help boost the negotiation effort was a series of 
information programs and a daily news bulletin for the 82nd troops to help them 
understand why they were in the Dominican Republic and thus prevent incidents between 
them and the often hostile rebel-inspired crowds.90  The American soldiers had been 
trained to fight and had not been adequately sensitized to political-military considerations 
when the deployment began.91   As soon as Palmer had the military situation relatively 
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stable, he began placing greater emphasis on civil affairs and humanitarian aid.  Palmer’s 
command climate and political acumen helped his soldiers adopt a more patient and 
measured approach. 
 The end result of the combined military and civic actions was that in just three 
weeks the Power Pack forces had separated the combatants and imposed a military 
stalemate that ensured the situation would be resolved by negotiation and compromise 
rather than armed conflict.  Once the LOC had been established, Palmer noted increased 
chances of success “in achieving a political settlement because US troops were in a 
position to prevent either side from defeating the other.”92  Time was now working 
against the belligerents and in favor of the US and international peacekeeping effort.93  
Perseverance was working. 
 Nonetheless, given the rather contentious nature of the intervention and the 
growing involvement in Vietnam, the US was eager to get its forces out of the Dominican 
Republic as soon as some sense of stability had been reestablished.  This condition would 
require finding and imposing a political solution that occupied what Palmer called “the 
‘practical middle ground’ between the extreme Left and Right.”94  Such a solution would 
be very complicated to achieve.  As a contemporary news report assessed, in the 
Dominican Republic, the US was finding “it is easier to move into a country with military 
force than to get out again.”95  Success would depend on the US’s ability to practice the 
principle of perseverance in the face of mounting pressure to bring Power Pack to a 
conclusion. 
 Complicating the situation was the US’s continuing awkward attempts to maintain 
neutrality, now as part of the IAPF.  Up to this point, the US had found itself providing 
114 
 
 
 
 
foreign aid to both the junta and the rebels, although the majority went to the junta.96  In 
the long term, Ambassador Bunker favored establishing a “middle road” government, not 
necessarily associated with either the Constitutionalists or the Loyalists.97  The solution 
finally came on September 3, when Hector Garcia-Godoy, a Dominican businessman and 
diplomat, and the OAS’s hand-picked moderate candidate, took the oath of office as 
president.  With this development, the IAPF shed its neutrality and became the protector 
of Garcia-Godoy’s Provisional Government.98 
 With Garcia-Godoy’s inauguration, violence in the Dominican Republic dropped 
to the point that the US could resume the troop withdrawals that it had begun two months 
earlier.  Still, the continued presence of the IAPF proved essential to Garcia-Godoy’s 
survival, and the IAPF and Palmer were instrumental in removing General Wessin, who, 
as the leader of the archconservative military faction that had ousted President Bosch in 
1963, posed a serious threat to Garcia-Godoy.  With Wessin gone, the IADF also 
demilitarized the rebel stronghold of Ciudad Nueva.   
 The adherence to the principle of perseverance in the Dominican Republic is 
consistent with Roland Paris’s prescription for “institutions before liberalization” (IBL).   
The key elements of Paris’s strategy are to wait until conditions are ripe for elections, to 
design an electoral system that rewards moderation, to promote good civil society, to 
control hate speech, to adopt conflict-reducing economic policies, and to produce the 
common denominator of rebuilding effective state institutions.99   Ambassador Bunker 
seems to have intuitively understood Paris’s logic and also knew the process would take 
time.  Fortunately, Bunker by nature was able to remain patient and unhurried, even 
under great stress.100  To provide the time he needed, “the IAPF settled down for a ‘long, 
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hot summer’ of keeping the peace and holding the belligerents apart, while the protracted 
OAS negotiations continued.”101  
  Paris argues that elections are inherently competitive processes that may, in fact, 
merely result in the rise to power of forces “dedicated to the violent destruction of their 
rivals.”102  Thus, he argues that elections must be delayed until a time when they can be 
held not only in a free and fair manner, but also in a way that advances the development 
of a stable democracy and reduces the risk of renewed violence.  This outcome requires 
an assessment of the political parties likely to participate in the election and the 
institutional setting in which the election will take place.103 
 Ambassador Bunker addressed these conditions by visualizing elections in the 
Dominican Republic as coming as the result of two separate stages.  The first was 
establishing a third-force government, and the second was laying the foundation for the 
electoral process.104  Garcia-Godoy was an effective choice for the first condition because 
he had no direct ties with either of the civil war’s belligerent parties.105  The second 
condition was facilitated by two principal documents: “The Institutional Act” and “The 
Act of Reconciliation.”  The Institutional Act established the parameters of Garcia-
Godoy’s provisional government, outlined the conditions for the elections, and delineated 
the power and authority of elected officials.  The Act of Reconciliation addressed issues 
such as amnesty, demilitarization, public order, reintegration of ex-rebels or their safe 
voluntary departure from the country, and the withdrawal of the IAPF.106   
Paris also considers the situation to be particularly dangerous in cases “in which the 
principal contenders for election are the very individuals or organizations that recently 
fought the civil war.”107  He encourages “peacebuilders” to employ “a variety of means” 
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to combat this threat, and in the Dominican Republic a very effective solution was to 
“persuade the Dominican military leaders of the crisis period, loyalist and 
constitutionalist, to leave the country voluntarily for an indefinite period of time as a 
patriotic act.”108  Key departures included rebel leader Francisco Caamano and loyalist 
Caminero Rivera.109  Even staunch anti-communist Wessin was subjected to a rather 
“unceremonious removal,” which was troubling to Alvim, but which Palmer considered 
“on the balance…for the best.”110 
 As a result of this groundwork, when the elections were held on June 1, there was 
“a record voter turnout and a minimum of untoward incidents.”111  A variety of 
international observers monitored the proceedings and declared them free and honest.112  
The moderate candidate, Joaquin Balaguer, emerged with almost 57 percent of the vote 
compared to 39 percent for Bosch.113  Palmer took great pride in the fact that “the new 
government assumed power under a constitution and electoral process that had not been 
imposed from without but had been drawn up by Dominicans.”114  Allowing the people 
of the Dominican Republic to take a measure of ownership of their own destiny was a 
key to the successful transition. 
 Balaguer held power for twelve years, and his rule certainly cannot be considered 
a liberal democracy.  Yet while he restored much of the authoritarianism of the Trujillo 
era to the presidency, Balaguer was “beloved for his beguiling, parental embrace of the 
country’s most destitute people.”115  His successor, Antonio Guzman, ushered in a 
transition to a more liberal, democratic style of politics and government, and, given the 
tradition of authoritarianism in the Dominican Republic, it is perhaps fair to take the long 
view of this process as being a part of a continuum.116 
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 Another piece of Paris’s IBL strategy that was adhered to in the Dominican 
Republic is the necessity of controlling hate speech.  He advocates regulating the 
activities of news media that incite hatred and violence as well as developing responsible 
news outlets that provide accurate sources of information.117  Radio Santo Domingo had 
become the “primary weapon” of the rebels in launching a “psychological offensive” 
against the United States and the OAS.118  The transition government launched a military 
strike on several Radio Santo Domingo sites on May 13 and 14, 1965, which reduced the 
rebels’ ability to broadcast outside the capital. 119  Garcia-Godoy ultimately got some 
control of the facility, but it was still dominated by leftists who broadcast inflammatory 
messages.  In October, a clandestine “Radio San Isidro” also began transmitting anti-
government programs.120   
Radio Santo Domingo remained problematic until December when Garcia-Godoy 
was able to install a more moderate and neutral director and staff.121  Resolving this issue 
well before the June 1966 elections was critical because, as Palmer notes, “In a civil war, 
propaganda is a deadly weapon, and words can at times be more effective than 
bullets.”122  In the Dominican Republic, Yates considered the propaganda generated by 
Radio Santo Domingo to be “the ‘biggest thorn’ in the side of the Americans.”123  It 
could not simply be ignored.  In answer to critics who see targeting such opposition sites 
as an infringement on free speech, Samuel Huntington notes that “authority has to exist 
before it can be limited,”124 and Paris observes that in 1997, NATO forces in Bosnia 
seized control of a key transmitter belonging to a Bosnian Serb radio station that had 
been broadcasting inflammatory propaganda.125 
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 A final aspect of Paris’s model that can be highlighted by the experience in the 
Dominican Republic is his contention that the “first task of peacebuilding is to restore 
[the Weberian monopoly over the legitimate use of force] as a foundation and 
precondition for all further institution-building efforts.”126  This requirement was 
problematic in the Dominican Republic because the Dominican National Police (DNP) 
had become demoralized and disorganized.  Palmer oversaw the DNP’s slow restoration 
to effectiveness and began their limited use in patrolling the ISZ, which lay in the “better 
part” of the city.  He restricted them from the rebel sector and prohibited them from 
making any political arrests.127  By the time Garcia-Godoy took office, the OAS Ad Hoc 
Committee was confident enough to grant the DNP full police powers under the authority 
of the new president.128  As a testimony to the rejuvenation of the asset, a special element 
of the DNP, equipped with helmets, armor vests, and heavier weapons on loan from the 
Americans, spearheaded the move to demilitarize downtown Santo Domingo by moving 
into Ciudad Nueva and taking over police jurisdiction.  Half of this force was comprised 
from the regular police and the other half from ex-rebels who had police experience.129  
The restoration of the DNP was a necessary step in establishing the credibility of the new 
Dominican government. 
Paris notes that proponents of the “quick and dirty” approach may argue that IBL 
takes too long.  He counters that “the danger of prolonged deployment is one that must be 
faced and accepted if the goal of peacebuilding is to foster a stable and lasting peace.”  
He adds that “the IBL strategy does not preclude the judicious use of timetables to 
maintain the forward momentum of a peacebuilding mission.”130  Palmer concurs that the 
military commitment must make steady progress to conclusion.  “The intervening forces 
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should get in and get out as soon as possible,” he argues. “Stability operations of this 
nature are, in a sense, deadly situations: the longer the forces stay, the worse things are 
likely to become.”131  Thus, there appears to be a useful tension between staying long 
enough and not staying too long.  Power Pack, with its willingness to build institutions 
before rushing to hold elections, but at the same time having the pressure of Vietnam to 
provide a sense of urgency, appears to have satisfied Paris’s vision.132 
 Events have proved the wisdom of the measured and long-term approach 
advocated by Paris and practiced by Palmer and his colleagues.  Power Pack helped set 
the stage for decades of relative peace in the Dominican Republic.  Especially in sharp 
contrast to the chronic instability of neighboring Haiti, the Dominican Republic has been 
relatively calm.133 
Conclusion 
The US intervention in the Dominican Republic was a successful OOTW.  It 
represents a mix of consistent adherence to some OOTWs and evolving adherence to 
others.  It contained no cases of strong failure to adhere to any one principle. 
Throughout its duration, Operation Power Pack demonstrated extremely strong adherence 
to the principles of security and restraint.  The American force was massive in size and 
capability, but the rules of engagement were strict, and soldier discipline was exemplary.  
The American involvement was also characterized by an adherence to the principle of 
perseverance in efforts to help transition the Dominican Republic to a new government.  
In this regard, the US demonstrated some of the characteristics of Paris’s “IBL” strategy. 
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Operation Power Pack suffered from an ambiguous objective that was potentially 
problematic for the military.  This deficiency was mitigated by the political sensitivity of 
General Palmer and the military’s willingness to subordinate itself to civilian authority. 
Adherence to the principles of legitimacy and unity of effort began problematically but 
progressed to satisfaction.  The unilateral nature of the initial deployment and America’s 
legacy of imperialism in the Caribbean posed a serious challenge to the operation’s 
legitimacy.  The subsequent significant role of the OAS and IAPF helped reverse this 
deficiency as well as enhancing international unity of effort.   The breach in unity of 
effort between the American political and military establishments was in large part 
repaired by the close interpersonal interaction between Palmer and Bunker. 
This analysis suggests relationships among several of the principles, both in terms 
of correlation and balanced application.  Like Operation Bluebat in Lebanon, Operation 
Power Pack highlights the opportunity for restraint that is facilitated by adherence to the 
principle of security.  Security “complements and complicates” restraint, and too much of 
one can be problematic for the other.134  Palmer was able to strike the proper balance, 
noting “although large and powerful forces were deployed to the region, the United States 
showed great restraint, using only the minimum force appropriate to the situation—a 
basic principle in dealing with a problem such as the 1965 Dominican case.”135  Also like 
Operation Bluebat, the US-centric anticommunist strategic objective negatively impacted 
legitimacy, but the US accepted this risk in pursuit of its Cold War agenda and perception 
of national interests.  The requirement for security generated by the operational objective 
of the NEO recommended unilateral action at the expense of unity of effort.  Once this 
immediate objective was accomplished and the strategic objective of transitioning the 
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Dominican Republic to a stable country that was safe from communist threat gained 
dominance, the US exhibited the prerequisite perseverance.  Like Operation Bluebat, this 
case study suggests that perseverance is a function of objective in that perseverance must 
be assessed in the context of being directed toward a specific objective.  The US 
experience in the Dominican Republic strongly supports the utility of the principles of 
OOTW as a planning and analytical tool and a predictor of operational outcome. 
 
Table 4  
 
Adherence to Principles of OOTW during US Intervention in the Dominican Republic 
 
 Strong 
adherence 
General 
adherence 
Neutral General 
lack of 
adherence 
Strong lack 
of 
adherence 
Legitimacy  x    
Objective  x    
Perseverance x     
Restraint x     
Security x     
Unity of 
effort 
 x    
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CHAPTER V 
VIETNAM PACIFICATION: THE PRIMACY OF OBJECTIVE 
In a “people’s war,” the center of gravity is the people.  The US only belatedly 
realized this to be the true nature of the Vietnam War and then embarked on a dizzying 
array of initiatives and organizations that collectively represented the “pacification 
program.”  America’s lackluster and haphazard pursuit of pacification highlights the 
objective principle of OOTW because of the program’s perceived competition with an 
alternative strategy that saw victory as coming from more conventional battlefield 
victories.  In part as an extension of its problems with objective, pacification also failed 
to adhere to the principles of security and legitimacy.  It demonstrated an evolving 
adherence to unity of effort, and its adherence to restraint was mixed.  Like the rest of the 
war effort, pacification suffered from a critical lack of perseverance, and America 
withdrew from Vietnam in 1973.  As a result of this OOTW, the US failed in its objective 
of securing South Vietnam from a communist insurgency.  
Background 
After the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu, the 1954 Geneva Accords 
divided Vietnam in two halves, one led by Ho Chi Minh in the north and the other by 
Emperor Bao Dai in the south.  Elections that would ultimately unify Vietnam were 
scheduled to occur two years later.  In October 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem became the first 
president of the newly formed Republic of South Vietnam, and the US established the 
Military Advisory and Assistance Group for Vietnam (MAAGV) to support the fledgling 
ally.  When the date set by the Geneva Accords passed without the promised countrywide 
elections, Ho launched a protracted war to realize his vision of a united, communist 
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Vietnam.  By 1958, an estimated 12,000 Vietcong (VC) or Vietnamese Communists were 
operating in South Vietnam, creating a Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) that would enable 
Ho’s insurgency. 
The VC’s primary target was South Vietnam’s peasantry, and the pacification 
campaign was designed to shield them from this threat while at the same time 
strengthening their commitment to the South Vietnamese government.   Of all the 
situations that made the South Vietnamese rural population vulnerable to VC 
exploitation, perhaps the most frustrating was the critical need for land reform.  The 
Agroville Program was an early pacification initiative intended to address this condition.1  
Beginning in 1958, the Diem government used a combination of direct force and 
incentives to relocate peasants scattered throughout the countryside into large 
communities called Agrovilles.  The initial focus area for the effort was the Mekong 
Delta where the dispersed pattern of settlement exacerbated the security problem.  
Villages were strung out for miles along canals and waterways, making them vulnerable 
to communist infiltration.  In a classic example of denial and oversimplification, 
President Diem felt that it was this geographic isolation that made the peasants easy prey 
rather than considering that the VC might actually be appealing to the people by meeting 
their needs.  Thus, in Diem’s mind, relocation would free the people from the clutches of 
the enemy and the problem would be solved.2  
In addition to relocating the population, Diem wanted to secure the people’s 
allegiance by making them aware of their larger national identity.  To accomplish this 
goal, he emphasized collective action, self-help, and hard work--ideas that were all 
subject to abuses.  Provincial officials conscripted thousands of peasants for construction 
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work without pay, drafting many more than were actually needed.  The construction 
interrupted the farmers’ efforts to bring in their harvests, and a scarcity of construction 
equipment forced the projects to be completed largely by manual labor.  Rather than 
correcting this problem, the government boasted that because of the absence of machines, 
“the people should feel that this was something they had done themselves.”3  In another 
selfish manipulation, Diem argued that the peasants had to build the Agrovilles 
themselves in order to free Vietnam from foreign dependence.  In the process, he was 
able to protect the project from the American oversight that he feared would limit his 
options.4 
Diem characteristically set a rushed pace for the Agrovilles in spite of providing 
only limited resources.  The government allocated the equivalent of $13,000 for each 
settlement, although estimates for some centers were two-thirds greater than that.  The 
pressure of limited time and money led to additional conscriptions as officials 
emphasized signs of physical progress rather than peasant satisfaction.  Of course, these 
increased demands only served to alienate the peasants further and clearly demonstrated 
the program’s lack of adherence to the principle of legitimacy.  In the end, the Agroville 
Program served more to exacerbate the problem rather than help it.5 
Under pressure from the Americans, Diem finally agreed in March 1960 to slow 
down the construction of Agrovilles in order to alleviate the program’s excesses, and this 
deceleration eventually turned into a gradual abandonment of the program.  With only 
twenty centers having been built and further construction lagging far behind, Diem 
announced in September that the program would be halted.  He explained his decision by 
citing monetary difficulties, but US Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow, recognizing the 
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program’s lack of legitimacy, speculated that “perhaps [Diem] has finally been convinced 
that the ‘real cost’ is the loss of popular support for his regime.”6 
The failure of the Agroville program left the pacification effort somewhat adrift.  
Not only had the Agrovilles failed to stem the insurgency, they seemed to have 
contributed to it.  Diem now found himself under increasing pressure to adopt the US-
styled policies he had hoped to avoid.  In response, Diem’s brother Nhu began plans for a 
successor to the Agrovilles that became known as the Strategic Hamlet Program.  Based 
on a program that had worked well for the British in Malaya, the idea was to concentrate 
the rural population in a limited number of fortified villages to provide them physical 
security against the VC.  By focusing on existing settlements, rather than attempting to 
build new ones, the Strategic Hamlet Program hoped to avoid some of the construction 
problems that had plagued the Agrovilles.  Once security was established, social 
programs that would hopefully foster government allegiance were planned to follow.7  
The Strategic Hamlet Program was largely a failure.  Unlike the Chinese 
immigrant squatters who were the subject of the British relocations in Malaya, the 
Buddhist South Vietnamese had ancestral ties to the land, and moving interrupted their 
practice of veneration of ancestors.  Additionally, the relocations caused the peasants to 
abandon generations of hard work and took vital, arable land out of production, which 
hampered economic progress.  In the new hamlets, the peasants had to start over from 
scratch, without compensation for their labor or loss.  These factors obviously led to a 
disgruntled population that was ripe for VC exploitation, a situation facilitated by the fact 
that many VC secretly relocated to the new hamlets with the rest of the population.  
Many peasants were so alienated by the entire ordeal that they slipped away from the 
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hamlets and returned to their ancestral lands.  This development greatly hindered one of 
the goals of the relocation, which was to create free fire zones in the vacated areas based 
on the assumption that anyone there now was a VC.8 
As part of the program, the VC-controlled areas that could not be penetrated by 
the government were subjected to random bombardment by artillery and aircraft in order 
to drive the people into the safety of the strategic hamlets.  This process created tens of 
thousands of refugees, which Diem advertised as a show of political support-- the 
population voting with its feet--as the people fled the VC to government-held territory.  
In actuality, the refugees were angered by this dangerous disruption to their lives, and 
they resented the government as the instrument of it.9 
The relocations created other problems as well, including the perception that if 
relocation was necessary in the first place, then security must be weak.  Many peasants 
were left with the impression that if the South Vietnamese government was not able to 
secure even its allies, fully supporting the government would be dangerous.  Finally, by 
moving the population away from the countryside, a significant, if imperfect, source of 
intelligence was lost.10  Summing up the Strategic Hamlet’s failure to address the needs 
of the South Vietnamese people, Dave Palmer concludes the program was “executed with 
too little real feeling for the human beings involved.”11 
All these problems were exacerbated by reporting inaccuracies that served to 
further weaken perceptions of the program’s legitimacy.  By the summer of 1962, the 
Diem government claimed to have established 3,225 strategic hamlets, which held over 
four million people or one-third of South Vietnam’s population.  When the Diem regime 
collapsed in October 1963, it became apparent that many of these hamlets existed on 
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paper only, and the reporting was part of a South Vietnamese misinformation campaign 
to deceive the Americans.  As a case in point, the number of “secure” hamlets in Long 
An Province was revised downward from over 200 to about 10 after Diem’s death.12  
Accurately measuring the success of the effort would be a common difficulty throughout 
the pacification program and a continual challenge to its legitimacy. 
As with the Agrovilles, the result of the Strategic Hamlet Program was “less 
rather than more security in the countryside.”13  Still searching for a solution, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, who was Durbrow’s successor as US Ambassador in Saigon, proposed 
another pacification program called Hop Tac in June 1964.  In this effort, pacification 
would spread outward from Saigon like a “giant oil spot” or concentric “rings of steel.”  
In this way, the capital city would be safeguarded because the enemy could never reach it 
through the secured outer rings.  By September, South Vietnamese troops were 
implementing Lodge’s plan, but a year later, little progress had been made.14 
Part of the difficulty was that the Americans were still having problems 
understanding the situation in Vietnam and determining the correct objective.  Language 
such as “rings of steel” reflected an attitude that the war could be won by isolating the 
population from the enemy rather than addressing the fundamental problems that made 
the population vulnerable in the first place.  Progress in these areas would be difficult, 
however, because of the weak commitment of the South Vietnamese government to real 
reform.  In fact, Hop Tac revealed the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) to be a 
largely political organization structured more as a private force designed to protect the 
regime from a coup than a professional army motivated to protect the population from the 
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VC.  The result was that ARVN “evinced little enthusiasm or aptitude for taking on the 
‘village war.’”15 
Hop Tac also suffered from a lack of unity of effort.  The South Vietnamese 
clearly desired to run the pacification program without outside interference, and they 
perceived Hop Tac almost exclusively as an American plan.  Thus, there was little 
incentive for them to execute it enthusiastically since, even if it succeeded, the credit 
would go elsewhere.  On the other hand, while increased South Vietnamese autonomy 
potentially would help pacification’s legitimacy, it had also been shown to lead to 
inefficiency and a lack of accountability.   South Vietnamese government officials thus 
far had demonstrated a reluctance to support reforms if compliance would weaken their 
power, and their self-serving execution of many pacification programs actually drove 
some South Vietnamese to the VC side.  Hop Tac showed that the Americans and South 
Vietnamese still had not achieved an appropriate level of cooperation and common 
purpose in their battle against the communists.16 
Hop Tac also failed to recognize the essentially decentralized nature of 
Vietnamese society.  While it seemed logical and businesslike to the American mind to 
work from the center out and to look to government for centralized solutions, such an 
attitude was antithetical to the severely localized nature of rural Vietnamese society.  The 
end result was almost a reverse oil spot model.  First, the VC were able to defeat and 
displace ARVN units.  Then, VC political cadres worked out from previously held areas 
into the newly available territory to expand VC control and influence at the expense of 
the South Vietnamese government.17  In this regard, Hop Tac had clearly failed to adhere 
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to the principle of security.  With this latest disappointing effort, the pacification problem 
continued to appear to defy solution. 
Analysis of the Principles 
 
Legitimacy   
Recognizing sufficient progress was not being made, President Lyndon Johnson 
convened a meeting with South Vietnamese leaders including new President Nguyen Van 
Thieu and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky in Honolulu, Hawaii in February 1966 to discuss the 
status of economic, social, and political projects for South Vietnam.  Johnson made it 
clear that he expected a massive increase in pacification productivity in the upcoming 
year, and he expressed his mounting impatience with the need to develop an effective 
American organization for pacification support.  The Honolulu Conference sent a clear 
message that Johnson considered business as usual to be sufficient.18 
As a result of the meeting, the South Vietnamese decided to give a new face to the 
pacification program by calling it Revolutionary Development.  At the core of this new 
program were teams of fifty-nine South Vietnamese specially trained and financed by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  Thirty of the team members were self-defense 
experts and the other twenty-nine were specialists in every kind of village need.  The 
teams, dressed in peasant garb, would move into a hamlet, identify and eliminate the VC 
secret political cadre, remove corrupt South Vietnamese officials from office, organize 
democratic institutions, and create a hamlet defense force.  Once these objectives were 
accomplished, the team would move on to another hamlet while the South Vietnamese 
government developed programs in education, health, land reform, and financial credit in 
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the original hamlet.  To supplement these teams, several US civilian agencies worked at 
various levels in information, agriculture, and public health programs.19 
Such an effort was consistent with “PROVN—The Program for the Pacification 
and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam,” a US Army report commissioned in 
1965 and completed in March 1966 that called for a greater focus at local levels.  The 
study argued that “the crucial actions are those that occur at the village, district and 
provincial levels.  This is where the war must be fought; this is where the war and the 
object which lies beyond it must be won.” 20  Nonetheless, while appearing promising at 
first, Revolutionary Development belied a basic flaw in connection with the principle of 
legitimacy.  The South Vietnamese government was not at all committed to the reforms 
the programs envisioned.  In fact, it viewed a better educated and empowered peasantry 
as a threat to its power.21 
Moreover, such a strategy lacked legitimacy in the eyes of many American 
officials because it conflicted with General William Westmoreland’s vision for “the big 
war” fought by battalion-sized conventional operations.  The enemy would be defeated 
by fighting, not by civic action, according to this school of thought.  While Robert Komer 
and other pacification advocates favored a “clear, hold, and rebuild” strategy, 
Westmoreland favored a traditional military solution to the war by using large unit search 
and destroy operations.  Knowing he lacked the forces to conduct both a war of attrition 
and pacification, Westmoreland relegated pacification to a second tier status as “the other 
war.”  The recommendations of PROVN would be largely ignored until General 
Creighton Abrams replaced Westmoreland as Commander, MACV in 1968.22 
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Against such resistance, pacification officials attempted various ways to use 
statistics to not only measure results, but also to boost the program’s legitimacy with an 
often-skeptical military command.  Major General Lewis Walt, commander of the III 
Marine Amphibious Force, developed an early model based on five “progress indicators”: 
destruction of enemy units, destruction of the Viet Cong infrastructure, South Vietnamese 
government establishment of security, South Vietnamese government establishment of 
local government, and degree of development of the New Life Program (a successor to 
the Strategic Hamlet Program).  Each indicator represented a possible total of twenty 
points and was broken down into related subdivisions.  A village that accumulated sixty 
points reflected “firm South Vietnamese/US Government influence,” while a score of 
eighty points indicated pacification.  Critics questioned Walt’s formula, arguing that it 
was possible for a village to gather enough points to be declared “pacified” even if the 
VCI, the most important of the indicators, remained virtually undisturbed.23 
Within a year, the CIA developed a more sophisticated “Hamlet Evaluation 
System” (HES), which, while it “borrowed freely” from Walt’s system, sought to 
“provide a uniform measure of progress throughout Vietnam.”24  Under HES, American 
advisors made monthly assessments on worksheets that were then sent to Saigon for 
computer processing into composite scores.  Like Walt’s system, however, HES was 
susceptible to challenges to its objectivity and legitimacy.  The evaluations took place at 
the district headquarters, far away from rural hamlets.  A senior advisor normally visited 
just one-fourth of the district hamlets in a month.  Visits to individual hamlets usually 
lasted only a few hours, and during that time most advisors were completely dependent 
on interpreters.  The result was evaluations based largely on surface appearances or 
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historical data.  To make matters worse, these advisory positions were not considered 
career enhancing jobs.  Thus, many military officers cycled through them as quickly as 
possible in pursuit of the more prized combat positions.25 
The result was that, in spite of efforts to make the evaluation as objective and 
legitimate as possible, assessment was still subject to manipulation.  For example, in 
October 1968 the US faced the disconcerting prospect of being subjected to demands for 
concessions at the Paris Peace Conference based on a communist claim of representing a 
large segment of the countryside.  To preempt this possibility, MACV inaugurated the 
Accelerated Pacification Program (APP) in November.26  The APP modified the criteria, 
attempting now to establish a minimal government presence in as many hamlets as 
possible.  Some 1,000 additional hamlets were earmarked, but to accommodate these 
increased quantities, the quality of the effort was diminished.  Where cadres once stayed 
six months, they now only stayed six weeks.  One American adviser said, “The name of 
the game is planting the government flag.” 27  Using these new standards, the number of 
“relatively secure” hamlets shot up to 73.3%, an all-time high.28  In the process though, 
legitimacy suffered. 
The pacification effort received a boost when Abrams replaced Westmoreland as 
Commander, MACV in 1968.  Abrams not only was more committed to the “one-war 
concept” than his predecessor, but the reality of the phased American withdrawal and 
Vietnamization limited opportunities for large combat operations.  Instead, Abrams 
emphasized that “the key strategic thrust is to provide meaningful, continued security for 
the Vietnamese people in expanding areas of increasingly effective civil authority.” 29  He 
was especially interested in neutralizing the VCI and separating it from the population, 
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considering the infrastructure to be the “eyes” for the enemy main forces.  Without this 
asset, Abrams figured the main forces “cannot obtain intelligence, cannot obtain food, 
cannot prepare the battlefield, and cannot move ‘unseen.’”30  What Abrams hoped to do 
was to implement the essential provisions of the PROVN study that had been largely 
ignored when it had been announced in 1966.  He insisted that population security, not 
enemy destruction, was the definitive mission.  One observer called the new approach 
“Son of PROVN.”31 
Vietnamization also helped to belatedly convince the South Vietnamese 
government to get behind pacification, as President Nguyen Van Thieu realized that he 
had to secure a popular base before the American withdrawal. 32  He actively promoted 
the return of village elections that Diem had abolished in 1956 and promulgated what the 
New York Times called “probably the most imaginative and progressive non-communist 
land reform of the twentieth century.”33  While admitting Thieu had many critics in other 
aspects of his performance, Komer assessed Thieu as “personally the most pacification-
minded of all top [South Vietnamese] leaders and did more than any other person to 
promote its growth.”34  Komer praised Thieu for chairing the Central Pacification and 
Development Council and using his personal leadership to make the 1970 Pacification 
and Development Plan a primarily South Vietnamese drafted document.35  The South 
Vietnamese assumption of ownership for the pacification strategy did much to enhance 
its legitimacy, but this significant development was far too late in coming. 
Objective  
Like Thieu, the Americans were slow to realize and accept the fact that the true 
objective in the war was the winning of the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people.  
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Thoroughly schooled in Mao’s doctrine of protracted war, the communists, however, 
understood this key to victory and waged the war accordingly.  They gained deep inroads 
into the South Vietnamese rural population thanks in large part to the work done by the 
VC during the initial phases of Mao’s model, and the establishment of a VC “shadow 
government” throughout the South Vietnamese countryside had helped solidify this hold.  
This shadow government consisted of communist cadres who were secretly assigned 
positions as village chiefs; police officers; postal workers; and district-, province-, and 
national-level officers.  These officials levied taxes, regulated trade, drafted men, and 
punished criminals on behalf of the communist cause.  The VC hoped to have a complete 
government in place when their victory was finally won, and these individuals then could 
step forward and formally claim their offices.36 
The pacification program was designed to weaken this control the VC had on the 
countryside and simultaneously strengthen the confidence the people had in the South 
Vietnamese government.  The first goal would protect the rural population from the 
insurgents and also help deprive the insurgency of its rural support base.  The second goal 
would be brought about by a host of reforms that would address the needs of the people 
and thus win their loyalty to the government.  Thus, pacification had a logical concept for 
the principle of objective, but one that proved difficult to measure and assess in a 
practical sense.37   
Komer realized that the chaotic nature of a half-formed country at war with an 
ever-present enemy created a difficult environment for dramatic progress.  Knowing that 
no one program could achieve success by itself, Komer opted for quantity over quality.  
His efforts can be roughly divided into four categories.  The first involved a massive 
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effort to produce and disseminate propaganda.  Second were initiatives focused on 
distributing food and other supplies to the countryside.  Next were paramilitary programs 
designed to control the rural population by improving physical security.  Finally, there 
was a whole host of new ways to measure progress and assess effects in order to 
statistically determine what percent of the population had been pacified.38   
Ever since the conference in Honolulu, there had been increasing calls to 
conceptualize pacification in terms of incremental results.39  As a result, Komer 
introduced a variety of means to measure the effort in order to determine if pacification 
was producing “an acceptable rate of return for [the] heavy investments.”40  The HES 
was an example.  It used a five letter scoring system to assess progress via eighteen 
security and development indicators.  Security indicators were in the categories of VC 
military activity, VC political and subversive activities, and security based on friendly 
capabilities.  Development indicators were in the categories of administrative and 
political activities; health, education, and welfare; and economic development.  An “A” 
hamlet was excelling in all areas of security and development.  A “B” hamlet was still 
considered high-grade with effective 24-hour security, adequate development, and no VC 
presence or activity.  A “C” hamlet was relatively secure day and night.  Viet Cong 
military control had been broken, and there were no overt VC incidents, although VC 
taxation was perhaps continuing.  Economic improvement programs were underway.  In a 
“D” hamlet, the VC frequently entered or harassed at night, and VC infrastructure was 
largely intact.  The South Vietnamese program was in its infancy, and control of the 
hamlet was still strictly contested.  An “E” hamlet was definitely under VC control, and 
American and South Vietnamese officials entered only as part of a military operation.  
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Most of the population in an “E” hamlet supported the VC.41  When Komer began the 
HES there were 12,600 hamlets.  He was able to assign US senior military advisors to 
222 of the 242 South Vietnamese districts.42   
One criticism of HES was that because the advisors had a vested professional 
interest in the results, the system was prone to manipulation.  When William Colby 
replaced Komer as head of CORDS, Colby built on his prior experience with the 
Strategic Hamlet Program to create a new evaluation system designed to remove some of 
the subjectivity that affected HES.  As part of this process, the army contracted with 
Control Data Corporation to develop a new survey called “HES 70.”  HES 70 was billed 
as “a highly integrated man-machine interface” which would solve the problem of 
subjectivity by being “objective and uni-dimensional.”43  The new survey counted such 
things as TV sets, organized activities for youths, motorized vehicles, self-defense forces, 
and other key indicators of security and development.  However, in a marked departure 
from the old system, advisers no longer did the rating, and all scoring was done in Saigon 
using a formula not known to the advisers.  The idea behind this arrangement was to 
remove the impression that the advisers were actually evaluating themselves.  While HES 
70 improved the system, it remained better suited to measure quantifiable factors such as 
control and suppression of the opposition rather than the less tangible but more 
significant ideas of popular allegiance and the strength of commitment to the South 
Vietnamese government.44 
Current military doctrine uses the term measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for 
techniques such as the ones used by Komer and Colby.  A MOE is “a criterion used to 
assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is 
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tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or 
creation of an effect.” 45  While all MOEs can at best offer incomplete assessments of the 
overall situation, the tools used by Komer and Colby did much to quantify progress 
toward the achievement of pacification’s objective.46 
Unity of Effort   
The Hamlet Evaluation System, however, was just one of the many often 
competing and disjointed initiatives that comprised what can only be loosely called the 
pacification “program.”  At the time American ground troops were introduced to Vietnam 
in 1965, a variety of civilian agencies had developed their own pacification programs 
which they were coordinating through the US Embassy.  The rapid expansion of military 
forces added military advisory teams to the pacification effort in all of South Vietnam’s 
provinces and most of its districts.  There was, however, no formal system of combining 
the civilian and military initiatives.47  
One of the obstacles to unity of effort was that pacification meant different things 
to different people.  Because the word stemmed from the French period in Vietnam, to 
many Vietnamese pacification smacked of colonialism and outside interference.  Komer 
admitted “the term often had unfortunate connotations.”48  Nonetheless the Americans 
continued to use the phrase, reflecting a failure to fully understand the Vietnamese 
situation.   
Within the American ranks, many considered pacification to be “the other war,” 
contrasting it with the strategy of defeating the enemy by battle and attrition.  Perhaps 
reflecting their diverse historical experiences, the marines and the army viewed 
pacification differently, and early marine initiatives “quickly involved key Marine 
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officers in a stormy debate with the Army-dominated US Military Assistance Command 
Vietnam (MACV) over the appropriate strategy for winning the war.”49  Even MACV 
commanders William Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams came to represent different 
strategic approaches.   
In such an environment, unity of effort was elusive.  Because “pacification is an 
imprecise term,” Thomas Scoville explains, “there was never agreement among 
Americans in Vietnam on just what pacification was and how it might be achieved.  
Some saw it as controlling the population; others as winning the people’s allegiance.  
Some viewed it as a long-term process of bringing in addition to security, economic, 
political, and social development to the people.”50  The result was a disjointed and 
fragmented approach to pacification and a myriad of programs that often were not 
synchronized or synergistic.51   
Pacification could make little progress under such conditions.  In January 1966, 
Westmoreland wrote, “It is abundantly clear that all political, military, economic, and 
security (police) programs must be completely integrated in order to attain any kind of 
success.” 52  President Johnson also saw the need for greater coordination and wanted a 
single manager to head the entire pacification program.  In March, he appointed National 
Security Council member Robert Komer his special assistant for pacification and tasked 
him with coming up with the solution.53   
One problem facing Komer was defining the roles of the Department of Defense 
and the Department of State.  He succeeded in convincing the military, which he argued 
controlled 90 percent of the resources, to lead the effort, but the civilian agencies 
uniformly opposed this plan.  As an ill-conceived compromise, Ambassador Lodge was 
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directed by Washington to create a new organization called the Office of Civil Operations 
(OCO) in November 1966 in an attempt to bring more efficient management to the effort.  
Expressing high hopes, President Johnson told Lodge, “I intend to see that our 
organization back here for supporting this [pacification] is promptly tightened and 
strengthened and I know that you will want to do the salve at your end . . . I suggest that 
your designation of [Deputy Ambassador William Porter] as being in total charge, under 
your supervision, of all aspects of the rural construction program would constitute a clear 
and visible sign to the Vietnamese and to our own people that the Honolulu Conference 
really marks a new departure in this vital field of our effort there.”54 
The results fell far short of these high expectations, in part because of Lodge’s 
recalcitrance in embracing Johnson’s vision.  Unwilling to appreciably relinquish his 
control over pacification, Lodge unified the civilian agencies but excluded the military 
aspects from Porter’s charge.  For his part, Porter saw his job merely as being to 
coordinate existing pacification efforts, rather than trying to establish direct command 
over different bureaucracies.  Although Porter understood “the basic idea is to place total 
responsibility on one senior individual to pull together all of the civil aspects of 
revolutionary development,” he saw his role “primarily as a coordination effort” and did 
not intend “to get into the middle of individual agency activities and responsibilities.”  
When he did interact with an agency, he endeavored “to suggest rather than criticize.”55  
The result was that, although Komer considered it “a step in the right direction,” the OCO 
did little to correct the existing problem of unity of effort.56  Like its predecessor 
Revolutionary Development, the OCO was short-lived and would be the last attempt to 
have pacification run by the US mission in Saigon.57 
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In May 1967, the US replaced the OCO with CORDS, an acronym for Civil 
Operations and Revolutionary Development, which combined the names of the last two 
pacification efforts and represented a unification of the previously fragmented 
pacification effort.  While CORDS was under the MACV command, it included 
representatives from a host of civilian agencies including the Agency for International 
Development (AID), the Department of State, the CIA, the United States Information 
Agency (USIA), and the White House.  The military and civilian efforts were now fully 
integrated at all levels in a single chain of command.  At its peak strength at the end of 
1969, CORDS had approximately 6,000 military and 1,100 civilian personnel.58  
Although late in coming, CORDS represented a dramatic step in the pacification effort, 
but even with this improved unity of effort, pacification still consisted of a mind-boggling 
quantity of initiatives that, although prioritized, even Komer assessed as “admittedly 
inefficient.”59   
Komer was a former CIA official who had served in both the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations as an aid expert.  When President Johnson appointed him 
Deputy to the Commander USMACV for CORDS, Komer asssumed ambassadorial rank 
and became the first ambassador to serve directly under a military command and also 
have command responsibility for military personnel and resources.  The relationship 
between Westmoreland and Komer was replicated throughout MACV.  Each of the four 
corps commanders was partnered with a CORDS chief who had direct responsibility for 
the province advisory teams in the corps area and coordinated military and civil plans as 
well as military civic action.  The resulting unity of effort infused the pacification 
program with a new sense of purpose and urgency.60  
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Komer found common cause with Ellsworth Bunker, who had replaced Maxwell 
Taylor as ambassador in Saigon in March 1967.  Bunker objected to those who called 
pacification “the other war,” protesting that “to me this is all one war.  Everything we do 
is an aspect of the total effort to achieve our objective here.”61  Komer and Bunker 
represented a new philosophy that pacification would no longer be relegated to a 
subsidiary role in the war.  Komer in particular also sought to improve the South 
Vietnamese Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF and PF) and police who were 
participating in pacification.62  He provided these forces additional training and 
equipment, to include M16 rifles, and greatly expanded advisory attention.  He 
established a program to field 353 Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT), each of which 
consisted of two American officers and three non-commissioned officers, to give what he 
called “on-the-job training” to the RF and PF units.  By these steps, Komer demonstrated 
he understood that the South Vietnamese would have to be active, capable, and willing 
participants in the pacification process.63 
Komer also improved unity of effort and accountability by establishing unified 
civilian-military advisory teams that worked with each of the South Vietnamese 
ministries associated with pacification at all levels from hamlet to national.  Part of their 
function was to contribute to periodic reports on the progress of various programs and on 
the impact of military operations on pacification.  Among the benefits of these “report 
cards” was the ability to identify corrupt and incompetent South Vietnamese officials and 
to increase US leverage to eliminate those who were not meeting the standard.64 
Komer noted that “there was no one pacification technique that could of itself and by 
itself be decisive if we just put all our resources behind it.  So as a practical matter we 
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pulled together all the various programs then in operation—civilian and military—that 
looked as though they could make a contribution.”65  It was not a system that reflected 
efficiency or rigid unity of effort, but it did seek to lend some order to a very fluid 
situation.  Through CORDS, Komer hoped by trial and error, time, and cumulative effect 
to make gradual progress.66   
Komer saw CORDS as “the organizational key” to the pacification effort.67  Prior 
to its creation, Komer assessed that “everybody and nobody had been responsible” for 
pacification.68  He claimed that “CORDS not only unified the US support and advisory 
effort but provided impetus to getting the GVN (Government of South Vietnam) to move 
in the same direction.”69  It was CORDS that brought some belated measure of unity of 
effort to pacification. 
Security 
Komer and other proponents of pacification knew there could be “no civil 
progress without constant real security,” and as numerous observers noted, the 
fundamental problem was an absence of that security.70  Recognizing this prerequisite,  
Komer pragmatically argued, “Until the GVN regained dominant control of the 
countryside and provided credible semipermanent protection to the farmers, it would 
hardly be feasible to proceed with other aspects of pacification.”71  In the same vein, 
Ambassador Taylor stated, “We should have learned from our frontier forbears that there 
is little use planting corn outside the stockade if there are still Indians around the woods 
outside.”72  The 1966 PROVN study had urged this same philosophy. The program that 
probably came closest to the intent of PROVN, and the one that best adhered to the 
principles of both security and unity of effort, was the Combined Action Program or 
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CAP.  Beginning as a small experiment to secure US military bases around Phu Bai and 
Da Nang in 1965, CAP soon became the linchpin in the marines’ strategy for winning the 
war.73  It also came to exemplify Westmoreland’s negative attitude toward pacification.   
A CAP platoon was a combination of a fourteen-man marine corps rifle squad and 
one navy medical corpsman, all who were volunteers, and a locally recruited Popular 
Forces (PF) platoon of about thirty-five men.  The resulting CAP was assigned 
responsibility for a village, which typically consisted of five hamlets spread out over four 
square kilometers with an average population of 3,500 people.  The American marines 
lived with their Vietnamese PF counterparts and became integral parts of the unit.  The 
effect was synergistic.  The marines gained intelligence from the South Vietnamese 
soldiers’ knowledge of the local terrain and enemy, while the PF benefited from the 
marines’ firepower, tactical skills, and discipline.  The CAP was a solid and mutually 
beneficial combination.74 
Perhaps most important, the constant marine presence sent a powerful message 
that the Americans were there to stay.  They did not fly in by helicopter in the morning 
and fly out at night to leave the villagers at the mercy of the VC.  This continued 
presence was critical because the peasant who cooperated with the government had to 
carefully weigh the risk of VC reprisals against himself, his family, his friends, and his 
community with the benefits of improved clothing, food, education, and medical 
assistance.  When the Americans flew in and flew out, the risks to the Vietnamese 
villager often outweighed the benefits.  However, under CAP, the marines shared the 
same fate as the South Vietnamese soldiers and people.  In fact, CAP marines took 2.5 
times the casualties of the PF in the CAP.  The CAP was a strong testimony of American 
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commitment and partnership, and gave the Vietnamese people a sense of enduring 
security.75 
The CAP program expanded steadily, and in 1966 there were fifty-seven CAP 
platoons.  By the end of 1967, the number had grown to seventy-nine.  Despite these 
increases and demonstrated success, Westmoreland was unwilling to adopt the program, 
arguing that he “simply had not enough numbers to put a squad of Americans in every 
village and hamlet; that would be fragmenting resources and exposing them to defeat in 
detail.”76  While there is some merit to Westmoreland’s argument about numbers, his 
genuine objection lay more in a fundamental strategic difference.  Westmoreland viewed 
the CAPs as static and defensive employments of his resources.  Instead, he favored the 
aggressive pursuit and destruction of enemy forces.  The focus of CAP at the small unit 
level also violated Westmoreland’s quest for the mass he needed to gain a conventional 
battlefield victory.   
On the other hand, CAP advocates argued that the real battlefields were the 
villages, and the real enemy was the VC in them.  Lieutenant General Victor Krulak had 
served as the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities during the 
Kennedy administration before becoming the commanding general of Fleet Marine Force 
Pacific.  He argued that “if the enemy cannot get to the people he cannot win.”  In an 
effort to “comb the guerrillas out of the people’s lives,” Krulak argued that protecting the 
South Vietnamese population must be “a matter of first business.”77  Once the villages 
were secured, the repelling of enemy main forces would be an easy matter, given the 
American superiority in firepower and mobility.  Furthermore, the main enemy forces 
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would be severely weakened by denying them the logistical support they enjoyed from 
the unsecured villages.  Such arguments fell largely on deaf ears.78 
In the end, Westmoreland never put the CAP concept fully to the test and 
ultimately vetoed the strategic concept.  Perceived as competition with “the big war,” 
CAP was never allocated the manpower resources it required, and, lacking a grand 
strategic direction, its local successes were never able to be replicated on a larger scale.  
For many, CAP showed that the marines, building on their experience in Cuba, Haiti, the 
Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Panama, seemed to understand pacification better 
than their army counterparts.   
The philosophical difference between the two services is exemplified by Krulak 
and army Major General Julian Ewell.  Krulak insisted that the big force engagements 
“could move to another planet today, and we would still not have won the war because 
the Vietnamese people are the prize.”79  In contrast, Ewell, commander of the 9th Infantry 
Division and a major proponent of the body count, had his staff draw up a report that 
concluded “the most relevant statistical index of combat effectiveness was the average 
number of Viet Cong losses inflicted daily by the unit in question.”80  Ewell explained, “I 
guess I basically felt that the ‘hearts and minds’ approach can be overdone.”81  “In the 9th 
Division,” he wrote, “we always stressed the military effort.” 82  By and large, the army 
high command shared Ewell’s point of view. 
Another effort to enhance security was chieu hoi, an open-arms amnesty program 
designed not just to woo VC defectors without reprisal, but to then train them to become 
productive members of the South Vietnamese economy.  It was not a popular program 
with the South Vietnamese government, which considered the VC better candidates for 
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prison than schooling.  Nonetheless Komer pressed ahead, dropping millions of leaflets 
by airplane and artillery shells that promised, “We will be happy to welcome you, feed 
you well, not put you in prison.”83 
The chieu hoi program drew large numbers of defectors, as many as 27,178 by 
early 1968.  After being interrupted by Tet, an additional 17,000 VC took advantage of 
chieu hoi from 1969 to 1970.  However, when the North Vietnamese saw that the 
program was beginning to bear fruit, they countered by unleashing a terrorist campaign 
that reduced defections from 5,000 to 500 a month.84 
In part as a response to these communist reprisals, the US turned to perhaps the 
most controversial pacification program-- Phoenix or Phung Hoang.  The initiative had 
been envisioned under Komer’s tenure, but its activation fell to his successor at CORDS, 
William Colby, who brought a more offensive approach to the pacification effort.  
Phoenix’s objective was to eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure and its shadow 
government in South Vietnam.  It was designed to enhance security, but in the process it 
would compromise the principle of restraint. 
By 1967, some 70,000 to 100,000 VCI cadre wielded considerable influence in 
South Vietnam, offering a viable communist alternative to the government in Saigon.  
The VCI provided a variety of persuasive services to win support, including medical 
treatment, propaganda, and education.  If these tactics failed, the VCI would resort to a 
terror campaign aimed at selected village leaders to increase the incentive to comply.  On 
the other hand, the South Vietnamese government was rarely able to establish a 
permanent presence, especially at night, in the villages.  Pacification could not succeed 
without countering this grip the communists had on the population.  The task was so 
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crucial that Dale Andrade and James Willbanks describe the VCI as “nothing less than a 
second center of gravity.”85 
The roots of the Phoenix program can be traced to the Intelligence Coordination 
and Exploitation Program (ICEX), which began in July 1967 and mainly served as a 
clearinghouse for information on the VCI.  In December, the focus on the VCI was 
intensified, and ICEX gave way to Phoenix.  Phoenix was much more decentralized than 
ICEX, and district intelligence and operations coordinating centers (DIOCCs) were built 
in regions where the VCI operated.  Also, with the new emphasis came a great increase in 
resources, and by 1970, there were 703 American Phoenix advisors throughout South 
Vietnam.86 
With CIA and CORDS assistance, Colby tasked the South Vietnamese to target 
the VC leadership through arrest, conversion, or assassination.  In its first year of 
operation, Phoenix eliminated 16,000 VC cadres, most by defection or capture.  By 
forcing high-ranking VC to move to safer areas, Phoenix made control more difficult for 
the communists and severed the link between the population and the mid-level VC that 
called the shots in the villages.87  Even General Tran Do, the North Vietnamese deputy 
commander in South Vietnam, admitted Phoenix was “extremely destructive.”88  
In spite of these successes, Phoenix’s detractors claimed it was a rogue operation 
that perpetrated murder and torture, and abuses certainly existed due to the decentralized 
nature of the program.   Andrade and Willbanks counter that most advisors understood 
that only VC captured alive could provide the intelligence Phoenix needed.  The numbers 
seem to support their claim.  Colby testified before a congressional committee that 
between 1969 and 1971, Phoenix had reduced the insurgency by 67,000 people.  Of that 
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number, approximately 21,000 were killed, and the rest had surrendered or been captured.  
Andrade and Willbanks argue that with statistics showing more than two-thirds of the 
neutralized VC were captured not killed, Phoenix can hardly be called “an assassination 
bureau.”89 
Corruption and political infighting was a less debatable problem with the 
program, as some South Vietnamese politicians identified their political enemies as VC 
and used the Phoenix hit squads, properly known as “provincial reconnaissance units,” to 
go after them.  In a development reminiscent of the body count, pressure to eliminate VC 
led to a quota system that erroneously labeled many innocent people as VC. 90  Such 
practices led Ivan Arreguin-Toft to consider Phoenix to be a strategy of “barbarism,” 
which he defines as “the systematic violation of the laws of war in pursuit of a military or 
political objective.”91   
Setting aside the different characterization offered by Andrade and Willbanks 
(and even Arreguin-Toft admits Phoenix represents “barbarism at the mildest end of the 
violations spectrum”), Arreguin-Toft uses Phoenix to demonstrate the hypothesis that 
“when strong actors employ barbarism to attack weak actors defending with a GWS 
[guerrilla warfare strategy], all other things being equal, strong actors should win.”92  He 
argues that Phoenix successfully “eviscerated the VC command infrastructure in the 
South [and] may have even provoked the North into its premature and disastrous direct 
confrontation with US regular forces during the 1968 Tet Offensive.”93  This analysis 
certainly depicts the compromise Phoenix made with the principle of restraint in its 
pursuit of security as being an efficient one. 
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Although it was the most aggressive of the pacification programs, Phoenix 
reflected the philosophy of the PROVN, Krulak, and others who had long argued the 
need of protecting the South Vietnamese rural population.  Like pacification writ large, 
however, the small measure of security provided by Phoenix was too little and too late 
and was unable to break the communist will to persevere.  Seriously hurt, the communists 
responded to the twin setbacks of Phoenix and Tet by “sharply curtailing the level of 
military activity in the south and withdrawing some of [their] troops back across the 
demilitarized zone.”94  Andrade and Willbanks note, “While enemy main forces and 
guerrillas licked their wounds, they were less able to hinder pacification in the villages,” 
but Arreguin-Toft captures the bigger picture: “Certain that American public opinion 
would eventually force Nixon to withdraw from Vietnam, the North Vietnamese were 
prepared to wait him out, no matter what additional suffering it might entail.”95  Against 
such a determined enemy, even drastic increases in security may not be enough to 
produce the desired strategic results. 
Restraint   
In spite of demonstrating Phoenix’s tactical and operational successes, Arreguin-
Toft is quick to note his findings “do not imply the necessity of creating a force capable 
of barbarism” in a counterinsurgency.96   Indeed, the pacification program reflected the 
principle of restraint by a variety of programs designed to reach the South Vietnamese 
population by means much less violent than Phoenix.  The previously discussed CAP is 
one such program that Arreguin-Toft offers as an example, but aid and information were 
two other efforts. 
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In an attempt to facilitate what is now called “human security,” Komer had at his 
disposal a $1.7 billion economic aid fund that he could distribute to the population.  
Multi-crop miracle rice, soya-bean seeds, fertilizer, cooking oil, pharmaceuticals, cement, 
corrugated tin, medical and dental supplies, and hygiene items all sat in warehouses 
waiting to be shipped to the countryside.  In the first half of 1967, American officials 
distributed 12,044 tons of food, performed 4,843,396 medical treatments, and 
administered 1,381,968 immunizations.97   But what made this aspect of the pacification 
program difficult was that physical security had to precede distribution.  The last thing 
Komer wanted was for his efforts, designed to win the hearts and minds of the South 
Vietnamese people, to end up as logistical support for the VC.  In addition to this 
problem with security, the American largess also eroded the legitimacy of the South 
Vietnamese government that “had neither the resources—nor in many cases the 
inclination—to shower gifts upon its own people.”98  As in all aspects of the pacification 
effort, balancing the principles of OOTW was problematic. 
A second initiative that modeled restraint was an intensive propaganda campaign.  
Between 1965 and 1972, over 50 billion leaflets were distributed in North and South 
Vietnam and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Cambodia and Laos.  In 1969 alone, over 
10.5 billion leaflets, 4 million pamphlets, 60,000 newspaper articles, over 24.5 million 
posters, and almost 12 million magazines were produced in the attempt to influence 
Vietnamese opinions.99  Based on volume, the Americans appeared to recognize the 
importance of persuasion and information in a people’s war. 
Oftentimes, however, the propaganda efforts seemed to be more appropriate for 
an American than a Vietnamese audience.  For example, one program in 1968 involved 
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distributing brown paper grocery bags to merchants.  Each bag had a political message on 
it.  The problem was that the Vietnamese traditionally used plastic netting or cloth 
squares rather than paper bags to carry their groceries.  Paper was used to wrap 
purchases.  Therefore, rather than using the bags for their intended purposes, merchants 
often shredded them to use as wrapping material before the customer even had a chance 
to read the message.100    
While the American propaganda campaign struggled to overcome such cultural 
differences, the VC proved highly skilled in using the combination of agitation and 
propaganda (“agitprop”) “to arouse the people to the [South Vietnamese] Government’s 
oppressiveness and lack of responsibility.”  They tapped into the local grievances, using 
songs, skits, and speeches to deliver their message “in terms the people could 
understand.”101  Once again, the communists demonstrated their superiority in reaching 
the center of gravity in Vietnam.   
Perseverance   
The pacification effort suffered from a lack of perseverance on a variety of levels.  
Tactically, there was little resolve to commit forces to the long-term presence that was 
necessary to bring real security to a village.  Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
noted this aspect of the problem, saying, “the most enduring problems are reflected in the 
belief of the rural Vietnamese that the GVN will not stay long when it comes into an area, 
but the VC will.”102 Strategically, Komer thought victory in protracted war would come 
“by patient and prolonged effort to outlast as well as counter” the enemy.103  He referred 
to the build-up of pacification resources as a “painful gradual process.”104   The program 
would take time to produce results and require a commitment that could not be sustained 
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by a nation that was rapidly losing its interest in the war.  According to Colby, 
“CORDS’s gradual success after Tet 1968 fatally lagged behind the American public’s 
rapidly growing perception that the Vietnam enterprise was an exercise in futility.”105  
In a field in which the marines showed a certain superiority, perhaps the army unit 
that showed the most potential for pacification at the tactical level was the 25th Infantry 
Division.  In the fall of 1966, a battalion from the division executed Operation Lanikai in 
the Hau Nghia province.  The battalion’s report of the operation noted that US units on 
pacification missions  
must be prepared to live in the pacification area until the people have been made 
to feel secure and their cooperation has been won…The full benefits of 
pacification type operations in an area can only be realized through vigorous and 
constant efforts to sustain the favorable conditions created until such time as the 
local Vietnamese officials and military leaders are prepared to accept the full 
gamut of civil and military responsibilities.106  
  
After highlighting the work of the 25th Infantry Division, Samuel Smithers 
cautioned that “no one can say how long US troops will be required to remain in any 
particular province before it can be declared capable of protecting itself.”  Writing in 
1967, Smithers cited commentators who predicted a US presence “may well be required 
in Vietnam for as long as 20 years.”107  This open-ended commitment and need for some 
sort of permanent security, however, required manpower that Westmoreland did not think 
he could spare from “the big war.”  “Had I had at my disposal virtually unlimited 
manpower, I could have stationed troops permanently in every district or province and 
thus provided an alternative strategy,” he mused.108  Instead, less proficient ARVN and 
local force units were left to provide the bulk of population security while US units 
conducted search and destroy operations.  This American failure to adhere to the 
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principle of perseverance left the VCI free to wield its considerable control over the 
South Vietnamese population.109 
Edwin Chamberlain, one of the hard-working military advisors, confessed, “There 
is little glory and much weariness in pacification.”110  America eventually reached the 
same conclusion about the Vietnam War in general and lost its will to continue the effort.  
Sir Robert Thompson had cautioned, “If one tries to talk about speed in pacification, it 
must be remembered that it will take as long to get back to the preferred status quo ante 
as it took the other side to get to the new position.”111   Given the huge head start enjoyed 
by the communists, the American public simply had no stomach for such a lengthy 
endeavor.  Lawrence Yates laments this lack of perseverance, arguing, “Given time, 
pacification might have worked; but time ran out.”112   It is equally valid to view the 
pacification effort as not being a failure to persevere long enough but rather a failure to 
start early enough.  Komer argues that to be successful, the surge in American interest in 
pacification that finally gained traction in 1968-1969 would have been better started in 
the late 1950s or early 1960s.113   
In the final analysis, pacification probably represented the best hope for the 
achievement of American and South Vietnamese victory in Vietnam, but the strategy was 
never fully embraced.  The effort to secure the South Vietnamese rural population from 
VC control and to strengthen the popular legitimacy of the GVN was a mammoth 
undertaking that would require significant commitment.  Instead, the failure of 
pacification is best explained by “its limited duration and scope.”114  Komer notes that 
“even after 1967, pacification remained a small tail to the very large conventional 
military dog.  It was never tried on a large enough scale until too late.”115   By then the 
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communists’ skillfully executed strategy of protracted war had exhausted American 
perseverance.  The lack of adherence to the principle of perseverance in terms of 
resources, emphasis, time, and effort doomed the pacification program to failure. 
Conclusion 
The US pacification effort in Vietnam was a failed OOTW.  In large part, the 
overall failure stemmed from poor adherence to the principle of objective based on an 
under-appreciation of the population as the center of gravity.  This deficiency led to 
pacification being labeled “the other war,” and the resulting problems with unity of 
effort.  With the creation of CORDs, the pacification program demonstrated an evolving 
adherence to unity of effort, but its earlier experience in this principle was seriously 
deficient, and even CORDs was unable to fully rectify the problem.   
The pacification effort also seriously failed to adhere to the principle of security 
by its inability to protect the South Vietnamese peasant from the VC.  Guenther Lewy 
attributes this failure to the initial poor adherence to objective.  The various pacification 
efforts, he writes, “failed because of the lack of a secure environment, in which they 
could thrive, the result of a faulty strategic concept.”116  Securing the population would 
require that additional troops be diverted from “the big war,” a diversion that was resisted 
based on the misapplication of the principle of objective.  Absent these resources, the 
pacification effort resorted to compromising the principle of restraint through the Phoenix 
program in order to gain some measure of security.  This trade-off proved effective, but 
not broad enough in scope to produce strategic results.  
The misunderstanding of objective also contributed to pacification’s problems 
with legitimacy.  It was perceived as not legitimate by many American military officials 
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who preferred the strategy of attrition, and it was perceived as not legitimate by many 
South Vietnamese for a variety of reasons.  To some South Vietnamese elites, 
pacification represented a threat to their base of power.  To many South Vietnamese 
peasants, pacification simply did not adequately meet their needs, including the most 
basic need of security.  Army chief of staff General Harold Johnson drew a connection 
between the principles of legitimacy and security, arguing that “the people will support 
their government when it can provide some security for them.”117  As executed, 
pacification failed to resonate with the host nation. 
Failure to convince the American population of the legitimacy of continuing the 
effort caused pacification, and the entire US commitment to South Vietnam, to strongly 
fail in adhering to the principle of perseverance.  In explaining “How the Weak Win 
Wars,” Arreguin-Toft concludes, “Strong-actor military and political elites must prepare 
their publics for long-delayed victories against even very weak adversaries when those 
adversaries employ indirect defense strategies” such as guerrilla war.118  This preparation 
did not occur during the Vietnam War, resulting in a loss of commitment among the 
American public. 
This analysis suggests relationships among several of the principles, both in terms 
of correlation and balanced application.  Like the aggressive population control measures 
used during the Greek Civil War, Phoenix deliberately and effectively compromised 
restraint in order to facilitate security.  All the other relationships among the principles 
are less productive and illustrate the dangers of a negative “snowball effect.”  The failure 
to properly analyze the objective led to difficulties with unity of effort, legitimacy, and 
security.  The failure to ensure domestic legitimacy led to a failure to adhere to 
156 
 
 
 
 
perseverance.  As a negative example, the US experience with pacification in Vietnam 
strongly supports the utility of the principles of OOTW as a planning and analytical tool 
and a predictor of operational outcome. 
Table 5  
 
Adherence to Principles of OOTW during US Pacification Effort in Vietnam 
 
 
 Strong 
adherence 
General 
adherence 
Neutral General 
lack of 
adherence 
Strong lack 
of 
adherence 
Legitimacy    x  
Objective    x  
Perseverance    x  
Restraint   x   
Security     X 
Unity of 
effort 
  x   
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CHAPTER VI 
NICARAGUA AND HONDURAS: RESTRAINT ENABLES PERSEVERANCE  
 Throughout the 1980s, the United States pursued a policy designed to support the 
Contra resistance to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.  President Ronald Reagan 
was a staunch proponent of the Contras, but his efforts were subject to two key 
limitations: the memory of Vietnam caused public opinion to be against direct military 
intervention, and the vagaries of Congress caused Contra assistance to be inconsistent.  
One tool that was available to President Reagan, however, was the indirect application of 
US power in a way that achieved unity of effort with a variety of diplomatic, information, 
military, and economic resources.  The absence of direct combat involvement allowed the 
US to effectively adhere to the principles of restraint and security.  By placing the 
situation in Nicaragua in the context of the larger struggle of defeating the Soviet Union, 
President Reagan also adhered to the principle of objective.  Adherence to restraint and 
objective enabled a decade of perseverance in an operation that faced numerous 
challenges to its legitimacy.  As a result of this OOTW, the US accomplished its 
objective of limiting the influence of communism in Nicaragua and Central America. 
Background 
 The US had been dispatching troops to Nicaragua since 1853, and the 
construction of the Panama Canal ensured American interest would not wane.  The 
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of 1916 granted the US the exclusive right to build a second 
trans-Isthmian canal through Nicaragua, as well as various naval bases, in exchange for 
$3 million.  The continuing US military, economic, and infrastructure presence made 
Nicaragua, in effect, an American protectorate until 1925, when President Calvin 
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Coolidge withdrew the contingent of marines that had been ensuring stability in 
Nicaragua for the preceding fifteen years.1 
 Trouble erupted within a month of the marines’ departure when a civil war broke 
out between Conservative supporters of General Emiliano Chamorro and Liberals, who 
seized much of Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast, including the town of Bluefields where a 
considerable American business community was located.  Marines were once again 
dispatched to Nicaragua, and by May 1927, the US was able to compel the belligerents to 
sign the Peace of Tiptapa.2   
 Although Henry Stimson, the US envoy who had brokered the peace, crowed, 
“The civil war in Nicaragua is now definitely ended,” looking back with the benefit of 
hindsight, Max Boot concluded, “In reality it was just beginning.”3  Liberal commander 
Augusto Sandino refused to accept the peace and gathered a band of followers to oppose 
first the government of President Adolfo Diaz, and soon thereafter the Americans that 
supported it.4 
 Sandino proved to be an elusive prey, and while the marines launched a 
frustrating effort to bring him to bay, he emerged as a “hero to the left.”5  In Moscow, the 
Communist International (Comintern) sent “fraternal greetings to the workers and 
peasants of Nicaragua, and the heroic army of national emancipation of General 
Sandino.”6  Although Sandino welcomed the communist support and had some 
communists on his staff, he lacked a developed political agenda of his own.  Perhaps for 
this reason, he had trouble rallying his countrymen to his cause, and, although he 
remained a problem for the marines, the election of 1928 resulted in a resounding victory 
for his archenemy, the Liberal candidate Jose Mariaq Moncada.  The election was 
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supervised under the watchful eye of US Army Brigadier General Frank Ross McCoy 
and some 5,000 American servicemen, and even the defeated Conservatives conceded it 
was the fairest in the country’s history.7 
 After the election, the US presence was steadily reduced to about 1,500 marines 
by 1929.  This small force garrisoned the large cities and provided direction for the 
Guardia Nacional (National Guard).  Although the marine presence included the 
legendary Chesty Puller and the Guardia Nacional grew into a highly effective 
constabulary force, isolated marine contingents were regularly subjected to well-executed 
attacks from Sandino’s men.  The guerrillas made Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast their 
primary base of operations, and the insurgency continued to fester.8 
 Liberal candidate Juan Sacasa was elected president in 1932 amid growing 
pressure in the Depression-racked US to bring the marines home.9  When the marines 
departed in early 1933, Sacasa, feeling vulnerable without the accustomed American 
protection, entered into negotiations with Sandino.  On February 2, the government and 
the guerrillas agreed to a ceasefire, officially ending the long war.  Tensions remained, 
however, between the Guardia Nacional, which had become increasingly politicized with 
the departure of the marines, and Sandino’s stalwarts.  Sacasa became stuck in between 
these two forces and quickly lost effectiveness.10 
 As Sacasa floundered, Anastasio Somoza Garcia, the head of the Guardia 
Nacional, began to fill the void.  He resolved to take matters into his own hands, and on 
February 21, 1934, his forces abducted and killed Sandino, his brother, and two of his 
generals.  They also raided a guerrilla camp in the north the next day, effectively crushing 
what was left of Sandino’s force.  Somoza grew in power, and in 1936 he deposed Sacasa 
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and became president of Nicaragua.  Somoza was an autocrat whom President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt famously described as “a sonofabitch, but he’s our sonofabitch.”  He 
ruled until his assassination in 1956, but after that, his sons continued the family 
dictatorship.11 
 The Somozas’s heavy-handed dynasty created a great disparity between the 
political and agricultural elite on the one hand and the rural population on the other.  
Amid the widespread belief that the government was exploitative and corrupt, an 
insurgency developed.  The Sandinista National Liberation Front, named after Augusto 
Sandino, the assassinated guerrilla leader, was founded in 1961 by young members of 
Nicaragua’s Partido Socialista Nicaraguense (FSLN), a “Moscow-line” communist party.  
Led by Carlos Fonseca, the Sandinistas advocated a revolutionary armed struggle against 
the Somoza government.  “Marxism,” Fonseca declared in 1968, “is now the ideology of 
the most ardent defenders of Latin American humanity.  It is high time for all Nicaraguan 
revolutionaries to embrace the goal of proletarian liberation.”12 
 In spite of Fonseca’s bold rhetoric, in the early 1970s the movement had fewer 
than one hundred members and controlled no Nicaraguan territory.  By 1972, divergent 
strategic views had divided the Sandinistas into three separate factions.  Of these, the 
Tercerista, or “insurrectional” faction, gained control of the national directorate in 1977 
after pursuing an agenda of broadening the revolution’s base of support by forming 
alliances with non-Marxist anti-Somoza elements, including middle class professionals, 
disaffected businessmen, and Catholic priests who subscribed to liberation theology.  The 
Tercerista succeeded in engineering a multi-class insurrection that was formidable 
enough to defeat the Nicaraguan Army in 1979, march into the capital of Managua, and 
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install a new regime.13   
 President Jimmy Carter refused to intervene as the Sandinista revolution gained 
momentum.  His foreign policy was designed to reduce the Cold War emphasis on 
containment and confrontation, and instead promote human rights - including in the 
notoriously repressive Somoza regime - and generate dialogue.  Carter criticized 
America’s history of imperialism in Latin America and vowed to transfer the Panama 
Canal, the ultimate symbol of American dominance in the region, back to Panama.  He 
pledged that no Latin American government would be overthrown by his 
administration.14 
 The Sandinista revolution tested Carter’s rhetoric, and some in his administration, 
most notably National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, urged intervention.  “A 
Castroite take-over in Nicaragua,” Brzezinski cautioned, “would impact on US-Soviet 
relations and on the President’s domestic political standing, particularly in the South and 
the West.”15  Carter refused to budge and instead adopted a policy of “conditional 
accommodation” and “restraint.”  He shipped $26.3 million in food, medicine, and other 
humanitarian supplies to Nicaragua and promised a long-term $75 million US economic 
aid package if the Sandinistas respected human rights, practiced political pluralism, and 
did not aid Marxist revolutions in neighboring Central American countries.  In September 
1979, Carter hosted former Tercerista comandante Daniel Ortega, now the president in 
the new Sandinista government, and other top Nicaraguan officials to a White House 
visit.16 
 Carter took comfort in the Sandinistas' public announcements pledging their 
commitment to political pluralism and a “mixed economy.”  Behind the scenes, however, 
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the party hardliners were consolidating control over the police, the state security 
agencies, a new “Sandinista People’s Army,” and other organs of armed power.  The 
Sandinistas also concluded that they must follow the path of Cuba and, in the face of 
predictable hostility from the US, turn to Moscow for a patron and protector.  In October, 
Ortega told a visiting Soviet KGB official he “regarded the USSR…as a class and 
strategic ally, and saw the Soviet experience…as a model to be studied and used” in 
Nicaragua.  “Our strategy,” Ortega explained, “is to tear Nicaragua from the capitalist 
orbit and, in time, become a member of…Comecon” (the Soviet bloc international 
economic organization).17 
 Nicaragua’s ties to Cuba were even closer, and Michael Grow concludes, “In 
many respects, the Sandinistas were Cuban clones.”18  Both Nicaragua and Cuba were 
ideologically anti-American nationalists who viewed many of their country’s problems as 
being generated by the American imperialists and the self-serving local collaborators that 
did their bidding.  Ortega vowed that the “popular revolution” had brought to an end 
Nicaragua’s long history of “submissions and sell outs.”  Now, he would have to prepare 
to defend against direct and indirect attack from the country the Sandinistas had come to 
see as the “rabid enemy of all peoples who are struggling to achieve their definitive 
liberation.”19  He was eager to support like-minded revolutionaries, and by the mid-
1980s, it was becoming increasingly apparent the Sandinistas were helping move 
weapons from Cuba to Marxists guerrillas in El Salvador.  President Carter’s hope that 
accommodation would produce moderation in Nicaragua was quickly losing credibility.20 
 These disappointing developments in Nicaragua were just one of several foreign 
policy problems plaguing Carter as the 1980 presidential election approached.  The 
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Iranian revolution and ensuing hostage crisis continued to humiliate the nation.  The 
December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had breathed new life into the 
superpower rivalry.  The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries doubled the 
price of oil and ignited a domestic energy crisis that many Americans blamed on the 
President.  In contrast to Carter’s passivity, the Republican presidential challenger 
Ronald Reagan condemned the “Marxist Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua” and declared 
his support of the Nicaraguan people in their efforts to establish a free and independent 
government.21 
 In the face of charges he was “weak” on foreign policy in Nicaragua and 
elsewhere, Carter began to reverse his accommodation of the Ortega government.  He 
approved a “covert political-action program” that authorized the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) to transfer $19.5 million in funds to “private business groups, organized 
labor, political parties, and the press” in an effort to promote opposition to the 
Sandinistas.  To help El Salvador resist its Marxist insurgency, he renewed aid that had 
been suspended since 1977 as a result of El Salvador’s poor record of safeguarding 
human rights.  Ultimately, he halted the $75 million economic aid package to Nicaragua, 
based on “conclusive proof” of the Sandinistas' involvement in arms transfers to the El 
Salvadoran guerrillas.  By the end of his term, Carter’s attitude toward Nicaragua had 
decidedly shifted from restraint to confrontation.22 
 Carter’s new-found vigor did little to reassure the American public, and in 1980, 
Reagan was elected president after capturing 50% of the popular vote and a staggering 
90% of the electoral vote.  The landslide empowered Reagan with a mandate to rebuild 
US national power and prestige, and adopt a more aggressive response to challenges 
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abroad.  He announced, “Restoring both our strength and our credibility is a major 
objective of this administration.”23  For Reagan, a new policy toward Nicaragua would be 
a key part of this equation.  
Analysis of the Principles 
Objective   
 President Reagan’s resolve to undermine the Soviet system exceeded that of any 
previous administration.24  A specific global objective outlined in his National Security 
Decision Directive was “to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and 
military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and 
use of proxy, terrorist and subversive forces.”25   Reagan’s strategy to aid anti-Soviet 
insurgencies attempting to overthrow Marxist regimes in the Third World eventually 
became known as the Reagan Doctrine.26   Specifically, he saw Nicaragua’s increasing 
ties with the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Cuba, as well as Nicaragua’s growing 
military, as a serious threat to American interests in Central America.27  CIA Director 
William Casey shared Reagan’s concern, and in a March 1980 meeting of the National 
Security Council, Casey asked, “If we can’t stop Soviet expansion in a place like 
Nicaragua, where the hell can we?”28  
 Casey’s observation suggests that more was at stake than just Nicaragua.  The 
Reagan Administration felt that over the past years US credibility had suffered, and now 
Reagan “wanted to send a message to others in the world that there was new management 
in the White House.”  He argued, “American strength and American integrity must…be 
taken seriously—by friends and potential foes alike.”  Thus, Reagan made it a 
foundational principle of his foreign policy “to send as powerful a message as we could 
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to the Russians that we weren’t going to stand by anymore while they armed and 
financed terrorists and subverted democratic governments.”29  Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig agreed that “only a credible show of will and strength” could convince 
the Soviets “it was better to accommodate to the United States and the West than to go 
marauding against their interests and security.”30  Haig added that US standing with other 
nations was at stake as well.  “Especially in the Third World,” he noted, “deep doubts 
existed about the United States and its capacity to project power in defense of its own 
interests.”31  By tying the local outcome in Nicaragua to the broader struggle to 
reestablish American credibility and defeat global communism, President Reagan’s 
objective also would encourage adherence to the principle of perseverance.  
 Reagan soon embarked on a campaign to change the US approach to Nicaragua 
from one of moderation to one of confrontation.   He pulled together representatives from 
such organizations as the CIA, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, 
and the Department of State to create a secret planning body called the Restrictive 
Interagency Group (RIG) to develop options.  There was already a small army of a few 
hundred Nicaraguan exiles being formed inside neighboring Honduras, and based on 
input from the RIG, Reagan decided the best way of challenging the Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua was through an insurgency.32  
 Following the collapse of the Somoza regime, small bands of Guardia Nacional 
had taken refuge in neighboring Honduras and Guatemala.  By 1980, several anti-
Sandinista leaders such as former Guardia Nacional Colonel Enrique Bermudez had 
begun the tedious process of organizing these disparate groups into a unified fighting 
force.  Fearing a spillover of the revolution into their own country, members of the 
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Honduran government assisted the effort.  In the meantime, Bermudez and others 
travelled abroad, trying to generate support.  By the time of Reagan’s election, Bermudez 
had made contacts in the United States and begun lobbying the Republican Party for 
backing.  He also found a sympathetic ear in Argentina, where a fanatically 
anticommunist military dictatorship had recently crushed a communist insurgency.  
Seeing the Sandinistas as the new threat to Marxist expansion in the hemisphere, the 
Argentines began providing Bermudez with money, advisors, and military training.33 
 While Bermudez was in Argentina, his ally, Honduran Police Chief and Army 
Colonel Gustavo Alvarez, was visiting CIA Director Casey in Washington to present a 
proposal to transform the anti-Sandinista exiles in Honduras into a force potent enough to 
launch into Nicaragua to ignite a civil war.  Alvarez surmised the action would likely 
prompt a Nicaraguan retaliatory strike into Honduras to which the US could respond with 
a crushing invasion to solve the Nicaraguan problem once and for all.34 
 The plan seemed perfect to Casey.  The US would supply money and weapons, 
the Argentines would supervise the military operations, and the Hondurans would 
provide the territorial base.  Casey took the plan to President Reagan, emphasizing that 
the Argentines were already training the Nicaraguan exiles in Honduras, and the US 
would merely be “buying in” to an existing operation.35  Reagan liked the idea and 
authorized the expansion of the heretofore small covert insurgent aid program to $19 
million.  With this support, the Contras, as the insurgent movement became known, 
eventually grew to a strength of some ten thousand.36 
 Securing Honduras as a base for the insurgency became absolutely essential to the 
US effort, and indeed, Honduras played host both to the Contras and to a variety of US 
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military activities.  Honduras’s shared borders with Nicaragua, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala made its geopolitical importance to the United States obvious.  Additionally, 
its status as the original “banana republic” provided a basis, no matter how controversial, 
of cooperation with the United States.37  Furthermore, Honduras had reason to worry.  As 
Honduran Ambassador to the Organization of American States Robert Martinez Ordonez 
said in 1983, 
It is of highest priority for the rest of the Central American countries to discuss 
the regional problems created by Nicaragua because of its worrisome arms 
buildup, its direct participation in the destabilization of other Central American 
governments, and its clandestine arms trafficking....Nicaragua has upset the 
Central American region’s military balance.  In only 4 years its armed forces have 
grown by 1,300 percent....The size of the Sandinista Armed Forces is much 
greater than the total of the military troops in the rest of the Central American 
countries.38 
         Honduran leaders did not hesitate to accept US interest and influence.  In April 
1982, General Alvarez, by this time the commander-in-chief of the Honduran armed 
forces, declared that “Honduras is in agreement that the United States, as a friendly 
country, [may] intervene militarily in Central America.”  Such support was not 
unrewarded.  American economic aid to Honduras rose from $50.7 million in 1980 to 
$139 million in 1984.  Military aid grew even more dramatically, from $3.4 million in 
1980 to $79.7 million in 1986.  By 1985, Honduras was the eighth leading recipient of 
US economic and military aid.39   In June 1983, retiring army chief of staff General 
Edward Meyer stated, “I believe Honduras is a strength.  I’d really like to anchor the 
defense of the region initially on Honduras.”40  In fact, one observer would go as far as to 
describe Honduras as “the linchpin for the administration’s regional warfighting 
strategy.”41 
 One model of strategy describes it as a three-legged stool made up of “ends, ways, 
and means.”  The “ends” are objectives, the “ways” are the concepts for accomplishing 
the objectives, and the “means” are the resources for supporting the concepts.42  President 
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Reagan had established a clear strategy along this formula of ends, ways, and means.  
The end was the eradication of communism in Nicaragua.  The way was through 
insurgency.  The means would be by leveraging the geographic location and cooperation 
of Honduras.  In articulating such a clear strategic vision, Reagan strongly adhered to the 
principle of objective. 
Legitimacy 
  While Reagan was completely convinced of the legitimacy of supporting the 
insurgency, the opinion was far from universal.  “The high priority assigned the issue by 
the president and the intense scrutiny given the policy by Congress” would be a continual 
source of friction between the two branches of government.43  The Sandinistas were well 
aware of the divisiveness of the issue in the US and used the fickle nature of US support 
to gauge the intensity of their activities.  In fact, the inconsistency of congressional 
support led the Reagan administration to take extraordinary measures to keep the 
insurgency alive, measures that pushed the very limits of the operation’s domestic 
legitimacy. 
 In March 1986, the House voted against the Reagan administration’s $100 million 
military and humanitarian aid package for the Contras.44   Within forty-eight hours of the 
House vote, Sandinista military units crossed the border into Honduras on a mission to 
locate and destroy Contra logistics bases, training centers, and medical centers.45  The 
specific objectives were a major base of the Nicaragua Democratic Force, the main 
Contra group, and a smaller Contra base that included an airstrip.  Both sites were in 
Honduras’s El Paraiso province, about ten miles from the Nicaraguan border.46   
 Reports of the size of the operation varied from 800 to 2,000 Sandinista troops 
with Reagan administration officials estimating some 1,500.  Among these forces were 
what the State Department described as “special counterinsurgency battalions.”  After the 
operation, Nicaragua admitted that some 2,500 men were involved.47 
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 Perhaps based on the assessments of their Cuban advisors, the Sandinistas 
expected to find a demoralized and disorganized Contra force that would run rather than 
fight.  Instead, the Sandinistas were met by some 7,000 Contras, including “battle-
hardened units that had just been rearmed and resupplied.”  About half the Sandinistas 
were stopped near Las Vegas, and the rest launched four unsuccessful assaults on a 
Contra camp, which was initially defended by 700 Contras and then reinforced by 
another 300.  When the Sandinistas broke off the attack and tried to withdraw, they were 
blocked by another 6,000 troops from the crack Jorge Salazar regional command, which 
had doubled back from its own operation into Nicaragua.  With the escape route cut off, 
the Sandinistas scattered.48 
   The Sandinista attack into Honduras had the potential to lend much legitimacy to 
the Reagan administration’s support for the insurgency, but instead the ambiguity and 
controversy of the situation produced a much more mixed result.  On the night of March 
24, Honduran President Jose Azcona formally requested urgent US military assistance, to 
include airlifting Honduran troops.  Initially, however, the Hondurans had denied or 
minimized the incident.  Opponents of the Reagan’s administration’s Contra policy 
seized upon this condition to accuse the administration of exaggerating, if not fabricating, 
the incident.  These charges would be repeated in March 1988 in debates surrounding 
another border clash.49 
      In actuality, the confusion can best be attributed to a diplomatic dilemma that 
Honduras faced.  The Honduran government had repeatedly denied that Contras operated 
from bases within its borders, making it difficult for them to acknowledge a Sandinista 
raid against bases it would not publicly recognize.  Additionally, while the Hondurans 
knew they were dependent on the United States, they were not eager to appear overly so.  
To a certain degree, national pride was at stake.50   Both the American and Honduran 
governments were wrestling with their own issues of domestic legitimacy. 
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    Surely there was some encouragement from Washington for the Hondurans to 
request aid.  US Charge d’Affaires Shepard Lowman reportedly demanded a meeting 
with Azcona and Foreign Minister Carlos Lopez Contreras and insisted the Hondurans 
request US military aid while scolding them for their low key response.  Lowman was 
quoted by one Honduran official as saying, “We’re here trying to help you, and you’re 
going to leave us hanging in Washington.”  In fact, John Ferch, the US ambassador to 
Honduras, later admitted he had put some pressure on Azcona to request aid.51 
     But neither the American self-interest in publicizing the incident nor the 
Honduran awkward response alters the fact that the Nicaraguans entered Honduras in an 
attack that did not constitute “hot pursuit” of the Contras.  In response to the Honduran 
request, President Reagan approved a $20 million emergency assistance package, which 
included air defense weapons, conventional ordnance, emergency spare parts and 
armament for helicopters, and essential training.52  The aid also involved airlifting 
Honduran troops to the border.  Fifty US pilots and crew members used ten Huey and 
four Chinook helicopters to move 600 Honduran soldiers to within ten miles of the 
fighting.  While the United States had begun building a military presence in Honduras in 
1980, this action marked the first direct involvement of US troops in a Honduran military 
operation.53 
      Also at stake was the legitimacy of the Contras as a fighting force.  While media 
headlines focused on the US helicopter involvement, many observers seemed to overlook 
the fact that the Contras won a clear victory.  Sensitive to his own need to preserve 
legitimacy, Nicaraguan Army Chief of Staff Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo at first denied the 
incident, stating that “it is absolutely false the Nicaraguan troops have violated Honduran 
territory.”  Eventually, the Nicaraguan government acknowledged the attack and even 
admitted to 40 dead and 116 wounded.  As the battle for legitimacy continued, 
Nicaraguan President Ortega justified the raid, explaining that “Honduras lost control of 
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its sovereignty by having the mercenary forces [meaning the Contras] there.”  Thus, 
Ortega established that he now considered any area in Honduras where Contras were 
encamped to be a legitimate military target.54 
   While some considered the incident as proof “that the contras are indeed a serious 
resistance force, quite capable of holding their own against the Nicaraguan army if given 
half a chance,” others feared that the use of US helicopters foreshadowed Central 
America as “being the next stop for US combat forces.”  Others began to draw analogies 
between the current situation and Vietnam, a war in which the United States had clearly 
failed to build and sustain legitimacy.55 
  Amid these speculations, Nicaragua’s border violation did have a profound 
legitimizing effect on US politics, especially because it occurred the very week that the 
Senate was debating President Reagan’s Contra aid bill.  The attack seemed to validate 
the Reagan argument, and administration officials were delighted by the windfall, saying, 
“We knew what Ortega was but we never expected he’d help us prove it so badly.”  Pat 
Buchanan gloated, “Danny Ortega, you’re my man.”  Even House Speaker Thomas 
O’Neil, a leading foe of Contra aid, pronounced Ortega as “a bumbling, incompetent 
Marxist-Leninist-communist.”  O’Neil described the raid as a “tremendous blunder” and 
warned that it could trigger wholesale changes of congressional votes.56 
   The incident did not, in fact, change any senator’s vote, but it did quash attempts 
to further restrict the House’s limits on Contra aid.  On March 27, the Senate voted 53 to 
47 to approve a $100 million package of military and humanitarian aid for the Contras.57  
Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole concluded, “I think Ortega gave us a boost.”58  In 
effect, the Nicaraguan misstep and the stout Contra response gave the Reagan 
administration a tenuous claim to legitimacy in what remained a see-saw battle for 
support. 
 The victory, however, was short lived.  On November 21, President Reagan and 
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Attorney General Edwin Meese made the embarrassing announcement that National 
Security Advisor John Poindexter and National Security Council staff member Lieutenant 
Colonel Oliver North had initiated a program to circumvent the sporadic congressional 
funding by “overcharging” Iran for weapons and diverting some of the proceeds to the 
Contras.  Reagan dismissed Poindexter and North, but the incident haunted his 
presidency and cast a pall over the legitimacy of the insurgency.  As Secretary of Defense 
Caspar Weinberger put it, “The Contras should have been funded, but there is only one 
way to secure legal spending by our Government, and that is by vote of the Congress.”59  
For many, the Iran-Contra Scandal became the defining event in the Reagan 
administration’s Nicaraguan policy, and it presented an enormous failure to build 
domestic legitimacy. 
 Restraint    
 One result of this relatively weak sense of legitimacy was that US support for the 
insurgency would have to closely adhere to the principle of restraint.  In a nation still 
bruised by the memory of the Vietnam War and with a military clearly still in the 
rebuilding process, direct action, for all of Reagan’s aggressive rhetoric, was an option 
fraught with problems.  While Secretary of State Haig proposed consideration of direct 
military intervention, even the Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to such a course.60  
Their sentiments were consistent with remarks made by General Paul Gorman, former 
commander of the US Southern Command, who at a 1988 colloquium on low intensity 
conflict noted, “The United States armed forces will not be combat participants in the 
sorts of struggles that are at issue here.  The role of US forces in low-intensity conflict 
will almost invariably be indirect, and that certainly pertains to the role of the United 
States armed forces in any kind of support for insurgencies abroad.”61  Such would be the 
case with regard to the Nicaraguan resistance. 
  According to one observer, “the Republican administration came to office with an 
173 
 
 
 
 
inflexible mind-set on Nicaragua.  It was dedicated to removing the Sandinistas from 
power by whatever means necessary.”62  President Reagan began planning the largest 
defense build-up in history, which would then allow him to launch a “strategic offensive” 
designed to “roll back” Soviet influence from the Cold War frontiers.63  However, very 
practical considerations limited the direct use of force and led to restraint manifesting 
itself in Reagan’s approach to Nicaragua through a concept Todd Greentree calls 
“selective engagement.”  The notion of selective engagement recognizes there are limits 
to the US involvement in Third World conflicts.  It is consistent with the lessons learned 
from Vietnam that the United States should avoid using its troops to fight protracted 
internal conflicts in foreign countries.  Selective engagements encourage rapid action for 
specific short-term contingencies but try to avoid overly ambitious continuous direct 
involvement in protracted conflicts.64  Throughout his two terms, President Reagan 
would use numerous selective engagements of his military forces to adhere to the 
principle of restraint as he pursued his foreign policy in Central America. 
   Part of this process was a series of military exercises the United States staged in 
Central America in an effort to influence Ortega without resorting to force.  In August 
1981, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders had 
travelled to Managua for two days of secret talks with Ortega and other top Sandinista 
officials in hopes of reaching a negotiated settlement in which the Nicaraguans would 
agree to end their support for the El Salvadoran insurgency.  Ortega issued Enders a 
strong rebuff, informing him the Sandinistas had already “seen the crossroads” and 
“decided to defend our revolution by force of arms, even if we are crushed, and to take 
the war to the whole of Central America if that is the consequence.”65   
 As a result of this bellicose response to attempted diplomacy, the US executed 
Exercise Halcon Vista (Falcon View) in October 1981.  This relatively low-key affair 
was a three-day exercise designed for the immediate military purpose of evaluating the 
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US-Honduran ability to “detect and intercept hostile coastal incursions.”66  Strategically, 
the exercise was “designed to signal that the United States was in a position to intervene 
militarily if the FSLN did not acquiesce” to Ender’s proposals.67  Even one US military 
official understood the true purpose of the maneuvers was “a deliberate attempt to stick it 
in their [the Sandinistas] eye.”68 
 Halcon Vista was followed by Combined Movement, which began in late July 
1982 and lasted two weeks.  The object of these maneuvers was to “conduct 
combined/joint movement in support of Honduran Army forces to meet an aggressor 
force in a remote area of Honduras.”  To this end, the US Air Force transported 1,000 
Honduran soldiers and their equipment to an area on the Atlantic coast about twenty-five 
miles from Honduras’s southeast border with Nicaragua.  During the maneuvers, US 
troops also began construction of a new Honduran airstrip at Durzuna, which could 
accommodate fighter jets and transport planes.  The airstrip was just six miles from the 
Morocon military base, which served as the main camp for the Miskito Contras.69 
     The next major exercise was codenamed Big Pine.  It lasted for eight days during 
February 1983 and took place in the Moroccan area near the Nicaraguan border.  Big 
Pine involved 4,000 Honduran and 1,600 American troops practicing to repel an invasion 
from the imaginary country of “Corinto.”  Coincidentally, Nicaragua has a port of the 
same name.  Ten US C-130s, thirteen helicopters, and two US Navy landing craft 
participated in the exercise, and US Army engineers upgraded a dirt airstrip at Puerto 
Lempira on Honduras’s Atlantic coast. 
      The biggest exercise, however, was the gigantic Big Pine II, which began on 
August 3, 1983 and lasted six months.  Big Pine II involved 12,000 US troops and 
included drills in naval interdiction, aerial bombings, airlifts, amphibious landings, and 
counterinsurgency techniques.70  The exercise also included building or improving 
runways at Aguacate, San Lorenzo, and Trujillo.  Furthermore, contracts were signed 
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providing for construction of and access to airfields at La Ceiba, La Mesa, and 
Palmerola.71  As a July 23 article in the New York Times explained, “The plan approved 
by Mr. Reagan does not envisage any immediate combat role for United States forces, but 
does call for making preparations so that American forces can be swiftly called into 
action if necessary.”72 
     With the conclusion of Big Pine II, President Reagan authorized the Pentagon to 
“develop and implement plans for new exercises in Honduras and naval activities in 
waters off Central America in a manner that will maintain steady pressure on the 
Nicaraguans.”73  These exercises included the three-month Grenadero I in April 1984; 
Big Pine III, involving 4,500 troops from January to April 1985; the 6,000-man Universal 
Trek ‘85 from April to May 1985; and Solid Shield in May 1987, which involved 50,000 
US personnel.74 
  This almost continuous US presence in the region was consistent with an inter-
agency strategy paper prepared for a July 8, 1983 National Security Council meeting, 
which stated, “Today the situation in Central America is nearing a critical point.  
Nonetheless, it is still possible to accomplish US objectives without the direct use of US 
troops (although the credible threat of such use is needed to deter overt Soviet/Cuban 
intervention), provided that the US takes timely and effective action.”  The paper 
recommended that “the Secretary of Defense shall develop plans for joint exercises in the 
region.  In particular, exercise possibilities in Honduras should be planned.”75 
    Through these maneuvers, the US established a presence in Central America that 
could not escape the notice of Nicaragua.  “Presence” is a military mission option on the 
lesser end of the application of force spectrum.76  However, this series of maneuvers 
allowed President Reagan to accomplish three objectives: providing covert support for 
Contra operations, waging psychological war on the Sandinistas, and building the 
infrastructure to make overt military intervention possible and the threat credible.77  This 
176 
 
 
 
 
approach also allowed him to meet the requirement of restraint as a principle of OOTW. 
 Still, the failure of Ender’s diplomatic mission indicated that mere exercises 
would not compel a change in Ortega’s behavior.  On November 16, 1982, the National 
Security Council endorsed a plan to establish a secret US-funded, CIA-directed 
paramilitary force of “non-Americans” to attack the “Cuban-Sandinista support 
infrastructure in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America.”78  Politically unable to 
deploy US military forces to combat, the covert option allowed President Reagan to 
pursue his Central American objective “in the least violent and least controversial manner 
possible.”  By requiring “no public explanation, no public defense, and no public vote in 
Congress,” such an alternative met Reagan’s need for restraint, but would ultimately pose 
some problems with legitimacy.79 
Unity of Effort  
 The overriding need for restraint and the continuing challenges to the legitimacy 
of its support for the insurgency meant that the US had to get the most out of every one of 
its activities.   The principle of unity of effort requires that every activity contribute to the 
achievement of a common goal, and the limited US military activity certainly achieved 
synergy with other attempts to influence the Sandinistas’ behavior.  The steady stream of 
exercises and their associated improvements to Honduran infrastructure created a threat 
of intervention that played on an acute Sandinista fear of the US military.  This 
psychological pressure has been described as “perception management,” and recognizes 
what one observer notes is the inseparability of  “the military from the political from the 
psychological in low intensity conflict.”   This relationship is apparent in an American 
official’s description of Big Pine I as a “substantial feint” designed to convince the 
Sandinistas “that they will be finished if they do not bend to the general line adopted by 
Washington.”80   
 But while America’s military power relative to Nicaragua’s was unquestionably 
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superior, this unrealized potential alone was not enough.  To be of value, a resource must 
be “both mobilized in support of foreign policy objectives and made credible.”81  
 Recognizing this, the National Security Council stated, “No threat should be made 
[without] willingness to follow through [with] military force.”82  
    Ortega was convinced the US meant business.  At the height of Big Pine II in 
November 1983, just days after the successful US invasion of Grenada, the Nicaraguan 
government mobilized the population to defend the country.  Thousands of Nicaraguans 
were pulled from their jobs to participate in emergency militia training, causing 
production to come to a standstill.  The government ordered citizens to dig air raid 
shelters, and 1,000 Cuban advisors were ordered back to Cuba “to remove any pretext for 
an invasion.”83  Ortega was obviously worried, and these actions represented a diversion 
of scarce Nicaraguan resources and manpower from economic and social programs to 
defense.84 
   The pressure brought on by the increased US presence in the region and the 
invasion of Grenada had a marked impact on Nicaraguan politics.  The government 
announced an amnesty program for certain Miskito Indians that had taken up arms 
against the Sandinistas and a “safe conduct” program for the other members of the armed 
opposition.  The senior Salvadoran guerrillas in the Managua area maintained a 
substantially lower profile, and Nicaragua cancelled plans to airdrop logistical support to 
guerrillas in the Olancho area of Honduras.  There was a temporary relaxation of press 
censorship, and Bayardo Arce, coordinator for the political committee of the Sandinista 
Front for National Liberation, cited US pressure as a reason for the scheduling of the 
1984 Nicaraguan elections.85 
   According to a Georgetown University study, if the United States invaded 
Nicaragua, it would take two months of relatively high intensity fighting and five years of 
US military occupation to oust the Sandinistas, eliminate their support, and pacify the 
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countryside.  This direct intervention could cost “between 2,392 and 4,783 dead with 
9,300 to 18,600 wounded.”86  However, by the carefully unified effort of diplomatic 
threat and credible show of military force, the Reagan administration was able to disrupt 
the Sandinistas without firing a shot.87     
Security   
 The steady buildup of military capability left the US well-postured when another 
border clash occurred in 1988, one that bore a striking resemblance to the incident that 
had happened two years earlier. Again the situation was closely tied to the US political 
scene.  Again there was a Sandinista raid against Contra camps inside Honduras.  Again 
there were charges of US pressure to force Honduras to declare an emergency.  And 
again the US military became involved.  Borrowing an expression from Yogi Berra, one 
Honduran observer said, “It’s deja vu all over again.”88  This time, however, the US 
response would be much more dramatic and require a close adherence to the principle of 
security. 
     On February 3, 1988, Congress voted to terminate aid to the Contras, but before 
the February 29 funding cutoff, the CIA was able to fly in an estimated 300 tons of 
supplies to Contra depots in Honduras.89  With little chance of additional outside help, the 
Contras were forced to fall back to the border areas in order to protect their scarce 
supplies.  It was a situation similar to what the communist insurgents experienced after 
the withdrawal of Yugoslav support in the Greek Civil War, and it caused a deviation 
from the Contras' normal guerrilla tactics of dispersion.  By having to consolidate to 
defend their supplies, the Contras became very vulnerable to the superior Sandinista 
firepower.  In the words of the State Department, “the resistance position is difficult.”90 
    Realizing the vulnerability of the Contra position and hoping to deal them a 
severe blow before peace negotiations resumed on March 21, Ortega began planning a 
raid into Honduras.  On March 8, he warned that the Contra resistance “should prepare 
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itself for another heroic drive” by the Sandinistas.91  In fact, the United States had been 
monitoring a Sandinista build up in the Bocay Valley of northern Nicaragua for weeks.  
The State Department estimated twelve combat battalions in the area, which at full 
strength would represent about 6,000 troops.  The battalions were supported by at least 
ten Soviet MI-17 helicopters, and the Sandinistas had diverted a significant amount of 
their scarce supply of fuel to accommodate the helicopters.  A new base was built in 
Bonanza, about fifty miles inside Nicaragua, to provide command and control and 
logistical support for the operation.  Obviously, this effort would be a better planned and 
resourced attack than the ill-fated 1986 incursion.92 
    On March 10, the Sandinistas launched a 1,500 to 2,000-man attack into 
Honduras.  The other 4,500 Sandinistas from the State Department’s 6,000-man estimate 
remained in the Bocay region.  In addition to these troops, the Sandinista attack included 
Soviet-supplied AN-26 aircraft, artillery, rockets, and Soviet M-25 “flying tank” attack 
helicopters.93 
  The Honduran government’s response to the border violation was somewhat slow 
in developing, as it had been in 1986.  A senior administration official, however, stated 
that President Azcona had telephoned US Ambassador Everett Briggs upon learning of 
the Sandinista action and asked “what the American attitude was.”  Briggs quickly 
consulted Washington and then informed Azcona that the US would help Honduras in 
any way it could.  Azcona, planning on his air force being forced into action, requested a 
package that included US aerial surveillance, electronic targeting equipment, radar, 
weather-data equipment, and electronic countermeasures devices.  Washington promptly 
approved this request but summarily rejected Azcona’s additional desire for US 
helicopters and paratroopers to assist in combat operations.  Instead, Briggs suggested US 
troops might be used in a symbolic training exercise in Honduras if Azcona were to make 
a formal request.94   
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     On March 16, Azcona sent a letter to Washington seeking “effective and 
immediate assistance.”   The US responded by deploying a task force comprised of 2,000 
troops from the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and 1,100 more 
from the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, California.  The deployment was 
codenamed Operation Golden Pheasant, and White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater 
described it as “a measured response designed to show our staunch support to the 
democratic government of Honduras at a time when its territorial integrity is being 
violated by the Cuban and Soviet-supported Sandinista army.”  The State Department 
described the action as being “based on a special relationship of security existing between 
the United States and Honduras.”95   
 According to the army’s low-intensity doctrine of the era, Operation Golden 
Pheasant was designed to be a “show of force.”  Such operations focus on specific 
problems that require rapid and decisive solutions, and their purposes include lending 
credibility to the nation’s promises and commitments, influencing other nations by 
deploying a viable military force, and reassuring a friend or ally.96  All of these objectives 
were at work during Operation Golden Pheasant. 
   But the intention of a show of force is just as the name implies--a display rather 
than a use of force.  The Reagan administration was very clear on this point.  One senior 
official stated, “We’re not going down there to knock the hell out of somebody.”97  
Another spokesman confirmed that there was “no intention” of sending US troops into 
combat.98  The State Department echoed that “the brigade task force will not be deployed 
to any area of ongoing hostilities” and stressed that the deployment involved only light 
infantry, no artillery.99  In spite of this deliberate purpose, some derision could be 
inferred in Time’s comment that the troops “first pitched their tents...more than 100 miles 
from the Contra sanctuaries that were the target of the incursion...grandiloquently 
characterized by the Reagan Administration as an ‘invasion’.”100   
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    Rapid deployability is critical to the success of a show of force, and this aspect of 
Operation Golden Pheasant was facilitated by the army’s recent fielding of light infantry 
divisions like the 7th Infantry Division, as well as the engineering work accomplished by 
previous exercises in Honduras.101   The air movement involved simultaneous actions on 
both coasts of the United States and three distinct missions.  On the Atlantic side, twenty-
three C-141s and one C-5 aircraft picked up elements of the XVII Airborne Corps and 
82nd Airborne Division and airlanded them at Palmerola.  Additionally, eight C-141s 
conducted a strategic airborne insertion of 700 paratroopers from the 82nd at La Paz.  
The show of force is a specified mission for airborne forces because of their excellent 
deployability, and the 82nd showed its ability to execute this critical task.102  From the 
Pacific coast, two battalions from the 7th Infantry Division flew on twenty-six C-141s 
and one C-5 to Palmerola.103 
    The fact that Palmerola air force base was available for Operation Golden 
Pheasant is a good example of the unity of effort benefits reaped by the establishment of 
a US presence in Honduras.  Palmerola’s construction as a military command and control 
facility was begun in 1983, and after Big Pine II a contingent of troops was left behind 
there to “aid in the operational aspects” of future maneuvers.  By March 1984, 1,486 US 
troops manned Palmerola, comprising “a self-contained combat control team fully able to 
direct a battle force of tens of thousands of troops.”104  Although Operation Golden 
Pheasant was not nearly that ambitious, the presence of the Palmerola infrastructure 
greatly facilitated the operation. 
      In order to effectively influence the developing geopolitical situation, peacetime 
contingency operations require a rapid response by a credible military force, and the 
prompt deployment of Operation Golden Pheasant met this requirement.105  The first C-
141 took off from Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, at 7:03 a.m. Eastern Standard 
Time on March 17 and landed at Palmerola at 4:07 p.m., less than twenty-four hours after 
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the alert notification.   The entire deployment was completed within thirty-three hours of 
the launch of the first aircraft.106  General Frederick Woerner, commander of the US 
Southern Command, noted that “the demonstration of our ability to react as quickly as we 
did is most certainly a reassuring factor for our allies, not only here in Honduras, but 
elsewhere.”107  Honduran Defense Minister Wilfredo Sanchez Valladares echoed these 
sentiments, telling the paratroopers that “the morale of the Honduran people has been 
reinforced by [your arrival].”108 
     FM 7-98 cites one example of a show of force as “a training exercise that 
coincides with a troublesome international political situation.”109  Such was the nature of 
Operation Golden Pheasant.  A few hours after landing, most of the 1st Battalion, 504th 
Parachute Infantry Regiment, which had airlanded at Palmerola, was flying by 
Blackhawk and Chinook helicopters closer to the Nicaraguan border for the first of 
several combined exercises with Honduran troops.  By March 20, all four infantry 
battalions and the support troops were conducting training at four different locations 
around Honduras.  The Americans soldiers had positive comments about the combined 
training and the Honduran soldiers.110 
      As the name implies, a “show” of force must be visible.  With this in mind, a 
media pool of eleven journalists representing television, radio, and print was involved in 
the operation from its early stages.  Brigadier General Daniel Schroeder, the joint task 
force commander and chief of staff of the XVII Airborne Corps, stressed that the media 
“would be given full access to everything possible and that the operation was going to be 
entirely upfront.”  Television crews, reporters, and photographers were already in 
position at Palmerola before the first troops arrived.  Each evening, the media 
representatives were briefed on the next day’s training and told when and where to report 
the following morning.  From March 17 to March 27, there were more than 500 media 
personnel on assignment in Honduras, representing some 160 news organizations and 
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eleven foreign countries.111  The United States wanted full coverage of Operation Golden 
Pheasant to send a clear message to the Sandinistas and others that American support of 
both the Contras and Honduras was still tangible.  There was some truth in Time’s 
conclusion that Operation Golden Pheasant was “more media event than military 
action.”112 
   Nicaragua predictably protested to the United Nations, accusing the United States 
of creating an “artificial crisis” in an attempt to justify and continue its “warlike policy” 
in Central America.113  Ortega ridiculed President Reagan, saying, “Superman was 
defeated in Vietnam, and Superman will be defeated again if he disembarks in 
Nicaraguan territory.”114  Many news sources were likewise critical of the action, and 
some observers derisively labeled it “airborne diplomacy.”115   
      Among those that challenged the American claim to legitimacy was an article in 
US News and World Report that argued that the Reagan administration had played “one 
of its last cards” in the Nicaragua conflict and might have “shattered” prospects for 
Central American peace in the process.116  Others criticized the president for taking 
advantage of and straining US relations with Honduras.  Old jokes about the “USS 
Honduras” were revived.117  Current History pointed to “growing tensions between the 
Honduran people and the United States military,”118 and a Honduran political analyst 
stated, “Six years ago there was no anti-Americanism in Honduras.  Now it is increasing 
every day.”119  In Honduras, the liberal paper El Tiempo asked, “Does the state of 
Honduras really exist?” And opposition legislator Efrain Diaz argued that Operation 
Golden Pheasant “proves how the government has no policy of its own.”120   
        Certainly, Operation Golden Pheasant meant different things to different people.  
But as US News and World Report admitted, “Despite Ortega’s tough talk, however, his 
troops did take notice of the American presence; [within days of the deployment] the US 
State Department reported that the Sandinistas’ offensive forays against Contra positions 
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had all but ceased.”  As in 1986, this border violation was seen as “another stunning 
example of Ortega’s masterful knack of bad timing.”  The attack belied Ortega’s 
commitment to the Central American peace process and strengthened the Reagan 
administration’s position that, without additional funding, the Contra resistance was 
finished.121  Once again it appeared as if the Reagan administration had won another 
razor thin victory in its battle against the Sandinistas for legitimacy in the region. 
      Nonetheless, comparisons to Vietnam again surfaced, and there were antiwar 
protests in Washington, Chicago, and San Francisco.122  House Speaker Jim Wright 
accused administration officials of “obviously trying to do everything in their power to 
keep the war going,” and Senator Christopher Dodd, the most persistent Democratic critic 
of the administration’s Central American policy, suggested the whole operation was 
designed to trick Congress into approving a new aid package.  Following Dodd’s theory, 
Time argued that by deploying troops, President Reagan sent a “clear, if unspoken, 
message to the US public: if Congress refused to fund the contras’ fight against the 
Marxist-oriented Sandinista regime, the American boys just might have to do the job 
instead.”   Senator Tom Harkin went one step further, accusing the administration of 
pursuing a “three-for-one strategy” designed to divert public attention from Independent 
Counsel Lawrence Walsh’s criminal indictments of Poindexter and North and their 
accomplices in the Iran-Contra Scandal, to revive US aid to the Contras, and to sabotage 
the Central American peace talks.  Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd added, “I hope it 
[Operation Golden Pheasant] does not prove to be counterproductive [and] does not 
derail the peace process.”123 
        But, as the military was quick to point out, if it did anything, Operation Golden 
Pheasant certainly did not delay the peace process. An article in Military Review boasted,  
 
If Exercise Golden Pheasant’s demonstration of the rapid deployment of 3,000 
soldiers provided  a lesson for Americans, it was this: when the exercise began 
more than 2,000 Sandinistas were inside Honduras and showed no signs of 
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leaving.  After the deployment of US troops, the Sandinistas not only withdrew 
from the country, but for the first time, began to engage in serious negotiations for 
peace.  Golden Pheasant was a show of force that worked.124 
 
 The result would have certainly been different if the US had suffered casualties as 
a result of Operation Golden Pheasant.  Instead, close adherence to the principle of 
security allowed the US to send a strong signal to the Sandinistas while at the same time 
protecting support for the insurgency from criticism that the US was being sucked into 
another Vietnam.  Operation Golden Pheasant was a textbook show of force that included 
the force structure necessary to ensure security, but the restraint necessary to maintain 
legitimacy. 
Perseverance   
 Operation Golden Pheasant also was a profound demonstration that the US, or 
perhaps more precisely the Reagan administration, remained committed to the insurgency 
and willing to maintain the principle of perseverance.  Upon assuming the presidency, 
Reagan had vowed to confront communism, and by placing Nicaragua in the context of 
this overall struggle, he was able to sustain the strategic effort in spite of its tactical and 
operational ebb and flow.  It was a phenomenon similar to the impact the broad objective 
of the Truman Doctrine had on facilitating perseverance during the Greek Civil War. 
 While Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams contended the US had “no 
significant tangible interests in Central America,” he did recognize the international 
perceptions that were at stake.  “If people see that the Americans are not going to move 
against the Sandinistas in their own backyard,” he asked, “what will they do ten thousand 
miles away?”125  Likewise, Secretary of State Haig noted that President Reagan “knew 
that a failure to carry through on this challenge at the heart of our sphere of interest 
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would result in a loss of credibility in all our dealings with the Soviets.”126  Reagan took 
the matter to Congress, arguing 
If Central America were to fall, what would the consequences be for our position 
in Asia, Europe, and for alliances such as NATO?  If the United States cannot 
respond to a threat near our own borders, why should Europeans or Asians believe 
that we’re seriously concerned about threats to them?  If the Soviets can assume 
that nothing short of an actual attack on the United States will provoke an 
American response, which ally, which friend will trust us then? 
 The National security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America.  
If we cannot defend ourselves there, we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere.  Our 
credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety of our 
homeland would be in jeopardy.127 
 
Against such logic, perseverance was not negotiable. 
 Reagan’s steadfast commitment to the Contras proved tough for Nicaragua’s 
Soviet benefactors to match.  His aggressive policy threatened not just Nicaragua, but the 
much more important Soviet ally of Cuba.  When Fidel Castro asked the Kremlin for 
reassurances of support, Premier Leonid Brezhnev reportedly replied, “We cannot fight 
in Cuba because it is 11,000 kilometers away.  If we go there, we’ll get our heads 
smashed.” 128  In another similarity to Greece, the Soviets had to choose their battles, and 
apparently Nicaragua was expendable.  By continuous pressure and perseverance, Reagan 
was wearing down the Sandinistas’ ability to resist. 
 Thus, on March 23, less than a week after Operation Golden Pheasant began, the 
Sandinistas agreed to a cease fire.  The agreement called for:  
- Cessation of all hostilities beginning immediately and extending   
  60 days after April 1st; 
 
- High-level negotiations April 6 in terms of a definitive cease fire; 
 
- Arrangements for phased amnesty; 
 
- Respect for freedom of speech in Nicaragua; 
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- Measures for political dialogue and full political rights; and 
 
- Measures for verification of this agreement.129 
 
     In the final analysis, doubters of the wisdom of President Reagan’s resolve 
(including his use of the military) concerning Nicaragua would have to eat at least a little 
crow.  Time conceded that “the US rescue mission, for the moment, seems to have saved 
the rebels from what might have been near military extinction.”  Yet the magazine 
expressed doubts about the overall health of the resistance, stating that the Contras’ 
“long-range future appears far from assured.”130 
   In actuality, it was the long-range future of Daniel Ortega that was in jeopardy.  
Eight years of President Reagan’s military, economic, and political pressure had left the 
Sandinistas at the helm of a desperate economy and a divided populace.131  Furthermore, 
the collapse of the communist regimes in Europe deprived Ortega of any hope for Soviet 
aid.  The Soviets simply could no longer afford to subsidize inefficient revolutions so far 
from their own borders.132   
 The importance of Soviet aid cannot be overemphasized.   From 1980 to 1988, 
Nicaragua had received over $5.2 billion in economic and military aid from East-bloc 
sources.  On the other hand, the United States had provided just $282 million to the 
Contras and only $6.8 billion total to Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and 
the Contras. In fact, in 1984, Nicaragua received more military aid from the Soviet Union 
than the United States gave to all of Central America combined.133  The United States 
certainly appeared to have gotten more bang for its buck. 
       Ortega’s only choice was to liberalize his government.  The first tangible step in 
this process occurred on March 17, 1989, when he freed 1,894 ex-National Guardsmen 
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who had been serving long sentences in the Tipitapa prison.  All were granted 
unconditional amnesty except for thirty-nine former officers accused of the most serious 
crimes.134      
  In the following months, the Nicaraguans enjoyed political freedom unheard of in 
the past ten years.  The anti-Sandinista press operated free of censorship, and political 
dissidents were allowed to protest unmolested.  Amidst this reformed climate, critics of 
Ortega, with support from some foreign governments, challenged Ortega to cut his 
presidential term short and hold an early election.135 
   Remarkably, Ortega agreed, setting the date for the election at February 25, 1990, 
nine months earlier than the law required.136  The results were astounding.  Not only were 
Ortega and the Sandinistas defeated, but many of the opposition votes came from districts 
adjacent to the military bases, which were expected to vote almost unanimously for the 
regime.  In the final tally, challenger Violeta Chamorro, the wife of a publisher martyred 
a decade before, emerged with 55% of the vote.  The Sandinistas pulled just 42%.137  
This upset victory was less than two years after Newsweek had predicted the ultimate 
demise of the resistance, citing amongst other reasons the failure to accomplish “the 
crucial goal of creating a political infrastructure within the country.”138  In fact, while still 
entertaining many reservations about the conduct of the resistance, Newsweek later 
admitted that “the election result did overturn much liberal wisdom about Nicaragua.”139  
It also confirmed the effects of American perseverance in pursuing its objective of 
removing Sandinista rule in Nicaragua. 
Conclusion 
 The US intervention in Nicaragua and Honduras was a successful OOTW.  In 
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large part the success stemmed from President Reagan’s staunch framing of the objective 
as extending well beyond events in Nicaragua to include US credibility and the overall 
defeat of global communism.   Because of the importance of these issues, especially 
within the Reagan administration itself, perseverance was ensured.  
 However, inconsistent domestic perceptions of legitimacy compelled Reagan to 
pursue an indirect approach to his objective, which dictated strong adherence to the 
principle of restraint.  This strategy of “prolonged low-intensity conflict” was critical to 
perseverance and illustrates the interaction between this principle and restraint.  Thomas 
Walker explains, “Since the human and material expense to the United States—and 
therefore, the political cost—were expected to remain low, it was felt that a war of this 
sort could be carried out indefinitely.”140   
 Ironically, the American experience in Vietnam impacted both restraint and 
perseverance.  The memory of the costs associated with direct involvement compelled 
Reagan to practice restraint in Nicaragua, but the damage done to US credibility by its 
withdrawal from Vietnam encouraged Reagan to practice perseverance in Nicaragua.141 
 The indirect military approach also enhanced security in this OOTW.  No direct 
action ground combat troops were committed to Nicaragua, and what US military forces 
that were employed were involved only in exercise, support, and show of force roles.  
The regular US presence in Honduras and the region enhanced security by building 
militarily critical infrastructure that added credibility to the US threat without causing 
casualties that would have undercut legitimacy. 
 Reagan’s approach to Nicaragua reflected mixed adherence to the principle of 
unity of effort.  The US achieved exceptional cooperation with Honduras and the 
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Contras.  The presence of the Contras was indispensable, given the political impossibility 
of a US ground combat presence.  However, the executive and legislative branches failed 
to achieve unity of effort and were often at odds.  The Reagan administration’s efforts to 
skirt the congressional obstacle resulted in the Iran-Contra Scandal and serious damage to 
the operation’s legitimacy.   
This analysis reinforces several of the observations from the Greek Civil War case 
study concerning relationships among the principles.  In both examples, a clear 
presidential statement of objective that placed the specific crisis in a broader context 
facilitated perseverance.  In both cases, restraint also facilitated both security and 
perseverance.  Also, both cases showed the impact of external support and control of 
borders on the principle of security.  As a point of marked contrast, however, in the case 
of Nicaragua, the US found itself in the unfamiliar position of supporting an insurgency 
rather than combatting one.  President Reagan adapted well to this role and showed a 
certain skill in waging protracted war. 
Domestically, the legitimacy of Reagan’s strategy was subjected to constant 
attacks, particularly by Congress.  This weak adherence to legitimacy created some 
degradation of unity of effort between the legislative and executive branches.  This 
friction was overcome by President Reagan’s strong personal commitment to the 
objective, but not without political cost.  On the other hand, unity of effort was achieved 
among the instruments of national power in a way that clearly demonstrated that the 
military role can be a supporting one.  According to John Hunt, in OOTW “the military 
role is to create conditions in which decisive action can be taken by political means,” and 
the American experience in Nicaragua and Honduras is an excellent example of the 
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indirect application of military power as a contributing instrument of foreign policy.142  
The US support of the Contra insurgency in Nicaragua and Honduras strongly supports 
the utility of the principles of OOTW as a planning and analytical tool and a predictor of 
operational outcome. 
Table 6  
Adherence to Principles of OOTW during US Intervention in Nicaragua and Honduras 
 
 
 Strong 
adherence 
General 
adherence 
Neutral General 
lack of 
adherence 
Strong lack 
of 
adherence 
Legitimacy    x  
Objective x     
Perseverance x     
Restraint  x    
Security  x    
Unity of 
effort 
  x   
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 CHAPTER VII 
BEIRUT: UNITY OF EFFORT BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND FORCE 
Lebanon plays host to three major religions, and by the early 1980s, at least forty-
seven different sects or political groups were vying for power and control.1  The 
government of Lebanon was unable to exercise sovereignty amid such decentralization 
and competition.  Instead, power rested in myriad “foreigners in combat boots” from 
Israel, Syria, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and elsewhere.2  In 1982, the US was 
added to this mix as a member of a Multinational Force (MNF) nebulously designed to 
support diplomatic efforts to restore some sense of stability and sovereignty to the 
country.   The negotiated withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces turned out to be flawed, 
leaving a gap in unity of effort between the military and diplomatic initiatives.  The 
inability to achieve the agreement that was intended to underpin the MNF’s presence 
resulted in a failure to adhere to the principle of objective.  As the situation declined, the 
MNF lost its legitimacy with the Moslem population and the violent militias that 
represented it.  Unaware of the ramifications of this change, the MNF continued its strong 
adherence to restraint, based on its understanding of being a peacekeeping force.  The 
result was a catastrophic lapse in security that made the MNF vulnerable to a terrorist 
attack on October 23, 1983.  The tremendous loss of life forced the US to come to grips 
with the futility of the effort, and in exasperation and without a realistic policy objective 
to direct the mission, perseverance failed.  With the departure of the MNF, regular 
Syrian, Israeli, and Hezbollah violations of Lebanese sovereignty persisted.  As a result 
of this OOTW, the US failed its objective of supporting the government of Lebanon’s 
ability to control its territory.  The scope of the disaster was so great that it was 
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investigated by both the House Armed Services Committee and a special Department of 
Defense Commission.3 
Background 
The United States had sent forces to Lebanon in 1958 when the country’s 
factional tensions threatened to plunge the country into civil war.  Having quieted this 
immediate crisis without attempting to resolve its underlying causes, the Americans 
withdrew after just 102 days.   Lebanon maintained a precarious stability until the early 
1970s, when tension along its border with Israel increased, especially after King Hussein 
ejected Yasir Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Jordan in 1970.  
The PLO relocated to south central Lebanon, which commandos used as a base to 
conduct operations against Israel.  Israel responded to these attacks with reprisals against 
Palestinian bases in Lebanon and helped arm Christian militias within Lebanon to battle 
rival Moslem groups.4   
The escalating regional crisis erupted into war on October 6, 1973, when Egypt 
and Syria attacked Israel on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur.  Benefiting from the 
initial surprise, Syrian forces regained control of the Golan Heights that Israel had 
captured in the Six Day War of 1967, and Egypt secured a beachhead across the Suez 
Canal in the Sinai.  Israel recovered enough to slow the Arab momentum, and then, after 
receiving significant military arms and supplies from the US, counterattacked and 
appeared poised to win another sweeping victory when the US and the Soviet Union 
helped broker a United Nations ceasefire on October 22.  Before then, however, the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) punished the US for its support 
of Israel by imposing an oil embargo that caused gas prices to skyrocket and created an 
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energy crisis in the US.  Between October 1973 and January 1974, OPEC raised the price 
of petroleum to $11.56 a barrel, four times its pre-war level.5  
The traumatic experience in Vietnam led to an American reluctance to reengage 
in the international arena, especially in areas that might result in a military commitment.  
However, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War appealed to strong American interests related to 
both Israel and oil.6  Neo-isolationism began to give way to a rejuvenated containment in 
which observers such as Robert Tucker argued for a “countervailing power” against 
either Soviet or Arab threats to the oil fields that sustained the US and its allies.7  The 
Middle East situation was tailor-made for the personality, background, and negotiating 
style of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.  While Kissinger’s skill seized the national 
imagination and beguiled Congress, it also seemed to require a specific American 
response to domestic turmoil in countries that many Americans regarded as outside the 
realm of direct and vital American interests.8  
 President Jimmy Carter would build on Kissinger’s efforts in the Middle East, but 
while Kissinger’s insistence on Realpolitik alienated many Americans, Carter would 
restore a moral dimension to American foreign policy by advocating a strong human 
rights agenda.  In this context, Carter was drawn to the political status of Palestinians, a 
Middle East issue Kissinger had avoided.  Furthermore, Carter’s human rights agenda 
would be only one of several contending national interests, with strategic, political, and 
economic concerns still being powerful.  Indeed, America’s increasing dependence on oil 
would ensure that the Middle East remained high on America’s foreign policy agenda.  In 
1978, Carter worked with Egypt and Israel to reach the Camp David Accords, which 
ended thirty years of fighting between the two countries.  The peace required an 
195 
 
 
 
 
enormous amount of underwriting by the United States, both financially and militarily.  It 
would also further tie the US to military involvement in the region.9  
 But while Egypt was pursuing an accommodation with Israel, the PLO stepped up 
its attacks, including a March 11, 1978 commando raid.  Israel responded by invading 
Lebanon on March 14, and within a few days had occupied the entire southern part of the 
country except for Tyre and its surrounding area.  The Lebanese government protested 
the Israeli invasion to the UN, arguing that it had no connection with the PLO raid.  On 
March 19, the UN Security Council issued Resolutions 425 and 426, which called upon 
Israel to withdraw its forces and paved the way for the United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) to arrive in the area on March 23.  The threefold purpose of UNFIL 
was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international peace and security, 
and assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in 
the area.10  It consisted of some 6,000 troops from Finland, Fiji, France, Ghana, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Senegal, and Sweden, but its positions were regularly 
infiltrated by the PLO.11 
 Thus, President’s Carter’s diplomatic success with Egypt and Israel did not extend 
to the broader Middle East, and he remained vulnerable to criticisms of foreign policy 
weaknesses.  Soviet adventurism in Africa, the stalled Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran hostage crisis all made Carter, and the 
US, appear weak on the international front.  When Ronald Reagan became president, he 
brought with him a mandate to reverse that trend.  However, rather than sustaining 
Carter’s emphasis on the Middle East, Reagan devoted much of his anti-communist 
attention to Latin America, especially in Nicaragua.12   
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In the meantime, Lebanon continued to unravel.  In 1975, the country had plunged into a 
savage civil war, and the beleaguered government invited Syria to restore order in June 
1976.  Indeed, Syrian not only arrived to help, but they stayed.  By 1982, the Syrians 
were pressing to install a puppet Lebanese government.13 
The PLO took full advantage of the situation and continued to use Lebanon as a 
base to launch rocket attacks and raids into Israel.  Hoping to end the threat once and for 
all, on June 6, 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon again with the initiation of Operation Peace 
for Galilee.  The massive attack, with the equivalent of eight divisions, was intended to 
push the PLO fighters about twenty-five miles back into Lebanon to eliminate their 
ability to range Israel with rocket attacks.  Advancing on three axes, the Israelis quickly 
brushed aside the unprepared PLO defenses and soon pushed the Syrians back to Beirut. 
The hapless UNIFIL force was overrun and for the next three years remained behind 
Israeli lines, its role limited to providing what protection and humanitarian assistance it 
could to the local population.  While the shattered remains of the PLO huddled in the 
Moslem western sector of the city, the Israelis closed in to eliminate their enemy.  They 
sealed off Beirut and cut water and electricity supplies.  At the same time, the Israeli-
backed Christian Phalange seized the opportunity to attack their Druze rivals in the Shuf 
(alternatively Shouf) Mountains to the east of Beirut.14   
 When it became apparent that Israel intended to press its attacks, the unlikely 
combination of pro-American Saudi Arabia and pro-Soviet Syria joined together on July 
16 to ask the US to help facilitate a PLO evacuation.  By this time, Secretary of Defense 
Caspar Weinberger described the Reagan administration as “very worried about the effect 
of the house-to-house fighting in Beirut that we were sure would come about if 
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something were not done to try to halt the conflict.”15  In response to this imminent crisis, 
American Special Envoy Philip Habib arranged for a withdrawal of both PLO and Israeli 
forces from Beirut and the introduction of a peacekeeping force that included US 
Marines.16    
 Elements of the 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) commanded by Colonel 
James Mead had landed in Lebanon on June 23 to evacuate American citizens from 
Juniyah.  As a result of Habib’s negotiation, Mead’s men now became part of a 
Multinational Force (MNF), not under United Nations control, but “simply the product of 
cooperation of the participating countries,” which originally were the US, Italy, and 
France.17 
 In July, the MNF landed with the full consent and agreement of the Lebanese 
government and deployed to its agreed upon positions.  The Americans and French 
secured the port of Beirut, and the Italians protected the roads to Damascus.  The 
Americans made every effort to portray restraint and neutrality, carrying only personal 
weapons and leaving their mortars, tanks, and artillery offshore.18 
Ambassador Habib superintended the departure of more than 8,000 PLO soldiers safely 
out of West Beirut by ship and some 6,000 more by land.  Most went to Algeria, North 
Yemen, and Tunisia, where the PLO was headquartered.   In spite of America being a 
staunch ally of Israel, US Marines personally guarded Arafat as he boarded his steamer.19 
During the operation “everything went well,” and “Mead reembarked his men 
without incident.”20  Secretary of Defense Weinberger considered the “action to be a 
complete success because with virtually no losses, we had not only taken out the PLO 
army, one of the principal magnets for an Israeli house-to-house attack through Beirut, 
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but we had removed a principal cause of instability in Lebanon itself.”  He called the 
MNF’s arrival “not only timely, but lifesaving.”21   
There was, however, one untoward development that had occurred without notice.  
Sometime during the summer, some 300 to 500 Iranian revolutionaries had come to 
Lebanon to resist the Israeli invasion.  This group formed the nucleus of what would 
become Hezbollah.  The PLO may have been largely ousted from Lebanon, but the 
arrival of the Iranians merely “replaced one terrorist threat with another.”22  The October 
31, 1983 suicide attack on the MNF would eventually be traced to Hezbollah, but for the 
time being, the fanatical group remained in the shadows.  Its mission accomplished, the 
MNF was disbanded, and on September 10, it departed Lebanon.23 
The departure of the MNF left Beirut with no functioning civil authority, and the 
respite was not to last long.24  Four days after the MNF’s departure, Bashir Gemayel, the 
Maronite Christian chief of the Phalangist militia and President-elect of Lebanon was 
assassinated.  Within days the Israeli Army moved back into Beirut, and the Phalangist 
militia, now led by Elie Hobeika, staged a massacre of some 700 unarmed Palestinians in 
the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.  The Israeli Army, commanded by Brigadier 
General Amos Yaron, remained on the periphery during the atrocities.25 Ambassador 
Habib and President Gemayel had both promised that the Palestinian refugees would be 
safe after the departure of the PLO from Beirut.  Now, “the Israelis were going in for the 
kill.”26  Fearing further instability, Bashir’s brother Amin Gemayel, who had been elected 
as the new Lebanese president, appealed for American and European help.  On 
September 20, President Reagan announced the US, France, and Italy would reconstitute 
an MNF to replace the Israeli Army and the Phalangists in Lebanon until the Lebanese 
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Army could assume that responsibility.  On September 29, Colonel Mead’s redesignated 
22nd MAU returned to Beirut.27  Habib hopefully felt the MNF would be “a presence 
behind which the [government of Lebanon] could assert authority over West Beirut.”28  
Mead’s second stay in Lebanon was short.  On October 30, the 22nd MAU was 
relieved by the 24th MAU, commanded by Colonel Thomas Stokes.  The 24th MAU 
remained until February 15, 1983, when Mead returned for a third time with the 22nd 
MAU.  On May 30, Colonel Tim Geraghty and the 24th MAU assumed the mission again.  
Arriving in the midst of a “deceptively bright and optimistic” scene, Geraghty and his 
marines would find a completely different situation in Lebanon than the previous MNFs 
had encountered.29 
Analysis of the Principles 
Unity of Effort 
Unity of effort problems within the executive branch and between the diplomatic 
and military efforts hounded the MNF from its inception.  There has historically been a 
tension between the Department of State and the Department of Defense in most US 
presidential administrations, but the struggle between Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz was particularly heated.30  As the US 
presence continued, tension between the president and Congress also would mount after 
September 8, 1983, when Congressman Clarence Long initiated a debate on the War 
Powers Act.31  This challenge to presidential power may have encouraged administration 
reluctance to acknowledge a marine combat role,32 but the true problem with unity of 
effort in Beirut began with the contending views of secretaries Shultz and Weinberger 
over the proper use of the military. 
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 As Secretary of State, Shultz “stressed the need to interweave diplomacy and 
force in a wide range of situations.”33  While he argued for the “prudent, limited, 
proportionate uses of our military power,”34 he complained that "to Weinberger, as I 
heard him, our forces were to be constantly built up but not used: everything in our 
defense structure seemed geared exclusively to deter World War III against the Soviets; 
diplomacy was to solve all the other problems we faced around the world.”35 
 For his part, Weinberger interpreted the State Department’s position as being  
we should not hesitate to put a battalion or so of American forces in various 
places in the world where we desired to achieve particular objectives of stability, 
or changes of government, or support of governments or whatever else.  Their 
feeling seemed to be that an American troop presence would add a desirable bit of 
pressure and leverage to diplomatic efforts, and that we should be willing to do 
that freely and virtually without hesitation.36   
 
He considered the National Security Staff to be “even more militant” with an “eagerness 
to get us into a fight somewhere—anywhere—coupled with their apparent lack of 
concern for the safety of our troops, and with no responsibility therefor.”37   
 Conversely, Weinberger believed that “we should not commit American troops to 
any situation unless the objectives were so important to American interests that we had to 
fight.”  Even then, the commitment of the military would be “as a last resort” to be used 
only after “all diplomatic efforts failed.”38  Because Weinberger did not think these 
conditions had been met in Lebanon, he opposed the deployment of the second MNF.  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff shared Weinberger’s opposition to the plan, but the State 
Department and Deputy National Security Advisor Robert “Bud” McFarlane continued to 
strongly press for a second MNF.   In the end, what Weinberger calls McFarlane’s 
“petulant” demands carried the day.39  Out of loyalty and professionalism, Weinberger 
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“supported the President’s decision fully,” but Thomas Hammes argues there certainly 
was “no attempt to seek the effective interagency response essential to bring peace.”40 
 While Weinberger maintained the MNF was more of a vulnerability than a 
threat,41 Shultz pursued his theory that diplomacy could work “most effectively when 
force—or the threat of force--was a credible part of the equation.”42  Eight months later, 
Shultz’s efforts produced what Weinberger called “a curious agreement” between 
Lebanon and Israel.  “Why such an agreement was reported to us in such glowing terms 
by George Schultz,” Weinberger said, “has always remained a mystery to me.”  
Weinberger raised his objections with Shultz before the agreement was signed, but Shultz 
remained “extremely proud and protective of his agreement, and none of [Weinberger’s] 
arguments…made the slightest impression on him.”43 
 Like Weinberger, the 24th MAU dutifully followed orders.  Lieutenant Colonel H. 
L. Gerlach, who commanded the Battalion Landing Teram (BLT) 1/8, the ground 
element of the MAU, explained, “The political and diplomatic side of the house set up 
the parameters, and we accomplish our mission within them.”44  These parameters, 
however, were critical, and Weinberger insisted that the military’s success “was premised 
on achieving a diplomatic success.”45  Geraghty would come to believe the failure to 
establish this diplomatic success was the 24th MAU’s ultimate undoing.  “When you have 
the State Department leading the way, and the politicians fixing our bayonets,” he 
criticized, “it becomes a loser’s game.”46   
 The Department of Defense Commission that investigated the October 23, 1983 
disaster seemed to agree with Geraghty, concluding “that there is an urgent need for 
reassessment of alternative means to achieve US objectives in Lebanon.”47  The military 
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presence in Beirut had been intended to support a negotiated solution to Lebanon’s crisis.  
The hoped-for synergy never materialized, and the US diplomatic and military 
instruments of power failed to achieve unity of effort.  The failure of the US intervention 
in Beirut clearly showed the limits of what the military could do alone. 
Objective  
While Secretary of State Shultz saw the second MNF as a tool to facilitate his on-
going negotiations, Secretary of Defense Weinberger objected that it did “not have any 
mission that could be defined.  Its objectives were stated in the fuzziest possible terms.”48  
The principle of objective requires a seamless connectivity between the strategic and 
operational levels of action.  In this regard, the US strategic development in Beirut 
represented as much of a violation of the “ends, ways, and means” model as Nicaragua 
and Honduras represented its successful application.49  This critical linkage was 
dangerously missing in Beirut. 
President Reagan wanted to communicate America’s strategic interest in 
Lebanon, but it was unclear how this interest translated to an operational mission.  In his 
September 29, 1982 message to Congress, Reagan said the MNF’s “mission is to provide 
an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide the multinational presence 
requested by the Lebanese government to assist it and the Lebanese Armed Forces.” 50  
The September 23 JCS Alert Order used similar language, describing the US forces “as 
part of a multinational force presence in the Beirut area to occupy and secure positions 
along a designated section of the line south of the Beirut International Airport to a 
position in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace.”51  It was clear where the MNF was 
supposed to be, but what it was supposed to do there and why remained vague. 
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Marine Corps Commandant General Paul X. Kelley identified the core of the 
problem as the fact that the operation described in these instructions was “not a classic 
military mission.”52  As the marines grappled with how to make sense of the guidance, 
they gravitated toward the idea of “presence.”53  Glenn Dolphin, who was a 
communications officer on the 24th MAU headquarters staff, recalls he “didn’t envy Col. 
Geraghty’s job in having to get a handle on this presence thing.”54  Journalist Eric 
Hammel, author of a detailed account of the marine experience in Beirut, contends it was 
“a phrase no Marine commander had ever before seen on an operations order.” 55 
What Geraghty concluded was that “the mission of the MAU in Lebanon is a 
diplomatic mission.”  “It was important to me, in the interpretation of that mission,” he 
explained, “that there was a presence mission.  That means being seen.”56  Career army 
officer and military historian Daniel Bolger contends that Geraghty and other marine 
commanders “misinterpreted their assigned mission,” but explains the failing as “a 
function of trying too hard to translate overarching political objectives into military 
terms, always a risk when national policy rides on the backs of tired colonels far from 
home.”57  Bolger argues the marines created for themselves “a self-designated 
nonmilitary role” when they could have concentrated on the “occupy and secure” portion 
of the JCS Alert Order.58 
According to Robert Jordan, the Marine Corps public affairs officer in Beirut and 
later executive director of the Beirut Veterans of America, “Presence was interpreted to 
mean a showing of the flag, a symbol of American interest and concern for the legitimate 
government of Lebanon and a neutral stance toward Israel, Syria, and the various 
religious and political factions.”59   Later, the “mission” was defined to be the 
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interposition of the MNF between the withdrawing Israelis and Syrians, but the problem 
remained, of course, that there was not an agreed-upon withdrawal.60  “Absent this,” 
Weinberger writes, “there was no military action that could succeed, unless we declared 
war and tried to force the occupying troops out of Lebanon.”  He argues that even after 
the “objective was ‘clarified,’ the newly defined objective was demonstrably 
unobtainable.”61  The American presence in Beirut did not adhere to the principle of 
objective. 
Legitimacy   
The imprecision of the mission would also negatively impact the MNF’s 
legitimacy.  Dolphin writes in his memoirs, “Over the years, I’ve heard discussions about 
the mission being ‘fuzzy’ or how the word ‘presence’ lacked definition in the military 
context.”  By the time the 24th MAU arrived for its tour in Lebanon, Dolphin believes 
“the meaning of the word presence had evolved into ‘peacekeeping.’”62  Earlier, 
however, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James Watkins had told Congress, “We are 
not in a peacekeeping mission.  Peacekeeping could well be a combat operation.  This is 
not a combat operation.”63  The Department of Defense Commission Report was no 
doubt correct in concluding “that the ‘presence’ mission was not interpreted the same by 
all levels of command.”64 
As a result of imprecise terminology that led to such confusion, military doctrine 
writers refined their vocabulary during the 1990s.  While these improvements came too 
late to help the MNF, they shed valuable light on how to best characterize the situation in 
which the marines found themselves, and its implications for legitimacy. 
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By 1993, FM 100-5 had described peacekeeping operations (PKO) as supporting 
“diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in areas of potential conflict.”65  For a PKO to 
“maintain peace,” peace must already exist.  In the wake of the assassination of the 
Lebanese president and the Israeli invasion that preceded the second MNF, and certainly 
in the case of subsequent MNFs, it is difficult to describe the situation in Lebanon as 
being one of peace.  Instead, when Colonel Mead returned with the second MNF, the 
Syrians and Israelis were in direct combat with each other.  A legitimate military mission 
would be to forcibly separate belligerents, but that is not what peacekeeping forces do. 66 
FM 100-5 also noted that PKOs “require the consent of all parties involved in the 
dispute.”67  The first MNF entered Lebanon with the approval of the government in 
Beirut and the concurrence of the various Christian and Moslem factions.  President 
Gemayel may have requested the second MNF, but he could not speak for all the various 
factions. 68  The usual procedure is that diplomatic negotiations establish a mandate that 
“describes the scope of the peacekeeping operation.”69  The second MNF lacked the 
legitimacy that consent and a mandate provide. 
“The Application of Peace Enforcement Operations at the Brigade and Battalion 
White Paper” appeared a year after FM 100-5 and noted that because “the success of the 
peacekeeping force depends on the consent of the former belligerents, the force must 
shepherd its own legitimacy by actual and apparent neutrality.”70  Of course, in the case 
of the second MNF there was no “consent,” and the belligerents were active rather than 
“former,” but the emphasis on neutrality remained.  FM 100-5 notes that peacekeeping 
“demands that the peacekeeping force maintain strict neutrality,” and Gunnery Sergeant 
Randolph Russell remembered telling many civilians in Beirut, “We’re a peacekeeping 
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force, we don’t take sides.”71  In spite of these efforts, the perception arose that the 
Americans were aligned with the Lebanese, and the MNF became caught in the middle of 
several warring factions that did not acknowledge its legitimacy.  By these measures, 
interpreting the MNF mission as “peacekeeping” was a flawed concept. 
However, these problems remained deceptively beneath the surface when Mead’s 
22nd MAU first arrived in Beirut.  According to the Department of Defense Commission 
Report, the MNF was “warmly welcomed by the local populace” and “the environment 
was essentially benign.”72  That generally peaceful condition continued, in spite of “the 
deterioration of the political/military situation in Lebanon,” until April 18, 1983, when a 
terrorist attack on the US Embassy killed sixty-three people, including seventeen 
Americans.73  Still, as Mead departed and passed the mission to Geraghty, Mead felt the 
MNF was on good terms with the various factions in Lebanon.  He called the LAF “our 
friends,” while also claiming, “The Shia Moslem populations in our area treated us with 
the same courtesy and respect we had showed them.”74  He was proud that the MNF had 
helped Lebanon move “a few inches closer to peace and sovereignty” and felt enough 
progress had been made that the LAF would be able to exert governmental control 
throughout the country within a year.75   
Geraghty considered neutrality to have been critical to Mead’s success, and the 
new MNF commander “was very adamant to maintain that neutrality that I think we had 
built up—and goodwill—for over a year.”  He endeavored to walk “a razor’s edge to 
maintain our neutrality” and treat “all Lebanese factions alike, showing no favoritism 
toward one group or another.”  Whatever successes had been made, Geraghty attributed 
to this approach.76  
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Unfortunately for Geraghty, what the Department of Defense Commission Report 
would describe as “a series of circumstances beyond the control” of the commander 
would bankrupt his predilection for neutrality.77  What would ultimately pass for a 
withdrawal agreement was finally brokered on May 17, 1983, eighteen months after the 
second MNF returned to Lebanon and just weeks before the arrival of Geraghty’s 24th 
MAU.  Departing 22nd MAU commander Mead had high hopes for the negotiation, 
praising it as the work of diplomats who “had been able through patience and persistence 
to bring about a compromise in a highly complex and emotionally volatile situation.”78 
Mead’s high hopes notwithstanding, in reality, the agreement was a seriously 
incomplete settlement, signed only by Lebanon and Israel, not Syria.  Accompanying the 
deal was a secret side letter, accepted by Secretary of State Schultz but unknown to 
Lebanese President Gemayel, that Israel would not withdraw if Syria did not withdraw 
simultaneously.  Israel also required information about all Israeli soldiers missing in 
action and the return of all Israelis being held prisoner of war and the remains of dead 
Israeli soldiers before Israel would withdraw.  Secretary of Defense Weinberger 
considered this side letter to amount to giving “President [Hafiz] Assad of Syria veto 
power over any withdrawal and thus over Israel’s ability to establish better relations with 
a key Arab neighbor, Lebanon.”  “Assad promptly exercised this [power],” Weinberger 
continues, “by not withdrawing.”   He declared “the May 17 ‘agreement’ was not only 
absurd, but was nullified from the start” by Syria’s veto power.79  Similarly, diplomatic 
historian John Boykin labels the agreement “stillborn” and a “charade.”80  Weinberger 
describes it as “a losing proposition from the get-go” and considers it “a wonder anyone 
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could have been naïve enough to believe it would work.”81  Such assessments did not 
bode well for the MNF. 
The day of the agreement, President Reagan also announced at a televised news 
conference, “The MNF went there to help the new [sic] government of Lebanon maintain 
order until it can organize its military and its police to assume control of its borders and 
its own internal security.”  Hammel considers this a significant expansion of the original 
MNF presence as “merely a symbolic act of solidarity with a reemergent Lebanese 
national entity” to now taking “an active role in policing borders and providing for 
internal security...[that] positively identified American servicemen with the besieged 
Gemayel government.”82   
The situation was further agitated on May 20, when President Reagan notified 
Congress he had removed his ban on the sale of seventy-five F-16 fighter aircraft to 
Israel.  Syria responded by stepping up its activities in the Bekaa Valley, and Libyan 
military contingents were also reported to have entered the area.83  On July 6, Syria 
formally rejected the withdrawal plan, but seemingly expected the Israelis to withdraw 
unilaterally.  Syria’s Moslem Druze allies began a major effort to eject the Christian 
Phalange from the Shuf Mountains, and the Druze and Amal Shiites prepared to fill the 
gap left by the anticipated Israeli departure.  The Lebanese Army readied itself to do the 
same thing.  The Department of Defense Commission Report noted the MNF’s “initial 
conditions had dramatically changed,”84 and Bolger describes the mission as having now 
“reached a crossroads.”  Neutrality was no longer an option. 85   
The marines had been training the LAF for six months in hopes that the more 
professional the LAF became, the less need there would be for the MNF or the Israelis to 
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remain in Lebanon.  Although the LAF was officially the non-partisan representative of 
all of Lebanon, it was traditionally dominated by the Maronite Christians, which caused it 
to lack legitimacy with the Druze and Moslem groups.  Boykin explains, “Since the 
Marines were supporting the LAF, the Druze reasoned, then they too were enemies.  As 
that perception increased, so did fire at the Marines from Druze and other factions.”86  
The perception was reinforced from July 19 to July 23, as President Gemayel travelled to 
the US, where President Reagan described him as “our friend.”87  In Beirut, daily 
bombardments protested Gemayel’s visit, and the MNF rapidly found itself “caught in 
the middle of the conflict erupting around them.”88   
While Gemayel was in the US, President Reagan announced his July 15 
appointment of Robert McFarlane, a retired marine lieutenant colonel, to replace Habib 
as his Middle East Ambassador.  McFarlane took a more confrontational approach than 
Habib had attempted.89  In an effort to buttress Gemayel, McFarlane severed all US 
contacts with the Druze.  While Gemayel’s defense advisor Wadia Haddad crowed, “We 
have the United States in our pocket,” Druze leader Walid Jumblatt turned to Syria for 
more support.90 
On July 20, the Israeli cabinet authorized a partial withdrawal of its forces to the 
Awali River, less than twenty miles south of Beirut.  The US was able to persuade Israel 
to delay the order twice to give additional time for the LAF to prepare, but on August 28, 
the initial troop movements began.91  Druze and Amal fighters rushed to fill the vacuum 
left in the northern Shuf range and Christian East Beirut.  The LAF was unprepared for 
this challenge, and marine Lieutenant Gregory Blazer recalls they “began using our lines 
as protection for movement up and down the coast road, which put us in direct fire of 
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forces hostile to the Lebanese Armed Forces, trying to control the positions that the IDF 
[Israeli Defense Forces] withdrew from.”92   
Every time the marines fired back in self-defense, the Moslems saw them as being 
in league with the Christian-dominated Lebanese Army.  Even Moslem troops within the 
LAF debated with their Christian officers about returning fire on their coreligionists.93  
Captain Morgan France, who as commander of Amphibious Squadron 8 was the overall 
commander in Lebanon, and Geraghty struggled to develop “a postured response,” which 
advanced incrementally from pointing weapons and launching Cobra attack helicopters to 
popping illumination flares over active hostile positions to finally opening fire.  Some 
junior marines felt such restrained tactics as responding with nonlethal illumination flares 
to mortar and rocket attacks that had killed their comrades made the Marines “sitting 
ducks.”  More seasoned ones understood Geraghty was “in a tough political position.”94  
From the command perspective, more was at stake than politics.  France explained, “We 
were very concerned with remaining neutral.  That was the linchpin of our mission and 
the linchpin of Tim’s [Geraghty’s] survival.”95  Geraghty had to carefully weigh short-
term military expediency against the potential long-term benefits of neutrality.96  By this 
point, however, neutrality and the legitimacy that it was hoped to engender, had become 
impossible.  Now, declares Hammel, “There was a full-blown war in The Root [marine 
slang for Beirut], and the MAU was part of it.”97 
On September 4, when the Israelis withdrew their main forces from Khalde, the 
marines were trapped in a similar situation.  Without coordination, two Lebanese armored 
columns advanced through the marine positions in an effort to replace the departing IDF.  
In fighting that exceeded the August incident, the maneuver gave the impression the 
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marines were laying down a base of fire in support of the Lebanese advance. 98  Dolphin 
assesses that “with the LAF operating dozens of armored vehicles so close to our 
positions…the Druze militia would see [the Marines’] defensive fires as being in direct 
support of an LAF offensive.”99  In such a situation, “perceptions are everything.”100  At 
first Geraghty authorized only illumination rounds be fired, but by this time the strategy 
“was beginning to lose its punch.”101  When Druze batteries continued to shell the 
marines, the USS Eisenhower launched F-14A Tomacat fighters that located the position 
which was then destroyed by naval gunfire from the USS Bowen.102 
In spite of this necessary deviation from neutrality, Geraghty still resisted 
Ambassador McFarlane’s request to launch carrier air strikes in support of LAF forces in 
danger of being overwhelmed by an assortment of militia fighters at Suq-al-Gharb, the 
critical high ground overlooking the Beirut International Airport.  Only when US Special 
Forces personnel with the LAF reported Syrian tanks were closing in on their position on 
the morning of September 19, did Geraghty consent to supporting fires from the USS 
Virginia and the USS John Rodgers.  Bolstered by this support, the LAF line stiffened 
and held.103  A ceasefire was arranged for September 26, leading Jordan to surmise, “It 
appeared that presence and a good salvo or more of naval gunfire had indeed made peace 
a possibility.”104  Perhaps the measured use of added firepower was moving the MNF in 
the direction of the combination of security and restraint that had proved successful for 
Operation Bluebat and Operation Power Pack.  Instead, Jordan concludes, “Hindsight 
shows that the optimism was misplaced.”105 
Indeed, many would later point to Suq-al-Gharb as a “turning point” in America’s 
role in Beirut.106  Boykin argues that “with the Americans now shelling Druze positions 
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in the Shouf in support of the LAF, the Marines lost their only real asset, their neutrality.  
They were now seen as full partisan participants in the civil war, and the attacks on them 
by various factions increased even more.”107  Michael Petit agrees that with this new 
development “the nature of the Marines’ role in Lebanon changed dramatically.”108  
Whatever tenuous claim to legitimacy the MNF once may have had was now gone.   
Restraint   
However, it was based on this assumption of legitimacy that the MNF placed its 
high premium on the principle of restraint.  In his September 23, 1982 message to 
Congress, President Reagan had emphasized, “In carrying out this mission, the American 
force will not engage in combat.  It may, however, exercise the right of self-defense and 
will be equipped accordingly.”  He also expected the mission would last “only for a 
limited period.”109  Because there was never any intention of the MNF engaging in 
combat, it was only lightly armed.  Moreover, Secretary of Defense Weinberger describes 
the MNF as being “quite insufficient in numbers or configuration to deal militarily with 
either the Israelis or the Syrians, and certainly not with all the factional militias of 
Christians and Moslems who fought each other with great ferocity and had been doing so 
for many years.  Indeed, the second MNF was not designed or intended to deal militarily 
with any other forces.”110   
The apparent calm that Mead found when he returned to Beirut “hardly 
necessitated a bona fide defense,” and he understandably focused on establishing a 
presence.111  Indeed at that time, Secretary of Defense Weinberger argues, Mead “had no 
mission other than to ‘establish a presence.’”112  At this point “the operation was intended 
to be of short duration,” so little attention was paid to much beyond that.113   
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When the second MNF deployed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed it to follow 
the standard “peacetime rules of engagement” and fire only in self-defense and defense of 
collocated LAF units.114  One of Stokes’s initial acts as commander of the MNF was to 
refine these ROE in an effort to keep “an innocuous exchange of fire” from erupting into 
mayhem.115  Stokes’s ROE stated: 
- In every possible case, local civil/military authority will be used. 
- Marines will use only the degree of military force necessary to  
  accomplish the mission or reduce the threat. 
 
- Wherever possible, avoid injury to noncombatants or damage to  
  civilian property. 
 
- Response to hostile fire will be directed only at the source. 
 
- Marines will act in self-defense only.116 
Stokes’s ROE “clearly imposed commonsense restrictions that he felt had to be 
stated in simple, unheroic terms to attack-minded combat infantrymen who had been told 
every day of their careers, beginning from training-day one, that they were 
thoroughbreds.”117  It was the same challenge Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer had 
faced in the Dominican Republic of “ratcheting-down” the aggression of soldiers in a 
non-traditional role.  Geraghty noted the same difficulty in adjusting to a mission that 
was “not solely military, an offensive mission, more Marine-oriented” like the MAU was 
used to.118 
Stokes went to great lengths to signal the MNF’s impartiality.  He began jeep 
patrols into the Phalange strongholds of Christian East Beirut, a move which no doubt 
impressed many Moslems.  He dealt decisively with Israelis who seemingly “expected 
special treatment by the Marines,” and his actions garnered extensive and favorable 
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coverage in the Moslem press.119  The difficulties with the Israelis came as somewhat of a 
surprise given the positive diplomatic relationship between Israel and the US, but Israel 
had come to resent the Americans as the protectors of the PLO that Operation Peace for 
Galilee had intended to crush.120  The MNF had few friends in Beirut, but Stokes did his 
best not to take sides. 
Where Stokes unintentionally deviated from his policy of neutrality was in his 
dealings with the Lebanese Army.  In his September 29, 1982 address to Congress, 
President Reagan had stated the MNF “will operate in close coordination with the 
Lebanese Armed Forces.”121  In December, the 24th MAU began training the LAF in 
coordination with the Office of Military Cooperation.  The goal was to raise LAF 
readiness to a level where it could help the government of Lebanon ensure the 
sovereignty of the country.  However, by training the Christian-dominated LAF, the 
marines “inadvertently compromised the neutral image they had tried so hard to build.”122  
Hammel declares it “was in its way among the most crucial decisions taken during the 
entire Marine experience in Beirut, for it inextricably linked the intentionally visible 
Marines to the fate of the LAF and, by extension, identified the Marines and their 
government completely with the fate of the Gemayel government.”123 
When Mead returned to Beirut for his third time on February 15, 1983, and 
replaced Stokes’s 24th MAU, the 22nd MAU soon felt the effects of Moslem perceptions 
that the MNF had moved too close to the LAF.  On March 15, an Italian squad hit a 
minefield and took sniper fire.  The next day, someone dropped a grenade off a rooftop 
onto a marine patrol in West Beirut.  During the same week, two grenade attacks 
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occurred against French patrols. In the midst of these increased threats to the MNF, Mead 
reports that cross training with the LAF increased.124  
The growing violence peaked on April 18, when a van carrying the equivalent of 
a 2,000-pound explosive charge crashed into the US Embassy, killing sixty-three people.  
Hezbollah later claimed responsibility for the attack, boasting it was part of a “promise 
not to allow a single American to remain on Lebanese soil.  When we say Lebanese soil 
we mean every inch of Lebanese territory.”125  Mead quickly upgraded security measures, 
increasing patrols, improving positions, and placing his Amphibious Assault Vehicles 
(amtracs) to provide protection.  Special Envoy Habib agreed with the actions, noting that 
“policymakers at the civilian level don’t make the rules of engagement.”126 
Mead’s strong precautions appeared to have worked, and the 22nd MAU 
completed its tour without further serious incident, although on May 7 the marines 
received indirect fire from an unknown source and location.127   When Geraghty’s 24th 
MAU arrived, the commander picked up on the emphasis his predecessors had placed on 
restraint.  In explaining the impact of the interpretation of the “presence” mission, 
Geraghty says, “It was a mission where we were not to build up any permanent-type 
structures because to emphasize the temporary nature of our mission, which is my 
understanding as to why the Marine Corps went in and not the Army to start with, and 
that is why we maintained ships offshore.”128  Staff Sergeant Todd Frederick agreed with 
Geraghty’s assessment, explaining, “If you start digging tank ditches and setting up hard 
barriers, it completely counteracts what you’re telling everybody else, that you’re not 
really in a combat situation.”129 
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When the level of violence increased dramatically after the Israelis began their 
withdrawal, Geraghty tried to respond with as much restraint as possible.  The MNF 
fought back in self-defense but refused to contribute to the escalation.  Geraghty 
explained, “I think a lot of the shelling and the casualties that we took there over the 
months were really directed to–as bait to force us to have a large response into the village 
and we didn’t do that.”130  FM 100-5 would later assert, “Peacekeeping often involves 
ambiguous situations requiring the peacekeeping force to deal with extreme tension and 
violence without becoming a participant.” 131  Geraghty refused to violate this charge. 
Hoping to gain legitimacy by restraint, Garaghty claimed the MNF “earned the 
respect of the people.”132  His strategy was not without precedent.  Such restraint had 
served Operation Bluebat forces well during the 1958 US intervention in Lebanon.  
Likewise, discipline had been a key to the success of Operation Power Pack forces in the 
Dominican Republic in 1965-1966.  In fact, “The Application of Peace Enforcement 
Operations at the Brigade and Battalion White Paper” would insist, “Only well-
disciplined soldiers will be successful in peacekeeping operations.”133   In Lebanon, 
however, Secretary of Defense Weinberger argues that the militias interpreted American 
restraint as weakness and continued “their season of rising threats” that had begun with 
the April 1983 embassy bombing.134  The difference was that the restraint exercised by 
Bluebat and Power Pack forces was backed up by strong adherence to the principle of 
security.  Moreover, by the time of Geraghty’s tour in Beirut, the MNF was clearly no 
longer in a traditional peacekeeping situation.  Restraint would not work in the absence of 
security or legitimacy. 
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Security   
The MNF’s problems with security began with its failure to adhere to the 
principle of objective.  “Without a clearly defined objective,” Weinberger argues, 
“determining the proper size and armament and rules of engagement for such a force is 
difficult at best.”135  This initial problem was exacerbated when legitimacy became an 
issue.  Assuming it had legitimacy that it did not, the MNF relied on restraint rather than 
security. 
After the US intervened on behalf of the LAF at Suk-el-Gharb on September 19, 
the USS New Jersey arrived in the eastern Mediterranean to give the MNF a significant 
firepower advantage.  The New Jersey’s sixteen-inch guns ensured the MNF was able to 
win any large-scale artillery duels.  Understanding this reality, the anti-American forces 
adjusted their tactics and increasingly practiced asymmetric warfare.  Corporal Michael 
Petit, a member of the 24th MAU, recalls, “The heavy fighting was over, but the sniping 
and terrorist attacks had just begun.”136   Jordan agrees, describing the MNF as now being 
“targeted for terrorist and sniper attacks.”137   Geraghty himself barely escaped a roadside 
car bombing on October 19.138 
General indications of this new approach were legion.  The Department of 
Defense Commission Report notes that “From August 1983 to the 23 October attack, the 
USMNF was virtually flooded with terrorist attack warnings.”  However, “those 
warnings provided little specific information on how and when a threat might be carried 
out.”139  There was a worldwide paucity of human intelligence sources available to 
confirm or deny the threats, and in an effort to prevent casualties from the increased 
militia violence, Geraghty had curtailed all but a few local security patrols on August 31.  
Without these focused resources, the vague reports from national intelligence services 
provided little in the way of timely, tailored, and “actionable” information.140  Certainly, 
none of the reports matched the vehicle actually used in the attack.141 
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If the reports lacked specificity, they did paint a picture of security conditions that 
had “continued to deteriorate as progress toward a diplomatic solution slowed.”  The 
MNF, however, did not keep up with this new reality.142  Geraghty complained, “The 
whole nature of the mission changed, but not our [combat size or area of operations].”  
Without those adjustments, Geraghty believes, “We never should have been there.”143  
Secretary Weinberger seemingly agreed, and he put forward a proposal that would 
immediately withdraw the MNF from Beirut and place it in readiness aboard relatively 
safe ships offshore.  According to Hammel, when the National Security Council met to 
consider the idea on October 18, “others attending the meeting prevailed upon 
Weinberger during a break to drop the proposal.”144  Weinberger implies this pressure 
came from the State Department, stating their claims that the US could not appear to “cut 
and run…carried the day.”145   This opportunity missed, the marines were left in what 
Weinberger called “the ‘bull’s-eye’ of a large target at Beirut Airport.”146 
It would not be long before this vulnerability was exploited.  At about 5:00 a.m. 
on October 23, a large truck was seen slowly circling the southern parking lot outside the 
BLT headquarters building.  Such cargo trucks were “nothing out of the ordinary,” and 
this one attracted little special notice.  About an hour later, the same truck or a similar 
one reappeared and began to circle again.  This time, however, the driver gunned the 
engine and blasted through the ineffective obstacles and past the sentry booth.  The 
guards had no time to react, and within seconds the driver detonated the explosive 
equivalent of over 12,000 pounds of TNT into the enclosed atrium of the BLT 
building.147  It was the largest conventional blast ever seen by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s forensic experts.148   
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In analyzing the implications of the attack on the principle of security, three main 
arguments present themselves.  The first is Weinberger’s consistent claim that security 
was impossible given the flawed diplomatic arrangement.  “We did not and could not, 
under the basic terms of the MNF agreement,” he explains, “equip or authorize our 
Marines to take the kind of normal responsive actions Marines are trained to do to protect 
themselves in combat.  That would include seizing and holding the high ground around 
their basic position and patrolling aggressively to insure that the airport was not only 
occupied but fully secured.”  He felt “we could not either guarantee their safety, nor give 
them the means to provide for their own security, under the arrangements and conditions 
then prevailing in Lebanon.”  The best, if not only way, to achieve security in such a 
predicament would be to “dissolve the MNF and leave.”149 
The second way of coping with the security implications of the attack was to 
describe it as “an unconventional bolt out of the blue, unanticipated by rational men who 
had done their best to prepare themselves for more ordinary direct and indirect fire 
threats.”150  Reflecting this logic, the Depart of Defense Commission Report labeled the 
attack “unprecedented,” and Marine Corps Commandant General Kelley testified, “No 
one that I talked to in Lebanon or anywhere else could ever show me a thread of evidence 
that would show this kind of massive assault where you were actually penetrating a 
position with a five-ton truck going sixty miles an hour.  This had just never been 
conceived of before.”151  Even if the attack had been anticipated, Secretary Weinberger 
argued the impossibility of the security challenge in lamenting, “Nothing can work 
against a suicide attack like that, any more than you could do anything about a kamikaze 
flight diving into a carrier in World War II.” 152  In fact, the explosion was of such a 
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magnitude that the Department of Defense Commission Report concluded, “Significant 
casualties probably would have resulted even if the terrorist truck had not penetrated the 
USMNF defensive perimeter but detonated in the roadway some 300 feet from the 
building.”153   
The final approach is a critical review of the security procedures and decisions 
made by the chain of command.  This analysis focuses on the billeting of such a large 
number of personnel in a single structure, the ineffective rules of engagement, and a lax 
security posture.  For these omissions, the Department of Defense Commission Report 
found the BLT and MAU commanders had failed “to take the security measures 
necessary to preclude the catastrophic loss of life in the attack on 23 October 1983.”154 
When Mead arrived with the second MNF, he opted to use a cluster of buildings at the 
Beirut International Airport (BIA) to house his headquarters and service units.  Assuming 
there to be little risk of artillery or ground attack, Mead made his decision based largely 
on convenience.  “It was simply logistics,” he said.155 
After the rocket attacks on July 22 and August 8, Gerlach and Geraghty agreed to 
move the remainder of the BLT support personnel and a reaction force of 150 men into 
the BLT headquarters building.  No one questioned the fateful decision at the time.  Petit 
notes, “The BLT was one of the safest buildings in the compound.  It had endured earlier 
fighting and survived Israeli artillery barrages without being harmed.  Even a minor 
earthquake in June had caused no structural damage.”156  Jordan says the building was 
“considered to be a fortress.”157  After intense shelling in September and increased sniper 
and terrorist attacks in October, messing facilities were also moved to the BLT 
headquarters building.158  By the time of the October 23 attack, one quarter of the BLT, 
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approximately 350 personnel, were concentrated in what the Department of Defense 
Commission Report termed “a lucrative target for attack.”  After the attack occurred, the 
Commission concluded that the billeting decision had “contributed to the catastrophic 
loss of life.”159  Ironically, Jordan notes, "many of the same Congressmen who later 
reviewed Marine security and use of the building posed for pictures and were briefed atop 
its roof just weeks before it was destroyed.”160 
The ROE also came under close scrutiny.  By the time Geraghty assumed 
command, the ROE had evolved from the peacetime ROE under which Mead deployed, 
to Stokes’s four rules, to a list of ten: 
1. When on post, mobile or foot, keep a loaded magazine in the 
weapon, bolt closed, weapon on safe, no round in a chamber. 
2. Do not chamber a round unless told to do so by a 
commissioned officer unless you must act in immediate self-
defense where deadly force is authorized. 
3. Keep ammo for crew-served weapons readily available but not 
loaded.  Weapon is on safe. 
4. Call local forces [LAF] to assist in self-defense effort.  Notify 
headquarters. 
5. Use only minimum degree of force to accomplish any mission. 
 
6. Stop the use of force when it is no longer needed to accomplish 
the mission. 
7. If you receive effective hostile fire, direct your fire at the 
source.  If possible, use friendly snipers. 
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8. Respect civilian property; Do not attack it unless absolutely 
necessary to protect friendly forces. 
9. Protect innocent civilians from harm. 
 
10. Respect and protect recognized medical agencies such as the 
Red Cross, Red Crescent, etc.161 
Geraghty spent a considerable amount of time briefing his men on the rules, and 
each marine was given a ROE card to carry.162  Additionally, four alert conditions were 
established, ranging from Condition IV, which constituted normal operations and the 
lowest state of readiness, to Condition I, which meant an attack against US positions was 
imminent or in progress.163 
The Department of Defense Commission Report noted that conspicuously absent 
from this set of ROE was “specific guidance for countering the type of vehicular terrorist 
attacks that destroyed the US Embassy on 18 April 1983 and the BLT Headquarters 
Building on 23 October 1983.”164  However, after the April 18 attack, the US Embassy 
was relocated to the Duraffourd Building and the British Embassy, and a permanent unit 
from the MNF was assigned as guard.  The MNF’s theater headquarters, US Commander 
in Chief Europe (USCINCEUR) issued an expanded set of ROE for the embassy guard 
mission.  This new ROE was more complicated in that it directed that magazines would 
be inserted in weapons, weapons on safe, with no round in the chamber for some posts, 
while other posts required a round in the chamber.165
 
  However, the more robust ROE 
better prepared the embassy guards to respond to terrorist type acts, such as car 
bombings, by allowing a marine “to fire if he perceived hostile intent.”  The result was 
that the marines in Beirut now had two sets of ROE, one based on hostile act and the 
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other on hostile intent.  The “hostile intent” ROE for the Embassy became codified as the 
“Blue Card,” and the “hostile act” ROE at the airport became the “White Card.”166  
Noting a cumulative effect, the Depart of Defense Commission Report concluded, “The 
mission statement, the original ROE, and the implementation in May 1983 of dual ‘Blue 
Card-White Card’ ROE contributed to a mind-set that detracted from the readiness of the 
USMNF to respond to the terrorist threat which materialized on 23 October 1983.”167 
Lulled into a false sense of security by the “presence” mission, the sturdiness of 
the BLT building, and the desire to not display a combative presence, the MAU had done 
little to harden its position.  The concertina wire, eighteen-inch sewer pipe, and sandbags 
proved no match for a five-ton truck.  In fact, they were never intended to stop such an 
attack.  Jordan recalls, “It [never] occurred to anyone that someone would try to charge 
through here.”168  Indeed, on the eve of the attack, Jordan reports a fairly relaxed, 
business-as-usual attitude prevailed among throughout the MNF.169  As a result, even 
though the compound was supposed to be at Condition II readiness, in reality it was not 
even at Condition III.170 
The security failure of the MNF was not the result of a single critical defect.  
Rather it was “the culmination of a series of understandable small decisions that 
aggregated to engender a tragedy.”171  Perhaps Jordan offers the best summation of the 
enduring lessons relating to the principle of security in Beirut: “The attacks illustrate the 
vulnerability of conventional forces to such suicide strikes and the problem faced by any 
military organization that must surrender the initiative to its opponents.”172  One of the 
objections to the term “operations other than war” was that it connoted a certain security 
that, as in Beirut, was not always the case.  Instead, Lieutenant Colonel, later General, 
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John Abizaid would caution, “Any American force committed to peacekeeping must keep 
in mind the Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon.”173 
Perseverance  
The October 23 attack claimed the lives of 241 service members, but remarkably 
there was no immediate call for a US withdrawal.  Certainly, the marines showed no 
signs of quitting.  Instead, “a grim determination set in to see the mission through 
regardless of their loss—to make sure that their fellow servicemen had not died in 
vain.”174  The media coverage reflected this attitude, and the American public responded 
with an impressive show of support.  Over 60,000 letters, most addressed simply to “A 
Marine.  Beirut, Lebanon” poured in, encouraging the survivors.  Schoolchildren sent 
poems and cards, and “Operation Cookie” kept the Marines well-supplied with home-
baked goods.175  Previous intelligence reports had suggested the terrorists believed that 
by killing or wounding one or two soldiers or marines a day, they could generate enough 
public pressure within the MNF countries that they would withdraw their forces.  
According to Jordan, “Without a doubt, the antigovernment terrorists had underrated the 
American people.”176 
 President Reagan responded to the bombing by declaring, “We cannot and will 
not dishonor them now, and the sacrifices they made, by failing to remain as faithful to 
the cause of freedom and the pursuit of peace as they have been.”177  He added, “These 
deeds make so evident the bestial nature of those who would assume power if they could 
have their way and drive us out of [Lebanon].  We must be more determined than ever 
that they cannot take over that vital and strategic area of the earth or for that matter any 
other part of the earth.”  Even, Reagan’s usual rival, Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill, 
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agreed: “This is not the time to cut and run.”178  In fact, on November 18, the 22nd MAU 
arrived to relieve the battered 24th and assume the MNF mission.179 
A former Lebanese cabinet official argued that America’s stake in Lebanon was 
now even greater than before.  “The Americans have over 200 dead.  That earns you the 
right to speak up,” he said.  “The US has paid the price of admission.”180  America did, in 
fact, increase its involvement in the region.  In December, the US launched an air strike 
and then naval gunfire at Syrian targets in an effort to quiet Syrian “belligerence.” 
Although some politicians condemned this action as “the use of excessive force in a 
peacekeeping mission,” Secretary of Defense Weinberger notes that there were also some 
who called for additional military pressure against Syria.181 
For over three months, the Reagan administration struggled unsuccessfully to 
translate this resolve into policy.  A wave of popularity brought on by the successful 
invasion of Grenada gave President Reagan the opportunity to make “a graceful exit” 
from Beirut, and on February 8, he announced the 22nd MAU would be withdrawn.182  
Hammel credits a variety of factors for this decision: congressional disapproval of 
continuing the mission, the Reagan administration’s failure to articulate a clear policy or 
objective in continuing the effort, a desire to calm the public in the upcoming election 
year, and the combat ineffectiveness of the LAF.183   Weinberger hones in on the most 
important of the group, declaring that administration officials finally reached the 
conclusion “some had for so long refused to recognize; namely that we were engaging in 
fruitless tactics in pursuit of unreachable goals.”184   
The casualty aversion that would plague perseverance in later OOTWs was not 
the operative issue in Beirut.  Thomas Hammel argues “the heavily battered...single 
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Marine infantry battalion...could be, and was, immediately replaced.”185  It was not the 
losses.  It was their seeming lack of purpose.  This time the American failure of 
perseverance was a function of its original poor adherence to the principle of objective.   
 Weinberger drew sharp lessons from this experience, and he developed what 
became known as the “Weinberger Doctrine”—strategic criteria to help guide “the 
painful decision that the use of military force is necessary to protect our interests or to 
carry out our national policy.”186  The overarching concern of the criteria was that the 
objective, commitment, and other conditions would be strong enough to ensure 
perseverance.  The Weinberger criteria required the following: 
1. The United States should not commit forces to combat unless 
the vital national interests of the United States or its allies are 
involved.  
2. US troops should only be committed wholeheartedly and with 
the clear intention of winning. Otherwise, troops should not be 
committed.  
3. US combat troops should be committed only with clearly 
defined political and military objectives and with the capacity 
to accomplish those objectives.  
4. The relationship between the objectives and the size and 
composition of the forces committed should be continually 
reassessed and adjusted if necessary.  
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5. US troops should not be committed to battle without a 
“reasonable assurance” of the support of US public opinion and 
Congress.  
6. The commitment of US troops should be considered only as a 
last resort.187 
Weinberger’s philosophy was aimed at “the gray area conflicts” like Beirut and 
other OOTWs.  He found these to be “the most difficult challenges to which a nation 
must respond,” and, as he had for Beirut, he advocated a “flexible response” that did not 
necessarily include military force.  If, however, the decision to use force was made in 
pursuit of some clear purpose, then the government must “continue to carry out that 
decision until the purpose has been achieved.”188  When troops were committed to 
combat, it had to be “with the sole object of winning.”189  He admitted that in the past, 
this perseverance had “been difficult to accomplish.”190 
Weinberger, however, did not advocate blind perseverance.  He understood that 
“conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict.”  Therefore, 
the US commitment must be “continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.”191   He 
specifically references Lebanon as being an intervention in which “conditions 
deteriorated” to a degree that withdrawal was required.192 
The Weinberger Doctrine required forces be committed only in cases “deemed 
vital to our national interest or that of our allies.”193  This emphatic requirement worked 
well during the remainder of the Cold War but came under scrutiny when the demise of 
the Soviet Union afforded the US the opportunity to pursue less critical interests.194  As 
America drifted further into these “gray-areas challenges,” it also became more difficult 
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to achieve Weinberger’s insistence on “clearly defined political and military 
objectives.”195  This departure from strict adherence to the Weinberger Doctrine would 
profoundly affect perseverance in post-Cold War OOTWs such as Somalia.   
Conclusion 
 The US intervention in Beirut was a failed OOTW.  Operations other than war are 
generally political in nature, and this was certainly the case in Beirut.  It is accepted that 
the military operates in support of diplomatic objectives, and Operation Power Pack had 
clearly demonstrated the military’s ability to subordinate operational decisions to political 
considerations.  However, in Beirut no unity of effort was established between the 
military and diplomatic instruments of power.  The discrepancy began at the cabinet level 
with Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Secretary of State Shultz disagreeing over the 
proper sequencing, cooperation, and efficacy of the military and diplomatic efforts.  
Because the political agreement the MNF was intended to support never materialized, 
unity of effort between the two instruments of national power was fractured. 
 This failure to achieve unity of effort unleashed a host of other problems with the 
remaining principles.  As Weinberger forcefully argues, without the diplomatic 
agreement, there was no objective for the MNF.  Instead, the MNF pursued an unclear 
mission associated with vague notions of “peacekeeping” and “presence.”  Such activities 
emphasize neutrality and assume a legitimacy that in reality was not present in Lebanon.  
This inappropriate characterization of the environment led to a strong adherence to the 
principle of restraint at the expense of security.  Earlier OOTWs, such as in the 
Dominican Republic, had demonstrated that restraint can be effective when it is 
supported by the security represented by the potential application of force, but the lightly 
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armed MNF lacked this capability and credibility.  Geraghty’s use of illumination rounds 
as “a painstakingly conceived response aimed at showing the power of the United States 
in a benign fashion” is a case in point.  To the American mind, such a restrained tactic 
would facilitate legitimacy.  In the reality of Lebanon, however, it had the opposite effect 
when directed at people who believed that “force met with less than equal force was no 
force at all; a weak response was a sign of weakness, and the weak were put on the earth 
to be beaten.”196  The MNF’s decision to emphasize restraint in the absence of security 
led to a loss of credibility with its challengers.197 
 The failure to adhere to the principle of security resulted in the loss of 241 
servicemen on October 23, 1983.  Throughout the duration of all the MNFs, some twenty 
more were killed. 198  Casualty aversion would later emerge as a leading threat to the 
principle of perseverance in other OOTWs, but in Beirut, the lack of a clearly articulated 
objective to justify the losses seems more to blame.    
This analysis reinforces several of the observations from other case studies 
concerning relationships among the principles.  In both Vietnam and Beirut, a lack of 
unity of effort negatively impacted on objective, and the problem with objective 
unleashed other failures.  Successful OOTWs, like Operations Bluebat and Power Pack 
and the decade-long effort in Nicaragua and Honduras, shared the MNF’s adherence to 
restraint, but the American experience in Beirut suggests that restraint alone does not 
result in success.  As a negative example, the US support of the government of Lebanon 
via the MNF strongly supports the utility of the principles of OOTW as a planning and 
analytical tool and predictor of operational outcome. 
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Table 7  
Adherence to Principles of OOTW during US Intervention in Beirut 
 
 Strong 
adherence 
General 
adherence 
Neutral General 
lack of 
adherence 
Strong lack 
of 
adherence 
Legitimacy     x 
Objective     x 
Perseverance    x  
Restraint  x    
Security     x 
Unity of 
effort 
    x 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SOMALIA: WEAK OBJECTIVE LEADS TO WEAK PERSEVERANCE 
The US involvement in Somalia came as a response to the anarchy, drought, civil 
war, and banditry that had reduced Somalia, a country encompassing approximately 
637,540 square kilometers on the Horn of Africa, to a virtual wasteland.  The failure of a 
United Nations relief effort resulted in a US-led peace enforcement operation that 
alleviated much of the humanitarian crisis.  This success was followed by another UN 
operation with a more expansive mandate that included nation-building.  The US 
involvement in Somalia came at a time when America was struggling with its leadership 
role in the post-Cold War era, and this OOTW was plagued by a weak analysis and 
articulation of the objective.  As the mission broadened over time, additional risks 
developed that violated the principle of security and eventually led to the disastrous 
Battle of Mogadishu.  The intervention was perceived as not being legitimate by various 
Somali warlords who had a vested interest in maintaining the existing anarchy.   In an 
effort to shore up that weak legitimacy, the UN mandate and the US rules of engagement 
exercised the principle of restraint, but not in a way that produced the desired results.  
The US also suffered from unity of effort issues, both internationally and between 
American conventional and special operations forces, which impacted security.  The 
costly commitment to an area outside traditional US national interests suffered from weak 
domestic legitimacy that was unsustainable in the wake of mounting casualties, and the 
operation experienced a strong failure to adhere to the principle of perseverance.   As a 
result of this OOTW, the US failed to accomplish its objective of bringing order and 
stability to Somalia. 
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Background 
Some 300,000 Somalis had died between November 1991 and March 1993, and 
another 1.5 million lives were at immediate risk because of famine.  Nearly 4.5 million of 
Somalia’s 6 million people were threatened by severe malnutrition and related diseases.  
Another 700,000 had sought refuge in neighboring countries.  To help relieve the mass 
starvation, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 751, which 
established a humanitarian aid mission known as United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM I) in April 1992.  UNOSOM I’s success was severely limited because Somali 
warlords, most notably Mohamed Farah Aideed of the Habr Gidr subclan and Ali Mahdi 
Mohamed of the Abgal subclan, refused full cooperation, and the limited mandate was 
not strong enough to compel compliance.  The warlords, whom Kimberly Martin noted 
“maintain their authority only by preventing the emergence of a functioning state,”1 kept 
the UNOSOM I troops from leaving Mogadishu Airport, and only 500 of the authorized 
3,500 troops deployed.2   
The failure of UNOSOM I quickly became apparent, and the US found itself 
under increasing pressure to act.  Responding to a variety of motivations, the US won 
United Nations Security Council approval in December 1992 of Resolution 794, which 
established Unified Task Force (UNITAF), a large, US-led peace enforcement operation 
known as Operation Restore Hope.  UNITAF made great progress, and humanitarian 
agencies soon declared an end to the food emergency.  By January 1993, food was 
getting to all areas of the country, leading 10th Mountain Division commander Major 
General S. L. Arnold to soon declare, “We have come very close to establishing the right 
environment to enable the Somalis to arrive at a ‘Somali solution.’”3  In light of these 
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improvements, US forces began withdrawing in mid-February, and on May 4, UNOSOM 
II, armed with a much broader mandate that included nation-building activities, took over 
operations from UNITAF.  With the benefit of hindsight, Colonel Kenneth Allard notes 
that at this point “the underlying causes of conflict in Somalia had only been postponed,” 
and it was during UNOSOM II that they resurfaced and “exploded.”4  Indeed, the 
disastrous October 3-4, 1993 Battle of Mogadishu brought an end to the international 
effort to bring order to Somalia. 
Analysis of the Principles 
Objective 
          Somalia’s problems with the principle of objective can be traced to the decision-
making process that led to the intervention.  After the disaster of Beirut, the Weinberger 
Doctrine had emerged as the definitive yardstick for measuring the application of military 
force, but by the time of Somalia, the success of Operation Desert Storm and the collapse 
of the Soviet empire were changing both America’s perception of its military and the 
nature of the threat.  To many, Weinberger’s strict criteria for the use of force seemed to 
require revision.5   
The decision to intervene in Somalia reflected these changing thoughts on the 
commitment of force.  In the case of Somalia, vital interests were not at stake.  In their 
place were the peripheral interests of promoting American values and a favorable world 
order.  While such interests did not meet Weinberger’s high bar, it appeared that the 
application of military power was likely the only option that had a reasonable prospect of 
producing favorable results in Somalia at an acceptable cost.6 
Thus, rather than being the result of deliberate and methodical exposure to a 
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criteria such as Weinberger’s, the decision to intervene in Somalia was based on a series 
of domestic and international influences.  The most conspicuous factor was an onslaught 
of media coverage that portrayed starvation conditions in Somalia and created the 
impression that only US intervention could save the country.  Michael Mandelbaum 
concludes that “televised pictures of starving people created a political clamor to feed 
them, which propelled the US military into action.”7  White House Press Secretary 
Marlin Fitzwater acknowledges this impact of the press coverage, saying, “After the 
election [of November 1992], the media had free time and that was when the pressure 
started building up…We heard it from every corner, that something had to be done.  
Finally the pressure was too great…TV tipped us over the top…. I could not stand to eat 
my dinner watching TV at night.  It made me sick.”8  Perhaps most telling is Craig 
Hines’s report of the media coverage’s impact on President George H. W. Bush.  Hines 
writes,  
Bush said that as he and his wife, Barbara, watched television at the White House 
and saw "those starving kids…in quest of a little pitiful cup of rice," he phoned 
Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman of the JCoS 
[Joint Chiefs of Staff]:  "Please come over to the White House."  Bush recalled 
telling the military leaders: "I–we–can’t watch this anymore.  You’ve got to do 
something."9   
 
Although the true situation was pockets of hunger rather than widespread 
starvation, the media created a popular perception of universal life-threatening conditions 
that demanded action.10  As President Bill Clinton’s National Security Advisor Anthony 
Lake explained, “We know that when the all-seeing eye of CNN finds real suffering 
abroad, Americans want their government to act--as they should and we should.”11  
However, these public demands for action based on media coverage can negatively affect 
policy decision making.  Former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger lamented, 
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“The public hears of an event now in real time, before the State Department has had time 
to think about it.  Consequently, we find ourselves reacting before we’ve had time to 
think.  This is now the way we determine foreign policy—it’s driven more by the daily 
events reported on TV than it used to be.”12 
In addition to the media coverage, there were other influences impacting 
American decision making concerning Somalia.  In the aftermath of the end of the Cold 
War and the victory in Operation Desert Storm, there was tremendous pressure on the US 
to use its status as the world’s only superpower to create a favorable new world order.  
Indeed in 1990, President Bush had declared,  
We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian 
Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic 
period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective--a new 
world order--can emerge: a new era--freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the 
pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace.  An era in which the 
nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in 
harmony.…A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, 
while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor.  Today that new 
world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we’ve known.  
A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle.  A world in which 
nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice.  A world 
where the strong respect the rights of the weak.13 
 
Somalia was just one of many crises demanding US attention as Bush and others 
sought to forge this new world order.  Bosnia was another, but the seemingly open-ended 
nature of an intervention there served to fracture American will and popular interest in 
becoming involved.  Somalia, on the other hand, seemed a much less complicated way of 
dealing with the pressure for US action and a way of buying time for America to come to 
grips with what its role in Bosnia should be.14 
The end result was that the American decision to intervene in Somalia was not 
based on the traditional rational actor model.  Indeed, one contemporary observer 
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described it as “more generous impulse than thought-out policy.”15  It certainly gave the 
appearance of being a “largely tactical decision reached to solve a current, concrete 
problem with little apparent concern for the longer term strategic implications.”16  Absent 
this clearly articulated objective and end state, the 10th Mountain Division, which 
provided the bulk of the forces for UNITAF, lamented in its After Action Review (AAR), 
“The first question that was difficult to answer was, ‘what is the mission?’”17  The AAR 
explains that this uncertainty was due to a lack of focus, definition, and end state 
provided by higher headquarters.18  Even National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft 
seemed to share the 10th Mountain’s frustration, telling President Bush, “Sure, we can get 
in…. But how do we get out?”19 
As a result of this ambiguity, the 10th Mountain was vulnerable to the 
accumulation of additional missions and tasks through the phenomenon of “mission 
creep.”20  While these added responsibilities strained the American forces at the tactical 
level, the most damaging example occurred at the strategic level when UNOSOM II, 
armed with a more robust mandate, embarked on a nation-building operation aimed at 
restoring order to Somalia, disarming Somalis, and rebuilding the country’s economic 
and political institutions.   
The transition from UNITAF to UNISOM II reflected a tremendous difference of 
opinion between the Bush administration (and continued by the Clinton administration) 
and the UN over the issue of disarmament.  The UN demanded a comprehensive program 
throughout the entire country while the US favored selective arms control only in the area 
of southern Somalia controlled by UNITAF.  Neither of the two sides would budge.  As 
late as April, just a few weeks before the announced transition date of May 4, 1993, UN 
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Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was still refusing to allow detailed planning for 
the handoff until UNITAF changed its position of disarmament, something Lieutenant 
General Robert Johnston, the commander of Joint Task Force Somalia, with his limited 
mission and forces, simply refused to do.21  The result was an “incomplete and at times 
acrimonious and incoherent transition, [that left] the new UN-led coalition…vulnerable, 
at least as it struggled to get started, and ill-prepared and poorly resourced to assume its 
broad mission.”22 
The UNOSOM II mandate, stated in Resolution 814, included eight broad tasks: 
1. Monitoring the factions to maintain peace; 
 
2. Preventing and responding to outbreaks in fighting; 
 
3. Controlling heavy weapons; 
 
4. Confiscating small arms from those who are unauthorized to 
possess them; 
5. Securing all ports and lines of communication; 
 
6. Protecting UN personnel and installations; 
 
7. Continuing mine-clearing efforts; 
 
8. Repatriating refugees and displaced persons.23 
 
UNOSOM II’s mission was to “conduct military operations to consolidate, 
expand, and maintain a secure environment for the advancement of humanitarian aid, 
economic assistance, and political reconciliation.”24  It was an ambitious undertaking. 
The differences in scope between UNITAF and UNOSOM II were striking.  While 
UNITAF focused on the southern parts of Somalia, UNOSOM II covered the entire 
country.  While UNITAF strictly limited its activities to securing humanitarian 
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assistance, UNOSOM II took on the much more dangerous task of disarmament.  While 
UNITAF had no role in nation-building, UNOSOM II was mandated to assist Somalia in 
rehabilitating its political institutions, rebuilding its economy, and promoting national 
reconciliation and political settlement.25 
This expanding mission drew political criticism in some circles, but few 
immediate protests.  One of the earliest opponents was Senator Robert Byrd, who called 
for a withdrawal of US forces, stating that while he supported the initial short-term 
humanitarian assistance, he did not have “nation-building in mind.”26  Nonetheless, the 
operation muddled along with little real effort to transform Somalia into a state but with 
increasing confrontation and problems.27  It was not until the US suffered unacceptable 
casualties that President Bill Clinton announced, “It is not our job to rebuild Somalia’s 
society.”28  From its very inception, the international effort in Somalia had suffered from 
poor adherence to the principle of objective.  The ensuing tension had built to this 
catastrophic climax, and international forces soon began withdrawing.  In many ways, the 
overall failure in Somalia can be attributed to a variety of failures all stemming from a 
failure to follow the principle of objective. 
Restraint  
From the very beginning, operations in Somalia were characterized by strong 
consideration of the principle of restraint.  Because there was no central government from 
which to obtain consent for the deployment of an international force, the UN adopted a 
limited neutral mandate for UNOSOM I, restricting the use of force and avoiding 
provocative actions.  UNITAF was more aggressive than UNOSOM I, challenging and 
disarming some clans thought to be a threat to security, but, like UNOSOM I, it generally 
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avoided provocative actions.  For example, UNITAF did not attempt to disarm all 
civilians on the street, instead establishing a policy of “no visible weapons.”29  When 
Aideed moved some of his technicals from Mogadishu toward Galacio to avoid 
confiscation by UNITAF, Robert Oakley, whom President George H. W. Bush had 
appointed special envoy to Somalia, explained, “There was no perceived need to confront 
Aideed over the disappearance of weapons as long as they posed no threat to UNITAF 
forces or humanitarian operations.”30  Such accommodations contributed to UNITAF 
being largely tolerated by Somali warlords because it did not threaten the political 
balance in the country.31 
UNITAF indeed made great progress, and in mid-February 1993, US forces began 
withdrawing.  On May 4, UNOSOM II took over operations from UNITAF, but this 
successor operation was severely flawed in its misapplication of the principle of restraint.  
UNOSOM II attempted to take on a more ambitious mandate than UNITAF despite 
having fewer and lower quality troops.  UNITAF had ultimately involved more than 
38,000 troops from 21 coalition nations, including 28,000 Americans.  UNOSOM II was 
authorized a strength of just 28,000, of which only 4,500 were from American forces.  
 In both UNITAF and UNOSOM II, US forces operated under rules of 
engagement (ROE) that granted “the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks 
or threats of an attack.”  Such wording allowed soldiers and marines to use deadly force 
not only against “hostile acts” but also against perceived “hostile intent.”32  While the US 
forces had a fairly flexible and robust ROE, they also faced several non-traditional 
situations that challenged the principle of restraint.  The most obvious situation was the 
congested and rickety urban area that created a tremendous possibility for collateral 
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damage, resulting in such ROE restrictions as strict limitations on the use of AC-130 
aircraft.33 
 Even more troublesome were the presence and behavior of noncombatants.  
UNITAF and UNOSOM II troops reported that many Somali males, to include children, 
“would try to steal almost any item that was not firmly secured.”34  Soldiers of 10th 
Mountain found that fixing bayonets proved an ineffective deterrent given the risk young 
Somalis were willing to take to obtain any piece of American equipment that might have 
significant resale value, as well as the thieves’ quick realization that the Americans had 
no intention of actually using their bayonets.  Some Marines countered by carrying 
whipping sticks, but the idea of beating Somali children proved problematic as well.  A 
solution that worked with some effect was found in hiring Somali elders, in whose hands 
the stick was a traditional symbol of authority and acceptable discipline, to keep the 
children at bay.35  Cayenne pepper spray also proved to be “an effective means of 
proportionate force against low-level threats.”36 
 American soldiers also faced the challenge of conducting combat operations in 
and amongst the civilian population.  One company commander explained, “There are so 
many civilians around that when you go crashing through doors there’s a potential to 
massacre innocent civilians.”37  Somali militiamen exploited this situation by frequently 
seeking cover behind noncombatants or in a humanitarian facility such as a hospital.38  In 
fact, Allard goes as far as to say that “women and children [were] considered part of the 
clan’s order of battle.”39  One instance where this dastardly technique was used was 
during the June 5, 1993 attack on a Pakistani platoon guarding a food distribution station 
at National Street in Mogadishu.  Unarmed Somalis descended on the Pakistanis, 
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blocking their view and grabbing at their weapons.  Then, as the UN’s account of the 
incident records, “From positions behind the women and children in the crowd, weapons 
were fired at the troops.”40  Likewise, during the October 3-4 Battle of Mogadishu, Staff 
Sergeant Edward Yurek of B Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment reported that 
militiamen hid behind unarmed women and fired from in between their legs and armpits41 
Nonetheless, ROE cards reiterated to soldiers that “the United States is not at 
war,”42 and Brigadier General Anthony Zinni, UNITAF’s J3, advised, “Always consider 
negotiations as a great alternative to violence.”43  One manifestation of these notions was 
the technique of “graduated response,” which was used routinely in cordon and search 
operations.  Such operations began by the open and peaceful formation of the cordon 
around the area to be searched, followed by loudspeaker announcements of the 
operation’s intent and specific instructions for compliance.  This step allowed inhabitants 
to peacefully exit the buildings before combat soldiers entered.  If this measure failed, the 
area was saturated with CS (tear gas).  If resistance continued, soldiers entered the 
objective using a cutting charge to create a hole in the wall and lobbed concussion 
grenades to seize control of the inhabitants “with as little violence as possible.”  Major 
General Thomas Montgomery, the deputy commander of UNOSOM II, reports that 
fifteen, ten, and five-minute warnings were normally given before attacking any target.44  
Of course, the trade-off for this graduated response was the extra time afforded the 
inhabitants to develop a defense or call for outside assistance.45   
As a result of extraordinarily measured actions such as these, the 10th Mountain 
AAR boasted, “Our soldiers displayed tremendous restraint in the use of force throughout 
[Operation Restore Hope].”46  Likewise, Special Envoy Oakley notes, “Compared with 
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the numerous incidents in which UNITAF forces encountered sporadic shooting or mass 
stone-throwing, the low casualty rate among Somalis shows how hard and how 
successfully UNITAF commanders worked to instill restraint and discipline into the 
behavior of troops from all nationalities and at all levels.”47 
Such well-intended efforts notwithstanding, adherence to the principle of restraint also 
negatively affected the mission.   The limited US presence in UNOSOM II can at least be 
attributed to considerations of restraint as a means of building legitimacy.  In spite of a 
“changed security situation” and “the slower than anticipated arrival of coalition forces 
and contributor support,” the US chose “to modify the composition of our force to meet 
these new needs without significantly raising its total size.”  Central Command 
(CENTCOM) commander-in-chief General Joseph Hoar explained, “Raising the profile 
of the Armed Forces in Somalia would undermine the perception of UN military forces as 
truly international and capable of meeting the task at hand.  A highly visible American 
presence is not in the best interests of the United States or the United Nations.”48  Hoar’s 
comments appeared in the Autumn 1993 issue of Joint Forces Quarterly, just weeks 
before the Battle of Mogadishu.  Much of the criticism of that disaster centered on the 
seemingly misplaced emphasis on the principle of restraint at the expense of security. 
Legitimacy   
Legitimacy was also a problematic issue in Somalia.  The first challenge to this 
principle was that UN Resolution 794, which led to the creation of UNITAF, and UN 
Resolution 814, which authorized UNOSOM II, were written under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter.  UN Resolution 794 represented the first time this chapter had been invoked.  
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Its use would make operations in Somalia peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping, 
an important distinction regarding legitimacy. 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter is titled “The Pacific Settlement of Disputes.”  It 
specifies non-military solutions to international conflicts, advocating disputants seek 
solutions through negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, and other peaceful means of their 
own choice.  It also allows the Security Council to recommend peaceful solutions to 
international disputes.49  The broad clauses in Articles 33-38 that refer to action taken 
though “other peaceful means” have been offered as justification for UN observation and 
traditional peacekeeping missions.  Others have argued that Chapter VI is limited to 
diplomatic efforts, leading former Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold to refer to the 
UN’s limited military operations as “Chapter VI and a Half.”50 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter is titled “Action with Respect to Threats to the 
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.”  It allows the Security Council to 
mandate solutions to international conflict, to include military action through “air, sea, or 
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”  
As such, Chapter VII operations move beyond peacekeeping into the realm of peace 
enforcement.51  UNOSOM II represented the first time US forces had been committed to 
a UN-led peace enforcement operation.52 
The 1993 edition of FM 100-5 stated, “Peacekeeping operations support 
diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in areas of potential conflict.  They stabilize conflict 
between two belligerent nations and, as such, require the consent of all parties involved in 
the dispute.”  Peace enforcement operations, on the other hand, “are military intervention 
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operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace or to establish the conditions 
for a peacekeeping force between hostile factions that may not be consenting to 
intervention and may be engaged in combat activities.”  They imply “the use of force or 
its threat to coerce hostile factions to cease and desist from violent actions.”  Under such 
circumstances, peace enforcement forces “cannot maintain their objective neutrality in 
every instance.”53  The ensuing perceptions of bias naturally affect the operation’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of those threatened by the peace enforcement force’s actions.   
In his highly regarded volume on lessons learned in Somalia, Allard warns of 
“bright lines” that when crossed indicate the “limits to the commitment of American 
military power” are being reached.  He notes that one of these lines “is any action in a 
peace operation that effectively takes sides between factions engaged in internal civil 
strife.”54  Although such actions are expected in peace enforcement, by forfeiting its 
neutrality among the various Somali clans, the US damaged its legitimacy.  In many ways 
the US found itself in an untenable situation.  As Jonathan Stevenson explains, “Each 
Somali political leader, notably Aideed, insisted on the UN’s neutrality but sought US 
support for its own clan—which was distinctly incompatible with equilibrium among 
clans.  Most Somalis in positions of power still could not stomach the idea of a clan-
neutral, egalitarian policy arching over the network of regional clans.”55 
The legitimacy of United Nations’ activities in Somalia was further plagued by 
the preexisting mistrust Aideed had for Secretary General Boutros-Ghali.  The situation 
dated back at least to January 27, 1991, when opposition forces, including those led by 
Aideed, toppled Mahammad Siad Barre’s Somali government.  As then deputy foreign 
minister of Egypt, Boutros-Ghali had supported Siad Barre, a fact that Aideed did not 
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forget.  Special Envoy Oakley recalled, “Certainly in my talks with Aideed he made it 
clear he did not trust Boutros-Ghali in particular and the United Nations in general.”56  To 
make matters worse in Aideed’s eyes, the deposed Siad Barre had found refuge in 
Nigeria.  This association made Nigerian forces in UNITAF a specified target for 
Aideed’s attacks.57  The legitimacy of the Italian contingent was also questioned, based 
on Italy’s colonial experience in the region and its leanings toward Mohamed Ali Mahdi, 
Aideed’s chief competition for control of Mogadishu.  Italy’s presence was especially 
confrontational to younger, anti-imperialist Somalis.58 
Another challenge to legitimacy was the American cultural misunderstanding of 
Somalia.  Even the culturally aware Brigadier General Zinni admitted that when he 
deployed, “I didn’t know Somalis from salamis.”59  He noted the US military’s traditional 
mindset often prevented it from gaining a nuanced “understanding of what makes people 
tick, what their structure is, where authority lies, what is different about their values, and 
their way of doing business.”60  Perhaps as a reflection of this inability to relate, it was 
not long before many UNITAF members began referring to Somalis as “skinnies” and 
other derogatory terms.61   
One thing Zinni and other members of UNITAF did understand was the 
importance of weapons in Somali culture.  Special Envoy Oakley noted, “If you think the 
National Rifle Association has a fixation with weapons, it’s nothing compared to the 
Somalis.  It’s part of their manhood.”  To surrender his weapon meant a Somali male was 
not just sacrificing the security of himself and his family, he was also losing some of his 
masculinity.62  This realization led the US to proceed slowly with regard to weapons 
control, in seeming acknowledgement of Allard’s observation that “forcible disarmament 
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is the ‘bright line’ of peace operations: when you cross it, you have entered a de facto 
state of war.”63 Rather than a wholesale disarmament policy, the 10th Mountain adopted 
the much more nuanced “four NOs”—no technical vehicles, no checkpoints, no visible 
weapons, and no banditry.64  The result according to CENTCOM’s General Hoar was a 
deliberate program of “selective ‘disarming as necessary.’”65 
 UNITAF was less adept in its understanding of the importance of clans in Somali 
society.  Even as seemingly innocent an operation as providing humanitarian assistance 
can threaten legitimacy because of its inescapable political and military consequences.  
This risk is especially prevalent in an environment where no government exists.66  In a 
clan-ridden society such as Somalia, aid was not seen as neutral or impartial if it was 
provided to a rival group.  Strengthening any of the warring factions altered the balance 
of power and created a perception of peacekeeper bias.67  UNITAF experienced this 
phenomenon when its bottom-up efforts to empower traditional local and regional leaders 
were seen by Aideed’s lieutenants as threatening to their own base of power.68  As 
nation-building expert James Dobbins explains, “The very act of intervention alters, often 
radically, the power balance and social dynamic in the subject nation and its region.  By 
virtue of an intervention, losers suddenly become winners, and winners become losers.”69 
 Norman Cooling argues that UNOSOM II continued this error.  He claims, 
“Disregarding the long-established Somali cultural order, the UN felt that, in the interest 
of creating a representative, democratic Somali government, they would be better served 
by excluding the clan leadership.  The policy reeked of arrogance coupled with cultural 
ignorance.”70  The problem was that since 1988, more than fourteen Somali clans and 
factions had fought a civil war for control of their own territory.71  In its expanded 
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mission, UNOSOM II directly threatened these warlords’ hold on power.  UNOSOM II 
deputy commander Major General Montgomery observes, “That [to build a nation] was 
not in the best interest of the warlords, who wanted, each of them, to control, and of 
course Aideed was the strongest of the warlords.”72  Nonetheless, 10th Mountain Division 
commander Major General Arnold argued equally correctly that in his view, “the center 
of gravity of the operation in Somalia is the erosion of the independent power of the 
warlords…. It must take place if Somalia is ever to return to normalcy and attempt to rule 
itself.”73  But by the UN's concentration on Aideed and Ali Mahdi, Somalia’s two main 
warlords, William Wunderle argues that it created the unintended consequence of 
actually increasing “the warlord’s degree of power and authority, which was desirable to 
the warlords but led to the marginalization of other clans, thereby upsetting the traditional 
balance of the Somali kinship system.”74  Moreover, the action that Arnold noted as 
critical to mission accomplishment, was the same one that Montgomery explained would 
render the effort illegitimate in the eyes of the Somali base of power.   
Some observers explained the phenomenon in terms of cultural understanding; 
this time in the context of the military’s growing pains associated with operations in a 
“nontraditional environment.”  Lawrence Yates cautions that in situations like Somalia 
“where there is no hostile force, there may be a tendency on the part of conventionally 
oriented officers and policy makers to create one.”  Yates cites an unidentified Marine 
Corps general as seeing this “need to have an enemy” as a fatal flaw in the military’s 
approach to Somalia.75  While such conclusions seem to dismiss the complexities of the 
situation in Somalia and the fact that the expanded mission was a UN rather than a US 
military initiative, they do address the difficulty of maintaining legitimacy once the 
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operation moved beyond its initial attempt to maintain neutrality.76  One thing is sure, the 
targeting of Aideed certainly coalesced Somali unity in an unprecedented way.  As 
Special Envoy Oakley explains, “Because [Somalis] are very xenophobic, and they 
reacted very strongly and would not allow foreigners to come in and single out one of 
their people [Aideed] even though they didn’t like him, those who didn’t like him began 
to rally to his defense, not just politically but he gained a lot of recruits and fighting 
against the United Nations in Mogadishu came in from other clans.”77  Allard echoes this 
sentiment, saying that Somali culture stresses the idea of “me and my clan against all 
outsiders.”78 
The result of this breakdown of legitimacy was that by June, UNOSOM II was at 
war with various Somali parties and was suffering high casualties, including twenty-five 
Pakistanis killed in an ambush on June 5.  United Nations Security Council Resolution 
837 was passed the next day and called for the immediate apprehension of those 
responsible.  The result was that US soldiers became involved in a highly personalized 
manhunt for Aideed.  In October, a US effort to capture him ended in eighteen American 
deaths in the Battle of Mogadishu.   
Security   
Even in its humanitarian capacity, the principle of security was essential to 
UNITAF’s success.  Much of the earlier attempts to provide relief to Somalia were 
siphoned off by the warring factions, because, as Dennis Jett explains, “Soldiers…will 
always eat before civilians.  No armed group is going to go hungry while unarmed relief 
workers distribute food aid to noncombatants in areas under its control.”  Food not only 
sustains the individual soldier, it also can be sold for cash that the warring faction can use 
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to buy arms, ammunition, and other essentials of violence that enhance its power.  To 
offset this phenomenon, relief officials in Somalia switched from providing high value, 
saleable foodstuffs to items that had less value in relation to their bulk.  They also tried to 
saturate the country with food in order to reduce its value.79 
Using more traditional methods to counter the threats, the 10th Mountain Division 
provided security for distribution sites, convoy operations, humanitarian agency 
activities, ports, airfields, and other key installations.  Soldiers established checkpoints, 
dismantled the roadblocks that had served as militia toll collection points, and disarmed 
bandits.80  On the average, UNITAF forces escorted 70 convoys carrying 9,000 metric 
tons of supplies from Mogadishu inland each month.  These efforts “ensured that relief 
reached those who needed it and was not looted.”81 Analysts such as James Dobbins 
identify security as the priority task in any nation-building operation.82  Somalis on the 
ground made the same observation.  For example, Omar Faiki, a 60-year-old former 
policeman, commented, “If there’s no security, there is no food.”83 
However, the security of UNITAF was impacted by a predetermined “force cap.”  
The 10th Mountain Division AAR noted that “while the ARFOR [Army Forces] 
developed courses of action for deployment that considered various methods of 
employment of forces, it seemed as though the crisis action planning accomplished at the 
strategic level was based on an artificial force cap of 10,200, not based on a mission 
analysis.”84  Some of these courses of action called for as many as 17,000 personnel, over 
half again as many as the ultimate 10,200 limit.85  The 10th Mountain lamented that once 
the cap was announced, it “took on a life of its own,”86 remaining completely 
independent of any mission analysis.  As an example of the artificiality created by such 
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restrictions, force caps caused a lift company of the 10th Aviation Brigade to deploy 
without any battalion command and control.87  The implications for security are obvious. 
Concluding that such arrangements “placed a great deal of strain on 
commanders”88 and that “our forces were stretched very thin,”89 the 10th Mountain 
recommended that, in the future, “the missions and tasks need to be assigned to the 
commander to conduct and then allow him to conduct mission analysis.  There may be a 
need to place a ceiling on forces based on lift availability or political reasons, but the 
commander must have the flexibility to design the force required to accomplish the 
mission he is assigned.... Once tasks are received, mission analysis and the staff planning 
process should drive the number of personnel to deploy, not the other way around.”90  
When such procedures are violated, security is bound to suffer. 
UNITAF forces were assisted in security operations by a revived Somali police 
organization that became known as the Auxiliary Security Force (ASF).  The project was 
controversial for several reasons.  Some saw UNITAF’s role in its creation as mission 
creep.  The ASF had to contend with legal prohibitions on using funds for the US military 
to train, advise, and support foreign law enforcement agencies.  Other critics noted the 
difficulties in vetting a national police force that would be free from disruptive clan 
political influences.  In the end, the principle of security trumped these considerations, 
with Special Envoy Oakley arguing that without Somali policemen, UNITAF was “going 
to get people killed patrolling in dark alleys.”91  The ASF “proved adept at controlling 
crowds and traffic, patrolling, securing key facilities such as ports and airfields and 
arresting criminals,” as well as freeing UNITAF personnel to perform other mission-
essential tasks.92 
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In addition to mere numbers, improper force types plagued the US security effort 
in Somalia.  Concerned with his “inability to get to US or UN forces in extremis,” 
Montgomery had requested armored reinforcement, including a full mechanized battalion 
and an air cavalry squadron, in July 1993.  Secretary of Defense Les Aspin denied the 
request, in Montgomery’s mind “because the United States wanted out of Somalia, 
wanted to lower our troop presence, rather than increasing it.”93  As things would turn 
out, the October 3-4 disaster which ultimately forced a US withdrawal was at least 
partially attributable to this subordination of the principle of security to those of restraint 
and legitimacy.  
Another cause was the failure to understand the impact of the changed objective 
on security.  Colonel Tim Geraghty, commander of the ill-fated 24th MAU in Beirut, had 
personal experience with such an omission and now wondered, “How did the mission 
ever evolve from feeding a starving nation, into going after a rinky-dink warlord?”  Once 
the change did occur, Geraghty believes the outcome should have been anticipated.  “If 
there’s any lesson we learned out of Beirut, it was that we never should have been there 
after the initial mission changed,” he commented.  “It’s very dangerous to put US forces 
in a hostile environment where there’s no peace to keep.  You essentially become a target 
for fanatics.”94  Geraghty was joined by many others who saw Somalia as “almost déjà 
vu” from the Beirut experience.95 
The October 3 operation, part of a larger endeavor to capture Aideed known as 
Operation Gothic Serpent, had begun favorably with a force of army rangers and Delta 
commandos conducting a daylight raid on a suspected location of Aideed and his 
lieutenants at the Olympic Hotel.  The Americans captured twenty of Aideed’s men, but 
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the mission quickly unraveled when Somalis shot down three US helicopters.  The 
Americans soon became surrounded by thousands of Somalis, and the relief column was 
ambushed on its way to rescue the beleaguered soldiers.  It was more than nine hours 
before help, primarily from the 10th Mountain Division, finally arrived. 
Only after the tragedy did President Clinton announce, “Today I have ordered 
1,700 additional Army troops and 104 additional armored vehicles to Somalia to protect 
our troops and complete our mission.  I’ve also ordered an aircraft carrier and two 
amphibious groups with 3,600 combat Marines to be stationed off-shore.”96  By then it 
was too late.   In Somalia, a failure to adjust the force structure to the expanded mission 
and accompanying threat had created a strong violation of the principle of security. 
Even after the disaster, there remained a reluctance among some US officials to commit 
to a strong adherence to the principle of security.  When asked, “Does Somalia prove 
Colin Powell’s doctrine that American military power, if used, should be used with 
overwhelming force?” Secretary of State Warren Christopher responded,  
The concept is most applicable when our vital national interests are involved, 
rather than a situation such as this, where President Bush decided to go into 
Somalia for humanitarian reasons only.  When US troops are involved absent a 
vital national interest, then some hard questions have to be asked, including "Will 
our forces be fully protected?"  But I wouldn’t say that every time US forces are 
involved anyplace, you have to have 500,000 troops.97   
 
Even the 10th Mountain AAR, after making its case for mission analysis, realized that 
“With all that said, commanders and their planners must remember that this [force caps] 
will probably be the norm.”98   Such assessments do not bode well for security in future 
OOTWs. 
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Unity of Effort  
Unity of effort proved a continuing challenge in Somalia, with initial concerns 
centering around activities between the military and the humanitarian relief agencies.  
Once the humanitarian crisis subsided, new unity of effort problems emerged within the 
coalition itself.  On a broader front, Somalia revealed the inherent problems with the 
UN’s ability to control such an operation. The entire experience epitomized the difficulty 
of obtaining cooperation among a variety of stakeholders in a complex and ambiguous 
OOTW environment. 
When the 10th Mountain arrived in Somalia, there were some forty-nine non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) conducting activities.99  While clan theft of relief 
supplies was one of the primary reasons a military force was needed, many NGOs 
remained wary of too closely associating with the military, fearing that such activity 
would damage the NGO’s claim to neutrality and peaceful purpose.  Indeed, Andrew 
Natsios argues that “NGOs, some of which have developed philosophical approaches to 
relief and development, guard their autonomy with such energy that they sometimes seem 
to be suggesting that autonomy is a form of strategy.”100  
In many cases, a certain mistrust bordering on animosity affected relations 
between the military and the NGOs.  For many soldiers, the humanitarian organizations 
were “left-wing, anti-military, disorganized, self-righteous ‘do-gooders.’”  Although 
senior leaders like Major General Arnold considered the NGOs “the real heroes of this 
operation,”101 one observer opined that “officers simply did not see women in their late 
twenties with Berkenstock sandals and ‘Save the Whales’ T-shirts as experts worthy of 
consultation.”102  Reciprocating, many relief workers saw the military as “right-wing, 
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insensitive, inflexible, ‘balls-to-the-wall’ control freaks who demonstrated little 
understanding of the situation in Somalia or what was required of them to alleviate the 
widespread suffering.”103   
Any lack of unity among the military and relief agencies would allow warring 
factions, in Somalia and elsewhere, to “manipulate the outside stakeholders working in 
the crisis, playing one off against another, to achieve their political and military 
objectives.”104  Although this “cultural gap” was never bridged completely, it was 
mitigated in Somalia by the creation of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) 
and the collocated Humanitarian Operations Center, which served as liaison and 
coordination centers for issues involving convoy escorts, general security, and weapons 
policy.105  The CMOC was set up jointly by Ambassador Oakley and Philip Johnson, 
head of CARE.  Daily coordination meetings were held among the lead state for the 
particular sector, NGOs, and the military, and governance was by committee.  James 
Fearon and David Laitin consider the CMOC in Somalia as an example of how “ad hoc 
committees can arise to spontaneously solve at least part of the coordination problem” 
inherent in such complex operations.106 
In other cases, unity of effort in Somalia was affected by the lack of command 
structure inherent in the traditional principle of unity of command.  During UNITAF, the 
10th Mountain Division had operational control of coalition forces including the Canadian 
Airborne Battle Group, 1st Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, 1st Belgian Para 
Battalion, and Royal Moroccan Forces Somalia.  The 10th Mountain AAR states that 
“coalition operations worked well during Restore Hope,” but while the division was 
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especially appreciative of the firepower and ground mobility provided by coalition forces, 
the AAR also identifies several challenges to achieving unity of effort.107 
The 10th Mountain noted clear distinctions between what coalition forces were 
capable of doing and what they are willing to do, as a function of “the political agendas 
by which coalition military commanders are constrained.”108  Indeed, the 10th Mountain 
felt “a coalition commander may accept a mission or turn a mission down, based on 
national pride or political agenda rather than a pure military reason.”109  As operations in 
Somali became increasingly dangerous and controversial, some national contingencies 
had to seek guidance from their respective capitals before carrying out even routine 
tactical orders.110  To achieve unity of effort under such circumstances, the 10th Mountain 
stressed the necessity of “meeting shared expectations among partners.”  This result can 
be best achieved by “open and frank discussions…to eliminate or at least limit the… 
differences in understanding” and by “experimentation and patience.”111  In such 
situations, creating the conditions necessary for unity of effort is a continual process. 
These unity of effort considerations in UNITAF were exacerbated during 
UNOSOM II when the UN expanded its objectives well beyond humanitarian relief.  
While supporting the broader mission, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali stated he was 
also “conscious of the feeling in some quarters that UNOSOM is deviating from its 
primary task of ensuring the safe distribution of humanitarian assistance” and was 
“concentrating disproportionate efforts and resources in military operations.”112  In 
Mogadishu, Jonathan Howe, a retired admiral whom, President Clinton put forward in 
March 1993, at Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s request, to be the special 
representative to the UN Secretary General for Somalia, appealed for unity among 
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coalition members.  Understanding that “there are bound to be growing pains,” Howe 
also lamented, “ I regret…there have been differences in approach.”113 
Part of these “growing pains” was the relief of Italian General Bruno Loi, who 
had held unilateral talks with Somali elders allegedly linked to Aideed and reportedly 
agreed to delay weapons searches in hopes of reducing escalating violence.  Other reports 
alleged Italians had warned Aideed when operations against him were about to take 
place.114  Howe explained Loi’s dismissal, saying, “We have to have unity of command, 
we have to have confidence among commanders.  We have to have one policy and unity 
to carry it out.”115  One UN official said the Italians should “either get on the team or get 
off,”116 and in spite of Howe’s efforts to restore cooperation, Newsweek decried “the 
mess in Mogadishu…[as] the result of a team effort in mismanagement that would be 
comical if lives weren’t at stake.”117 
Another unity of effort problem occurred when American soldiers found 
themselves working more closely with non-Western partners, which is perhaps reflective 
of Samuel Huntington’s assertion that “by and large, single civilization organizations do 
more things and are more successful than multicultural organizations.”  Specifically, 
Huntington believes, “military alliances…require cooperation among their members, 
cooperation depends on trust, and trust more easily springs from common values and 
culture.”118   Instead of this trust, UNOSOM II was plagued by a certain amount of 
mutual suspicion.  One Pakistani complained, “The US is quick to stir up trouble with air 
strikes, but it is my men and other Third World soldiers who always draw the tough 
assignments on the ground.”119  The result, according to Time’s Marguerite Michaels, 
was that “fear and resentment are fraying cohesion.”120 
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The presence of non-Western forces in Somalia was part of a growing trend 
during the era of expanded peacekeeping in the 1990s when fully two-thirds of countries 
contributing forces to peacekeeping operations were from the developing world.  These 
soldiers were typically less well fed, well led, and well equipped than their Western 
counterparts, creating a differential in capabilities among the force.  Nonetheless, 
developing countries may be motivated to supply forces because the UN typically 
provides contributing countries about a thousand dollars a month per man.  Many 
developing countries actually make money from UN peacekeeping operations, in part 
because it is up to the government to determine how much of the UN-provided money 
goes to the individual soldier.  Pakistan, for instance, retains the entire amount and gives 
nothing extra to the soldier.  The impact of such a policy on soldier motivation and 
morale is predictably negative.121 
The degradation of unity of effort among the coalition was dangerously apparent 
when logistical delays and poor coordination with Pakistani and Malaysian troops slowed 
the rescue of Task Force Ranger soldiers at the Battle of Mogadishu.  An ad hoc rescue 
team had been formed primarily from 10th Mountain assets, but which also included 
fourteen to sixteen Malaysian armored personnel carriers (APCs) and four Pakistani T-55 
tanks.  The 10th Mountain is a light infantry division with only light-skinned wheeled 
vehicles for ground transportation.  Therefore, the Malaysian and Pakistani assets were 
critical to the operation’s success.  The plan was for the 10th Mountain soldiers to ride on 
the APCs, attacking mounted as far as possible, and break through to Task Force Ranger.  
Once at the helicopter crash site, the casualties would be loaded on the APCs, and the 
convoy would fight its way back to the UN compound.122 
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In addition to language problems, Captain Charles Ferry, who as an infantry 
company executive officer participated in the rescue, reports experiencing the same 
problems with the differences between capabilities and willingness that the 10th Mountain 
noted in UNITAF.  Ferry writes that “it seemed that the [Pakistani] tank commander had 
been ordered to go only about half-way to the objective, and that did not support the 
plan.”123  Although American liaison officers were with both Malaysians and Pakistani 
units, they were unable to convince their coalition partners to cooperate.  Ferry reports 
that only after “a sharp exchange” was the issue seemingly resolved.124 
As the rescue column advanced, it came under heavy fire, and the original 
Malaysian and Pakistani reluctance quickly reappeared.  The Pakistani tanks had, in fact, 
been ordered to go only so far on National Street and then stop.  Ferry reports, “I didn’t 
see them again until the next morning.”125  The two lead Malaysian APCs did move 
forward but did not make the correct turn north and “continued out of sight” down 
National Street, not to be heard from again until the next morning.126  The American 
company commander reported “he was having a hard time getting the [other] Malaysian 
APCs to move under fire.”  At one point, the lead APC stopped and refused to move, 
effectively blocking the company’s progress.127  Only after much prodding were stalwart 
Americans like Ferry able to get a few APCs to the crash site to evacuate the dead and 
wounded.128  As the column made its way back to safety, Ferry reports, “several times, 
other leaders and I had to run into the street to get the Malaysian APCs moving again.”129  
Once the Malaysians did get moving back to safety, there was no stopping them.  Ferry 
reports seeing “six or seven soldiers…running as fast as they could under fire to catch the 
vehicles.  But the APCs did not stop.”130 
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Ferry was not alone in his identification of problems with unity of effort.  Captain 
J. B. Burton identified problems with a lack of UN doctrine at the tactical level; no 
common tactics, techniques, and procedures; and language barriers.  Burton’s conclusion 
was that unity of effort was so difficult to achieve that multinational forces should not be 
combined at the tactical level.131  Other observers focused on the discrepancy in 
capability between the American forces and the Pakistani and Malaysian forces, the latter 
two simply being untrained in quick reaction search and rescue operations.  Combined 
with the fact that most coalition operations required clearance from the respective 
countries’ defense ministries, there certainly was “not a recipe for fast action.”132  
Nonetheless, Major David Stockwell concluded, “By international standards, [the 
Pakistani and Malaysian response] was speedy,” indicating the inherent difficulties of 
multinational operations.133  Making no allowances for such excuses, Lieutenant General 
Bernard Trainor complained, “There’s no unity of command, and no good command and 
control system.”134 
Trainor’s assessment of unity of command problems was not confined to coalition 
forces.  There were serious breakdowns within the US military structure as well, leading 
Allard to conclude that “there should be no mistaking the fact that the greatest obstacles 
to unity of command during UNOSOM II were imposed by the United States on 
itself.”135  In keeping with a longstanding reluctance to place American soldiers under 
foreign command, Major General Montgomery did double duty as deputy to UNOSOM 
II commander Lieutenant General Cevik Bir (a Turk) as well as serving as the 
commander of US Forces Somalia.  However, when Task Force Ranger arrived in August 
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1993, its commander, Major General William Garrison, reported directly to CENTCOM.  
The result was “essentially three parallel chains of command.”136 
Garrison was obligated merely to consult with Montgomery, and Montgomery 
learned of the exact nature of the October 3 raid only hours before its initiation.  At the 
tactical level within US Forces Somalia, awareness of Task Force Ranger operations was 
even less, with many officers in the 10th Mountain’s quick reaction force (QRF) feeling 
completely ignorant of the special operations.  Compartmentalization and extreme 
secrecy are obviously normal in special operations, but in Somalia there emerged a 
psychological distance between the 10th Mountain and Task Force Ranger that further 
hampered cooperation.137  The end result of all these factors was that the QRF made few 
specific preparations to assist Task Force Ranger if necessary. 
In the final analysis, most observers agree that a situation as complex as the one in 
Somalia was beyond the UN’s ability to directly control.  The UN is best suited to deal 
with consensual, traditional peacekeeping scenarios rather than peace enforcement 
operations like Somalia.  These operations “simply [run] too much against the grain of 
what the organization and its members can or are willing to support administratively, 
financially, and politically.”138  In future such situations, analysts recommend unity of 
effort will best be facilitated by “military coalitions that have the blessing of the UN but 
are not under direct UN control.”139  In UNOSOM II, the absence of such an arrangement 
plagued unity of effort. 
Perseverance    
Perseverance is perhaps the most difficult principle to achieve in an OOTW, and 
Somalia certainly proved to be no exception.  Jett identifies outright failure, indefinite 
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extension, and a declaration of success as the three possible outcomes of peacekeeping 
operations.  He contends that Somalia contained elements of all three of these 
possibilities.  “When continuation (the second outcome) proved unsustainable and 
something that could be called victory (the third outcome) proved unobtainable,” Jett 
explains that “failure (the first outcome) became inevitable.”140  Edward Luttwak offers a 
similar analysis, concluding that “outside intervention would make sense only if it were 
prolonged indefinitely, in effect turning Somalia into a colony again, this time under UN 
control.  Otherwise, all the costs and risks of intervention can achieve only ephemeral 
results at best.”141 
Although it is estimated that the Americans inflicted up to two thousand casualties 
on the Somalis during the Battle of Mogadishu, the American losses and the chaotic 
nature of the operation created a domestic outcry in the United States.142  As a peripheral 
interest, Somalia had never evoked a deep US commitment, and the October fiasco led to 
the Clinton administration’s decision to withdraw US troops by March 1994.   David 
Rieff explains this loss of perseverance in the context of objective and legitimacy.  He 
argues,  
The American public came to think of the hunt for Aideed, even though they 
knew it was being carried out by US Army Rangers, not as war but as police 
work.  Casualties in war are understood to be inevitable.  Soldiers are not only 
supposed to be ready to kill, they are supposed to be able to die.  But casualties in 
police work are a different matter entirely.  There, it is only criminals who are 
supposed to get hurt or, if necessary, killed, not the cops.  Again, the fundamental 
problem has not been some peculiar American aversion to military casualties.  
Rather, there has been an essential mistake in the way such operations are 
presented to the public, and, perhaps, even in the way they are conceived of by 
policymakers.  Under the circumstances, it should hardly be surprising that public 
pressure on Congress and the president to withdraw US troops predictably arises 
at the first moment an operation cannot be presented in simple moral terms, or 
when casualties or even the costs start to mount.143 
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 Other analysts argue that if these losses had been used as a rallying cry, public 
resolve might have been steeled.  Max Boot cites the work of two political scientists who 
contend, “Had the administration chosen instead to galvanize public opposition to… 
Aideed, our research suggests that Americans would have tolerated an expanded effort to 
catch and punish him.”144  By this point, however, the Clinton administration had begun 
rethinking its policy of  “assertive multilateralism” and was eager to cut its losses. 
The US withdrawal compelled the UN to terminate UNOSOM II and withdraw all 
peacekeepers by March 1995.  Some observers, including Montgomery, saw this 
development as the result of a calculated strategy on behalf of Aideed.145  Walter Clarke, 
the deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy from March through July 1993 agreed, 
explaining, “I think he [Aideed] tended to look at the UNITAF period as a period of 
putting his force together, restoring some of his units, but certainly in preparation for 
events after UNITAF had gone…. If he was going to get the UN out of there, which I 
think was clearly one of his objectives, he was going to have to take some actions.”146  In 
Somalia, as is often the case, time was on the side of the belligerents rather than the 
peacekeepers. 
Other analysts believe Somalia failed, not because of a lack of perseverance, but 
because of the presence of it.  Michael Maren argues, 
The UN’s peacekeeping machine was cursed with a built-in flaw: it desperately 
needed to succeed.  When the only way to bring peace to Somalia might have 
been to walk away, the bureaucracy was compelled to stay and find a peace for 
which it could take credit.  As the UN stayed in Somalia it continued to supply the 
raw material of the conflict—loot.147 
 
Jett sympathizes, arguing that “while designed to save lives, humanitarian aid can, if it 
fuels the conflict and prolongs the war, ultimately cost more lives than it saves.”148  Such 
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arguments suggest that in some cases it may be better to let nature take its course than to 
cling to a stubborn perseverance that maintains an artificial and untenable situation. 
The end result was that perseverance in Somalia suffered from both internal and 
external challenges.  In many ways, nation-building activities of the size and scope 
required by Somalia are doomed because of the immense amount of time necessary to 
build trust among the warring parties.  While this time passes, the international 
community’s enthusiasm is dampened by increasing expenses and few visible 
improvements.  Indeed, as in Somalia, the warring parties themselves are often interested 
in an early withdrawal because such a presence interferes with their own internal agendas 
and will be tolerated for the shortest time possible.149  While the size of the work to be 
done is immense, the time to do it is limited.  The situation is almost mutually exclusive. 
Francis Fukuyama notes that the problem of long-term capacity-building goes 
well beyond the instance of Somalia.  By taking over responsibility for providing services 
directly, external agencies may please donors by delivering immediate aid, but they do 
nothing to strengthen local bureaucracies and prepare them for the international 
community’s departure.150  In Somalia, “there was no sustained effort to help Somalia 
reestablish national and regional institutions or civil administration” and “there was no 
attempt…to build civil or political institutions.”151  Absent this domestic capacity, what 
little progress that had been made in Somalia rapidly evaporated. 
Whatever the exact cause, the failure of the UN effort in Somalia marked a 
watershed in peacekeeping operations.  Jett contends that with the eighteen American 
soldiers who were killed on October 3-4, “the expectations that had been so high in late 
1988 [when the UN was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for peacekeeping] also died.”152  
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Indeed, the UN reported that at the end of 1995, it had some 60,000 personnel serving as 
peacekeepers at an annual cost of about $3.5 billion.  A year later it had just 26,000 
peacekeepers at an annual cost of about $1.6 billion.  The report admitted, “Clearly, the 
pendulum has swung away from the heady days of what some have referred to as peace-
keeping overstretch.”153   The most serious example of the impact of the Somalia disaster 
was the world’s failure to provide a meaningful response to the genocide in Rwanda, but 
its effects would also be felt in Haiti. 
 Indeed, the international community’s commitment to humanitarian interventions 
seemed to crumble in the aftermath of crisis.  National Security Advisor Anthony Lake 
offered to resign, but President Clinton would not allow it, instead blaming the failure on 
the UN.  He entered into “a recurring war of wills” with Boutros-Ghali that ended in the 
US using its diplomatic influence to oust the secretary general in 1996.154  While the UN 
continued to conduct a number of peacekeeping operations after Somalia, most were the 
longstanding operations in places like Cyprus and the Western Sahara.  New initiatives 
were generally small in scale and short in duration, such as the fifteen monitors sent to 
verify the Libyan withdrawal from the Aouzou strip.  Only two major undertakings were 
attempted over the next six years, and both involved situations in which the chief 
sponsors were receiving large numbers of refugees from the countries to which the 
peacekeepers were sent (Haiti, whose refugees were reaching the US, and Albania, whose 
refugees were reaching Italy).155 
With the departure of the international presence, Somalia quickly returned to the 
chaotic state it had been in during mid-1992 and continues to be a trouble spot.  The rise 
of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC)--a loose coalition of clerics, business leaders, and 
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Islamic court militias--in 2006 led to an intervention by Ethiopian forces concerned about 
CIC ties to al Qaeda.  The intervention resulted in the collapse of the CIC, but Somalia 
remains plagued by violence from extremist groups, including al Shabaab, which has 
confirmed its cooperation with al Qaeda insurgents in the region.156 
Amidst challenges from rivals like al Shabaab, “the current government [of 
Somalia] barely exists beyond the tiny pocket of the capital it controls.”  The country is 
again plagued by a humanitarian crisis with the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis 
Unit estimating more than 40% of the population is in need of emergency humanitarian 
assistance.  International donors, however, are reluctant to contribute amidst concerns 
that shipments are being diverted to al Shabaab and other militant groups, another 
similarity to the situation in the early 1990s.157 
Another of the major problems with Somalia is that it is “a pirate’s paradise.”158  
In 2008, Somali pirates had “a banner year,” attacking 111 ships and enjoying success 44 
times. 159  Somali piracy is basically a kidnapping/ransom business, receiving as much as 
$3 million in ransom for the release of the Sirius Star in January 2009.160  Analyst James 
Wombwell notes that the problem of “piracy emanating from Somalia can only be 
resolved ashore,” but concedes that "in light of the US experience in Somali in the early 
1990s, it is understandable that American policymakers are reluctant to take on that 
task.”161 
With its lack of central authority, violence, lawlessness, and humanitarian crisis, 
Somalia remains a failed state that has shown distressingly little progress in spite of 
international efforts to bring stability to the region.  Returning normalcy to Somalia 
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appears to be a task well beyond the limits of the perseverance of the US, or for that 
matter, the international community as a whole. 
Conclusion 
The US intervention in Somalia was a failed OOTW.  Much of this failure can be 
traced to the haphazard analysis of the objective and the failure to make security 
adjustments as the mission changed.  Because the objective of nation-building in Somalia 
was not broadly accepted by the American people or important to US national interests, 
perseverance could not be sustained in the wake of growing numbers of casualties. The 
US experience in Somalia shows a clear connection between the domestic legitimacy of 
the objective and the public’s willingness to exhibit perseverance when the OOTW 
undergoes difficulty. 
Somalia also serves as a caution that OOTWs with nation-building as an objective 
are likely to be inherently problematic.  10th Mountain Division commander Major 
General Arnold recognized from the beginning that when it came to making a nation out 
of the chaotic situation in Somalia, “history was not on our side.”  “For centuries,” 
Arnold explains, “the Somali warrior had been fiercely independent, uniting with 
extended family and other subclans only when challenged from external forces; showing 
some limited loyalties to the clan and demonstrating little, if any, sense of national unity.  
Even with a common language and religion, homogeneity in Somalia was a myth.”162  
Arnold’s observation is consistent with Francis Fukuyama’s assertion that “nation-
building in the sense of the creation of a community bound together by shared history and 
culture is well beyond the ability of any outside power to achieve…. Only states can be 
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deliberately constructed.  If a nation arises from this, it is more a matter of luck than 
design.”163 
 In addition to the general challenges posed by nation-building, Somalia 
demonstrates the limitations of the military’s capabilities in this area.  Allard argues that 
“while military power may well set the stage for such action, the real responsibility for 
nation-building must be carried out by the civilian agencies of the government better able 
to specialize in such long-term humanitarian efforts.”164  He warns that “an institution 
built around can-do attitudes and the expectation of success” may be tempted to try to do 
too much and instead needs to focus on tasks derived from mission analysis and clearly 
defined objectives.165  Rather than the overreliance on the military instrument of power 
that epitomized the Somalia operation, Allard recommends a more balanced application 
of military, diplomatic, and humanitarian efforts.166 
 Fukuyama sees the need for unity and synergy between these different efforts 
throughout what he identifies as three “distinct aspects or phases of nation-building.”  
These are post-conflict reconstruction, creation of self-sustaining state institutions, and 
the strengthening of weak states.167  It is in this first phase that the military must play a 
specific role. 
During the post-conflict reconstruction phase, Fukuyama acknowledges the need 
for outside powers to provide “short-term provision of stability through infusions of 
security forces, police, humanitarian relief, and technical assistance to restore electricity, 
water, banking and payment systems, and so on.”168  Obviously, the provision of security 
and restoration of basic physical life-sustaining infrastructure is within the military’s 
capability and should be a specific role for the military to play.  Fukuyama’s definition of 
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nation-building also requires an occupational authority in order to provide the direct 
leverage that an external position cannot.169  Obviously, a military presence provides such 
leverage. 
The problem lies in the transition from phase one to phase two.  The military must 
not just establish security; it must be able to transition the ongoing responsibility for 
maintenance of that security to someone else.  An international peacekeeping force, a 
retrained police force, and a newly formed apolitical and civilian-controlled host nation 
military are all candidates to assume the security function, but have all proved elusive to 
realize.  Unfortunately, while such organizations may have the perception of legitimacy 
needed to allow nation-building to take root, they all too often lack the capability that the 
US military, though perhaps perceived as less legitimate, clearly has.   
 In Somalia, this transition was envisioned as occurring between UNITAF and 
UNOSOM II.  However, misunderstandings of the principle of objective led to a lack of 
unity of effort between the US and the UN during the transition and left UNOSOM II 
overly committed to the principle of restraint and ill-prepared to adhere to the principle of 
security.  This condition was compounded by the fracturing of legitimacy associated with 
the expanded mandate.  These failures doomed the effort, which had begun with such 
good intentions and shown initial promise, to catastrophic failure.  As a negative 
example, the US involvement in Somalia strongly supports the utility of the principles of 
OOTW as a planning and analytical tool and a predictor of operational outcome.  It is 
also a strong demonstration of the impact of objective on the other principles and the 
connections among various principles. 
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Table 8  
 
Adherence to Principles of OOTW during US Intervention in Somalia 
 
 
 Strong 
adherence 
General 
adherence 
Neutral General 
lack of 
adherence 
Strong lack 
of 
adherence 
Legitimacy    x  
Objective    x  
Perseverance     x 
Restraint   x   
Security    x  
Unity of 
effort 
   x  
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CHAPTER IX 
HAITI: RESTRAINT NEEDS EITHER SECURITY OR LEGITIMACY 
The declining situation in Haiti was another of the many crises confronting the 
US in the post-Cold War era.  While Haiti appealed primarily to America’s humanitarian 
and special interest group considerations, its proximity to Florida and the potentially 
disruptive effects of an influx of refugees also posed some security concerns.   Pursuant 
to these combined interests, the US deployed a joint task force under the auspices of the 
United Nations Mission in Haiti with the objective of preparing a peaceful transition of 
the Haitian government from its ruling military junta to its exiled democratically elected 
president.  Because the UN and US were operating under the faulty assumption that the 
junta accepted the legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission, the joint task force relied on 
the principle of restraint rather than security.  In reality, the junta rejected the agreement, 
and a small group of protesters was able to repel the landing of the US ship that carried 
the lead elements of the joint task force.   Unity of effort difficulties abounded within the 
hastily thrown together task force, but the most serious failure regarding this principle 
existed between the diplomatic negotiators of the agreement and the military officials that 
would be charged with executing it.  The incident occurred on the heels of the Battle of 
Mogadishu in Somalia, and the US was little interested in practicing perseverance in 
another potentially dangerous environment.  This intervention highlights the OOTW 
principle of perseverance by suggesting either legitimacy or security is a prerequisite for 
perseverance.  It also demonstrates the inappropriate application of the principle of 
restraint and the mixed application of the principles of objective and unity of effort.  As a 
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result of this OOTW, the US failed to accomplish its objective of facilitating the peaceful 
transition of power in Haiti in 1993. 
Background 
Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier maintained an authoritarian rule of Haiti from his 
election as president in 1957 until his death in 1971.  He ensured the loyalty of the army, 
formed an even larger militia group called the Tonton Macoute, which “operated as hired 
political thugs,” and skillfully manipulated American anticommunism to secure support.  
Before he died, he engineered a referendum, which by the suspicious tally of 2,391,916 to 
0 ensured the direct succession of his son Jean-Claude or “Baby Doc.”  Baby Doc 
showed little interest in the responsibilities of government, and Haiti soon devolved into a 
den of corruption, disorder, and squalor.  With his regime on the verge of collapse, 
Duvalier resigned in 1986 and went into exile.1 
 A rapid succession of leaders followed Duvalier until Jean-Bertrand Aristide was 
elected president in 1990.  Aristide was a Catholic priest who had risen to prominence in 
1986 as a vocal critic of Duvalier.  His popularity with the poor and his advocacy of his 
own loosely defined version of socialism alienated him from the Haitian elites, who 
viewed him as a threat to their status quo power.  On September 30, 1991, Aristide was 
ousted from office in a military coup led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, Aristide’s 
erstwhile hand-picked chief of staff. 2 
 As a result of the series of coups between the rules of Baby Doc Duvalier and 
Aristide, large amounts of international aid to Haiti had been suspended.  With the 
government unable to pay its rank and file troops, many soldiers began resorting to armed 
bank robberies and home invasions as a source of income.  Seeing the crime wave as a 
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preferable option to a mutiny within the unpaid ranks, junta leaders did little to suppress 
the activity.  The marauders were given the folkloric term zenglendo, which connoted “at 
a time when the Haitian people needed to trust state authority the most, the army had 
transgressed the public confidence…and had turned on the populace in new and 
treacherous fashion.”  By the time of the Cedras junta, the army had become the “main 
obstacle to law and order,” with the zenglendo often carrying out their crimes in loosely 
organized gangs behind the special protection of the military.  Amid such chaos, 
thousands of Haitian “boat people” fled across the Caribbean for Florida.3 
Haiti’s plight soon attracted international attention, but in February 1993, Cedras 
deflected the attempt of United Nations negotiator Dante Caputo to arrange for the 
deployment of international human rights observers to monitor conditions in the country.  
Amid rising pressure from the Congressional Black Caucus, President Bill Clinton in 
March declared his intention to restore Aristide to power and help rebuild Haiti’s 
economy.   The next month Cedras acquiesced to resign in exchange for amnesty for 
himself, his family, and his staff.  Aristide agreed to the conditions, and Caputo returned 
to Haiti to begin facilitating the process.4 
 Upon his arrival, however, Caputo was met by renewed resistance from Cedras.  
Seemingly unconvinced that the international community was prepared to act forcefully, 
Cedras began “playing a game, attempting to deflect increased economic sanctions by 
agreeing to vacate power.  When pressured to leave, however, he would renege on any 
agreement.”5  Only after the UN Security Council took the drastic measure on June 16, 
1993, of voting to impose a ban on petroleum sales to Haiti and freeze financial assets of 
key Haitian authorities did Cedras seem to take notice.  Just four days after this United 
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Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 841 went into effect, Cedras and Aristide 
met separately with mediators at Governor’s Island, New York to work out a plan to 
return Aristide to power.6 
 The resulting Governor’s Island Accord was signed on July 3 and contained 
provisions for amnesty for those Haitians who had participated in the 1991 coup, the 
lifting of sanctions imposed by UNSCR 841, Cedras’s retirement, and Aristide’s return to 
Haiti on October 30, 1993.  It was a deeply flawed document, which according to one 
Haiti expert left the Haitian military with “so much to lose and so little to gain.”7  Shortly 
after the agreement was signed, Haiti plunged into its worst period of violence since the 
coup.  Pro-Aristide activists were routinely beaten, intimidated, or arrested.  Corpses 
were deposited on the doorsteps of hotels where UN observers lived.  Gunfire became a 
regular sound, and thousands of Haitians were killed or disappeared.  Rather than 
preparing for a departure, Cedras appeared to be consolidating his power.8 
Analysis of the Principles 
Objective   
The Governor’s Island Accord closed by stating the pledge of Aristide and Cedras 
to “the peaceful transition to a stable and lasting democratic society in which all Haitians 
will be able to live in a climate of freedom, justice, security, and respect for human 
rights.”  Part of the implementation of this process was for the international community 
to provide “assistance for modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and establishing a new 
police force with the presence of United Nations personnel in these fields.” 9  Pursuant to 
this provision, on September 23, 1993 UNSCR 867 was passed, authorizing “the 
establishment and immediate dispatch of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)” 
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to Haiti.  The mission would be “comprised of up to 567 United Nations police monitors 
(UNPMS) and a military construction unit with a strength of approximately 700, 
including 60 military trainers.”10 
 In August 1993, after the signing of the Governor’s Island Accord, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff directed the creation of Joint Task Force Haiti Assistance Group (JTF 
HAG).  Colonel J. G. Pulley, commanding the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina was designated the commander.  The JTF’s mission was to “deploy to 
Haiti under United Nations operational control and conduct military training and 
humanitarian/civic action programs in support of Haitian democratization.”  Pulley 
describes the mission as fitting “the classic Foreign Internal Defense  profile, undertaking 
civic-action programs designed to help a friendly government solidify its position, protect 
itself from subversion and lawlessness and mobilize popular support by improving 
conditions for its people.”11  Lieutenant Colonel Phil Baker, who was the JTF’s officer in 
charge of developing the plan to professionalize and train the Haitian Army staff, 
described the mission more informally: “We were supposed to do the high vis[isbility] 
things, the medical and construction and humanitarian things, with the intention of 
showing the Haitians that Aristide was returning, and look at the money he’s bringing 
back; hey, this is a good deal.”12  Baker saw his task as being to “do good things as 
representative of the United States Army.”13   
 The ambiguity of the mission may have been intentional.  Former Ambassador 
to El Salvador Robert White surmises that the ongoing uncertainty in Somalia convinced 
negotiators at Governor’s Island to avoid being too specific about military details for fear 
of attracting congressional attention and suspicion.  White criticizes this approach, 
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arguing, “What the Clinton administration should have done is to go precisely the other 
way.  They should have been more aggressive in defining the peace mission instead of 
less.”14   
 With the authorizing of UNSCR 867 in September, two US tank landing ships 
(LSTs) were prepared to transport JTF HAG to Haiti.  The USS Harlan County, under 
Commander Marvin Butcher, left first, arriving at Port-au-Prince on October 11 with 225 
UN observers.  The USS Fairfax County was scheduled to follow later.  Butcher’s 
mission was to transport JTF HAG to Haiti and then provide berthing and life support to 
the embarked troops until they moved on to the dock.  Once the landing was complete, 
the troops would come under the command of Colonel Pulley, who had flown to Haiti 
earlier and would meet the ship at Port-au-Prince.15  Joint Task Force Haiti Assistance 
Group was a reality, but, according to one State Department official, “The Department of 
Defense had major concerns about the mission.”16   
Unity of Effort    
The deteriorating situation in Haiti had not escaped the notice of the Pentagon, 
and in September 1991, the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina began 
dusting off contingency plans in case a non-combatant evacuation operation was 
required.  Eventually the urgency of the situation diminished, but staff officers continued 
to monitor developments.17  Still, the implications of the Governor’s Island Accord 
seemed to catch planners off guard.  Baker was ordered to report to US Atlantic 
Command (USACOM) in Norfolk, Virginia within twenty-four hours from his erstwhile 
posting at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas as a military history instructor.  When he arrived, he 
went to the JTF HAG planning cell where he found that 
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everything was in chaos.  Planners from all services were thrown together trying 
to figure out what they were doing without much organization.  Lots of people 
were just doing what they thought they needed to do; what they were comfortable 
with whether or not it had anything to do with the plan.  Everybody at least 
looked busy.  In the middle of the chaos was a Marine lieutenant colonel under a 
lot of pressure trying to produce an operations order.  I remember that chairs were 
scarce; if you left yours for even a second, someone stole it.18  
 
The result was that JTF HAG was a hastily assembled group that lacked unity of 
effort.  Walter Kretchik describes it as “an ad hoc organization whose personnel ranged 
from various subject-matter experts on Haiti to officers who knew nothing about the 
country and its problems.”  “Many assigned to the JTF,” according to Kretchik, “had 
little idea of what they were expected to do.”19 
Aside from the water-land division of labor between Butcher and Pulley, few 
other responsibilities were clearly defined.  With USACOM providing only minimal 
instructions for embarkation and departure, for example, boarding was conducted in a 
piecemeal and inefficient fashion.  Baker recalls standing around with other personnel 
waiting to board when the Harlan County’s executive officer came up to the group and 
asked who was in charge.  Baker said, “Everyone looked around or at their feet.  I noticed 
that I was the senior officer so I said I guess I was.  The executive officer then asked for a 
manifest, a list of equipment, copies of orders, and other administrative stuff.”20  Baker 
then rounded up the senior noncommissioned officer and an army captain, appointed 
them his first sergeant and executive officer, and began the painstaking work of getting 
things organized.  In the meantime, marine warrant officer “Gunner” Hayes 
superintended the loading of equipment.  As the Harlan County prepared to depart the 
next day, the last arrival of JTG HAG, a navy doctor, ran up the gangway and leaped 
aboard.21  It was an inauspicious beginning to say the least. 
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Perhaps more significant was the lack of synchronization between the diplomatic 
and military efforts.  Pulley noted that JTF HAG had been deployed into an environment 
that had not “been well-prepared diplomatically.”22  Instead, he felt that “diplomats hoped 
the presence of a UN military force would somehow drag the diplomatic process forward 
and create a more secure environment.  Instead, diplomatic progress remained stalled, 
and the environment became even more dangerous.”23  It was a situation reminiscent of 
Beirut in 1982-1983. 
The fissures between the Pentagon and the State Department had developed 
during the Governor’s Island meetings.  As the plans emerged, French-speaking UN 
member nations such as France and Canada were assigned the task of establishing the 
new police force while the military training fell primarily to the US.  According to Kate 
Doyle, “The problem was that while the Defense Department had served as the architect 
for the training package, it did not have a central role in designing the mission itself.”24  
Pulley had little opportunity to direct the JTF HAG staff, instead finding himself 
consumed by demands from higher headquarters and “inundated with insubstantial 
guidance from all quarters.”25  The military appears not to have been afforded much 
opportunity to exercise its own mission analysis procedures.26 
For his part, Pulley tried to establish some unity of effort by deploying to Haiti 
ahead of the Harlan County and meeting with American diplomats there.  He brought 
with him five liaison officers who were especially appreciated by the overloaded staff at 
the US Embassy, the office of the UN’s Deputy for Peacekeeping Operations, and 
elsewhere.  Pulley found the liaison officers of immense value, declaring that even 
though they “had only begun to develop their relationships when the UN mission 
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unraveled, their roles were validated during their brief period of operation.”27  Pulley met 
with his liaison officers daily, as well as personally interacting with his own diplomatic 
counterparts.  For example, he was with US charge d’affaires Nikki Huddleston to 
observe the Harlan County’s arrival at Port-au-Prince and was able to provide liaison 
during that crisis, but by that point it was largely too late.28 
In fact, Pulley was in no position to provide anything more than liaison at this 
point in the operation.  He had no command authority over JTF HAG while it was still 
aboard the Harlan County.  While still in the transportation phase, the Harlan County 
was not “subordinate to JTF HAG or a part of it.”29  Although Pulley was the nominal 
JTF commander, he found himself caught in a no-man’s land “with essentially no assets 
at his immediate disposal.”30  Whatever decisions would be made while JTF HAG was 
still aboard the Harlan County in Port-au-Prince would be the prerogative of Commander 
Butcher. 
Legitimacy   
The US intervention in Haiti suffered from weak legitimacy, both domestically 
and in Haiti itself.  Like Somalia, US involvement in Haiti was based on values rather 
than interests, and the Clinton administration failed to articulate to the domestic audience 
the importance of risking American lives and treasure for such an ill-defined pursuit.  
Within Haiti, the Governor’s Island Accord also had little legitimacy, being perceived by 
Cedras and his followers as a violation of Haitian sovereignty that had been forced upon 
them by a meddling US.  Thus, in Haiti the agreement could be easily resisted, and in the 
US there was little support for exercising any more than a token effort to enforce its 
provisions. 
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  Like Somalia, the situation in Haiti was another international event that caught the 
US at an awkward policy transition between the Bush and Clinton administrations while 
it struggled to define its role in the post-Cold War world.  Both Presidents Bush and 
Clinton faced pressure from domestic constituencies as they grappled with the increasing 
numbers of refugees fleeing Haiti by boat for Florida.  The result was another deviation 
from the rational actor decision-making model. 
The Bush administration’s initial policy in dealing with the mounting refugee 
crisis following the ouster of Aristide was to have the coast guard intercept the boats and 
take the Haitians to a makeshift camp at the US Navy Base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.  
There extensive asylum interviews were conducted to determine those whose claims were 
based on human rights and political issues versus purely economic ones.  By the end of 
February 1992, almost 33 percent of the Haitians who reached the base at Guantanamo 
were permitted to apply for asylum.  In May, however, the Bush administration 
responded to domestic concerns about illegal immigration and decided to close the 
Guantanamo camp and begin escorting detained boats back to Haiti without any asylum 
review at all.   In explaining the new policy, Richard Boucher of the State Department 
stated, “It was increasingly clear that [the Guantanamo camp] was acting as a magnet and 
causing more Haitians to get on boats in the hopes of getting there.”31  By June, the 
policy change had effectively curtailed the exodus.32 
As a presidential candidate, Clinton decried Bush’s “cruel policy of returning 
Haitian refugees to a brutal dictatorship without an asylum hearing," and as president-
elect he insisted the US “should have a process in which these Haitians get a chance to 
make their case."  However, coming to fear such pronouncements might unleash a new 
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wave of refugees, Clinton announced in early January 1993 that he would reverse his 
position and maintain the Bush policy.  “The practice of returning those who flee Haiti by 
boat will continue, for the time being, after I become President,” he explained in a 
broadcast to Haiti and to Haitians in the United States. “Leaving by boat is not the route 
to freedom.”33  Such a stance no doubt pleased Democratic Governor of Florida Lawton 
Chiles, who was facing a tough reelection challenge in 1994.34 
Influencing Clinton’s thinking was his experience with the “Mariel Boatlift,” a 
six-month period in 1980 when Fidel Castro temporarily lifted restrictions that had 
prevented his people from leaving Cuba.   More than 125,000 people left Cuba from 
Mariel Harbor, including those from the country’s prisons and mental institutions who 
were deemed “undesirables.”  At the time, Clinton was governor of Arkansas, and his 
support of President Jimmy Carter’s decision to house some of the refugees at Fort 
Chaffee, Arkansas contributed to Clinton’s failed bid for reelection, losing to Frank 
White, only the second Republican to be elected governor of Arkansas since 
Reconstruction.35   By June, Fort Chaffee housed more than 20,000 Cubans, and in 
October, White aired a political commercial that included footage of a thousand Cuban 
detainees attempting to leave Fort Chaffee on May 29 and suggested that as governor, 
Clinton had failed to protect the citizens of Arkansas.36  Advisors recalled that, as 
president, Clinton’s guiding mottos in formulating policies to deal with refugees from 
both Haiti and Cuba were “No More Mariels” and “Remember Fort Chaffee.”37 
President Clinton might have been able to maintain such a policy during the Cold 
War era of national security consensus, but by the time of his presidency, “foreign affairs 
agendas—that is, sets of issues relevant to foreign policy with which governments are 
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concerned—[had] become larger and more diverse.”38  The rational actor method of 
decision making, which assumes a unitary state “viewed as calculating and responding to 
external events as if it were a single entity” was also under increasing challenge from 
other models.39   Among the alternatives was the elite theory, which “is vitally concerned 
with the identity of those individuals making foreign policy and the underlying dynamics 
of national power, social myth, and class interests.”   Under this construct, “foreign 
policy is formulated as a response to demands generated from the economic and political 
system.  But not all demands receive equal attention, and those that receive the most 
attention serve the interests of only a small sector of society”40   In the case of decision 
making about Haiti, this “small sector of society” was the Congressional Black Caucus 
(CBC). 
Unlike President Bush, President Clinton could not keep his distance from this 
powerful interest group, needing its members’ votes for his domestic agenda.  In late 
1992, the CBC had urged the incoming Clinton administration “to focus its intention, not 
only on the refugee issue, but to attack its cause by demonstrating its unequivocal support 
for the restoration of democratic government in Haiti” and the return of Aristide.  The 
CBC also asked Clinton to implement a policy of “equitable treatment of refugees 
regardless of color.”41  As predicted by elite theory, the CBC was able to determine what 
issues received attention and therefore direct the government to respond.42  The result 
was that Clinton ultimately became “whipsawed by competing domestic pressures” that 
left “the administration’s credibility [on Haiti]…at stake.”43  An article in Newsweek 
would later describe Clinton’s policy toward Haiti as having “had the consistency of a 
Nerf ball.”44  Any significant intervention, especially a risky military one, lacked 
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legitimacy with the American public. 
One of the reasons for the scant popular support was that, as Bush administration 
officials repeatedly emphasized, there was no vital American interest at stake in Haiti.45  
However, as the world moved further from the Cold War era, proponents of a foreign 
policy that supported not just US interests, but also US values, began gaining credence.46  
Michael Mandelbaum believes President Clinton moved too far in this direction, citing 
Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti as examples.47  Mandelbaum derides Clinton for practicing 
“foreign policy as social work,” but admits that of these three cases, Haiti was the “one 
place where an appeal to values might have generated support.”  According to 
Mandelbaum, because Haiti was “nearby, poor, weak, had once been occupied by the 
United States, and was populated by descendants of African slaves, the United States had 
reason to be concerned about its fate.”  He believes the provision of political and 
economic development to Haiti “could have been presented as a good deed in the 
neighborhood at manageable cost and justified by the fact that America is a rich, 
powerful, and generous country.”48   
Yet the matter was not so clear that the American public would naturally reach 
such a conclusion.  Proponents of an active American involvement in Haiti would have to 
convince the domestic audience that the US had a legitimate role to play.  In fact, as 
Hastedt explains the dynamic of the elite decision-making theory, “public reactions are 
often ‘orchestrated’ by the elite rather than being expressions of independent thinking on 
policy matters.”49  Mandelbaum criticizes the Clinton administration for not trying to 
make this case and forfeiting the chance to establish legitimacy and support for the 
intervention in the eyes of the American people.50 
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Nor was the case made in Haiti, where there were problems with the legitimacy of 
the Governor’s Island Accord from its inception.  Because Cedras and Aristide refused to 
meet together, the accord could have hardly been described as a “negotiated” one.  
Instead, it was shaped and constructed by UN and Organization of American States 
(OAS) officials in consultation with the governments of Canada, France, the United 
States, and Venezuela, which had been deemed “Friends of the Secretary General” for 
Haiti.  The US was able to use its military dominance to provide heavy pressure on both 
sides to accept the accord, but neither side fully cooperated with its implementation.  
Aristide was particularly reluctant to endorse the provisions, and his continued heated 
rhetoric served to unite the factions opposed to his regime.  At the same time, backers of 
Cedras showed no inclination to surrender their power and profit and had genuine fears 
for their safety should Aristide return.51   
Another reason the Governor’s Island Accord lacked legitimacy with Cedras is 
because it had no enforcement mechanism.  He was not self-motivated to provide such 
security because it was not in his own interest to relinquish power, and the international 
community provided him no incentive to comply.  To make the intent of the agreement 
work would require “a message of unambiguous determination to be conveyed to the 
[Haitian] military in words and deeds, particularly by the United States.”52  No such 
message was forthcoming. 
American officials received early indications that there were serious discrepancies 
between their understanding of the Governor’s Island Accords and that of Cedras.  The 
State Department had envisioned the recreated Haitian military as being one whose “new 
mission would be oriented toward civic action, engineering, disaster assistance, and 
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coastal patrol instead of maintaining public order.”53  Pulley saw his mission as 
producing “an army respected for its ability to serve and protect Haitian society instead of 
one feared for its ability to terrorize that society at gunpoint.”  He prepared to embark on 
“a conspicuous professionalization program” that would teach “the role of a soldier in a 
democracy.”54   
On September 16, however, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Jones, the commander of 
the site survey team in Haiti, reported that the Haitian Army believed they already were 
“professional” and had no interest in receiving training along the lines of the American 
plan.55  Pulley found the Haitian Army’s interpretation of the word “modernization” in 
UNSCR 867 to mean that they “should be given more and better lethal weapons 
systems.”  His attempts to schedule professionalization training “were repeatedly 
countered by requests for tanks, self-propelled artillery, attack helicopters, and fighter-
bombers.”56  Clearly, Cedras and his cronies did not perceive JTF HAG’s mission as a 
legitimate one.  It soon “became clear [to Pulley] that the JTF was operating in a political 
climate that the diplomatic strategists had neither predicted nor prepared for.”57 
Just as Mandelbaum faults the Clinton administration for failing to make the case 
for Haiti with the American people, Pulley laments the missed opportunity to have used 
psychological operations (PSYOPS) teams to convince the Haitians of JTF HAG’s 
legitimacy.  Deployment of these assets was delayed for fear of bad connotations that 
might be drawn from the terms PSYOPS and propaganda.  Because of the delay, the first 
four soldiers of what became known as a “public-awareness team” did not deploy until 
the day before the Harlan County attempted to dock at Port-au-Prince.  “By then,” Pulley 
remembers, “the opponents of President Aristide were firmly in control of the flow of 
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information, and the US and the UN simply did not compete.”58  The Haitian media had 
routinely depicted the proposed UN force “as armed interventionists, portrayed alongside 
damning reporting about the UN/US operation in Somali.”  Thus, “Haitians hostile to the 
operation were able to link it, however unjustifiably, with scenes of violence in 
Mogadishu.” 59  What Pulley calls “the truth” of the US intentions, which may have been 
JTF HAG’s “best advertisement[,]…was never communicated.”60 
After the failure of JTF HAG, Pulley hypothesized that “a Joint Task Force Haiti 
II may be possible” if the situation in Haiti were to “reach a point where all parties 
genuinely desire an accord.”61  Instead, when the Harlan County arrived at Port-au-
Prince, it did so without the mandate of legitimacy many US and UN officials naively 
assumed it had.   As a result of this miscalculation, all planning efforts had assumed a 
“permissive environment” in Haiti, and UNSCR 867 made no provisions for the forced 
entry of the Harlan County, instead merely calling “upon the Government of Haiti to take 
all appropriate steps to ensure the safety of United Nations personnel.”62 
Security   
Because of this failure to ensure the legitimacy of the Harlan County’s arrival 
with Haitian authorities, Commander Butcher would quickly have reason to question the 
security conditions that planners had assumed.  When the ship arrived in Port-au-Prince 
at 2:00 a.m. on October 11, Butcher had to carefully navigate his way through a maze of 
vessels that were anchored around the harbor approaches in what appeared to be a 
deliberate attempt to impede his access to the port.  Butcher finally dropped anchor at 
5:00 a.m. but could not berth his ship because an old Cuban tanker was occupying his 
mooring.  Instead, he launched a small landing craft to survey the situation and found 
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little activity other than a group of Haitian policemen on the pier.  A US Coast Guard 
commander who was serving as an attaché at the US Embassy arrived at the pier only to 
report he was leaving due to gunfire.  Butcher could hear shots as well, but they were not 
directed at him.63 
Returning to the Harlan County, Butcher reported the situation to his headquarters 
in Norfolk and directed all JTF HAG personnel to go to their rooms and wait.  Several 
Haitian boats of assorted descriptions, some flying the Duvalier-era Tonton Macoute flag, 
were now circling the ship, but they dispersed when Butcher ordered crew members to 
man the Harlan Country’s .50 caliber machine guns.64 
From his vantage point on-shore, Pulley could also sense the mounting tension.  
At 7:00 a.m. he had seen a bus full of about forty Haitians arrive at the dock.  Fueled by 
freely dispensed liquor, the crowd worked itself into a frenzy, firing weapons in the air 
and chanting anti-American slogans.  Pulley saw two corpses dragged off the bus and 
thrown into the mob, but he took some comfort in the fact that a fourteen-foot high fence 
and a two-and-a-half-foot thick masonry wall separated the demonstrators from the pier.  
The mob was loud and unruly, but without access to the pier, Pulley felt it posed little 
immediate threat to the Harlan County.65 
By this time several Americans, including Charge d’ Affaires Huddleston, Pulley, 
and Dr. Bryant Freeman, an expert on Haiti from the University of Kansas, had gathered 
on the balcony of the Montana Hotel to observe the scene.  Against Pulley’s warnings, 
Huddleston decided to drive to the dock area in an attempt to calm the situation.  Upon 
her arrival, she found the gate to the port locked, and her armored car was quickly 
surrounded by a mob of drunken Haitians who were chanting “Remember Somalia.”  The 
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protestors began beating on the car with ax handles, compelling Huddleston to reluctantly 
retreat.  A live CNN video of the event gave the world a startling impression of the 
chaotic situation unfolding at Port-au-Prince.66  
In a three-way conversation, Butcher, Pulley, and a USACOM official discussed 
the situation.  Pulley considered the environment tense but still permissive, while 
Butcher, noting the sounds of gunfire, disagreed.  Various options were considered, but 
all had drawbacks, and in the end it was agreed the Harlan County would maintain only 
passive security measures from a position about one nautical mile off the pier.67   
Later in the day, Haitian boats circled the Harlan County but kept their distance 
when they saw the machine guns were manned.  Butcher also used his LCPLs (Landing 
Craft Personnel Large) to establish a floating security ring around his vessel.  At one 
point after darkness fell, Haitians lined up some cars on the shore and shined their lights 
on the ship.  Using night vision devices, ship personnel saw what they believed to be two 
V-150 armored personnel carriers with 90-mm guns hidden behind the pier.  It was a 
tense but quiet night.68 
The next morning, discussions continued about how to proceed.  An embassy 
official called to request Butcher recover his LCPLs, but Butcher refused, citing his 
security concerns.  A few minutes later, a representative from headquarters in Norfolk 
called to ask Butcher to at least contract his security ring closer to the ship.  While 
Butcher was having this discussion, two Haitian twenty-five-foot Montauk gunboats, 
armed with .50 caliber machine guns and carrying Haitian Police and Haitian Army and 
Navy personnel, emerged from Admiral Killick Naval Base to the south and raced toward 
the Harlan County.  Butcher ordered all guns manned and positioned snipers along the 
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deck, instructing his men to open fire if the Haitians so much as put their hands on the 
triggers of their machine guns.69  
Butcher assumed the Haitians were monitoring his unsecure radio 
communications, and he decided to use that situation to his advantage.  He placed an 
open call to the US Embassy, advising it that his top priority was to protect his ship, and 
he intended to destroy any gunboat that got within a thousand yards of the Harlan 
County.  The Haitian vessels soon left.  They reappeared about two hours later, but this 
time they kept their distance at a respectable 2,500 yards.70 
Butcher concluded his position was untenable, and especially with the threat 
posed by the Haitian gunboats, he was unwilling to risk another night in the harbor.  
Pulley later mused that an operation designed after JTF HAG could succeed only “in a 
truly permissive environment,” and Butcher determined now that the current environment 
was not permissive.71   He notified his headquarters in Norfolk that he was pulling out.  
The watch officer asked Butcher if he would wait long enough for him to obtain 
concurrence from Admiral Henry Mauz, the Commander-in-Chief, US Atlantic Fleet, but 
Butcher advised him that regardless of what was going on in Norfolk, he was leaving 
Port-au-Prince.  About thirty-five minutes later, Butcher received word that headquarters 
would support his decision. Within days, Pulley and his JTF HAG advance party were 
ordered out of Haiti.  The remaining UN and OAS personnel soon followed .72  In the 
words of Richard Millet, the Haitian “military and their supporters had, at little apparent 
cost, called the Clinton administration's bluff and won.”73 
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Restraint   
From JTF HAG’s inception, the principle of restraint was a controversial issue.  
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin argued that no US military force should deploy without a 
self-defense capability.  The State Department and National Security Advisor Anthony 
Lake, however, were against a US assistance mission going ashore in a way that might be 
interpreted as an overbearing show of force.74  A fairly ridiculous compromise resulted in 
which JTF HAG members were allowed to ship but not carry sidearms.75   Ian Martin 
describes the sidearm controversy as being “too much for some Haitians, while it would 
prove too little for the Pentagon.”76  Even when the security situation deteriorated after 
the Governor’s Island Accords, Pulley lamented that “it was too late to reconfigure the 
force package and impossible to clear a politically sensitive increase in defensive-
weapons capability with the diplomats of the US country team, the United Nations, and 
the de facto government of Haiti.77 
Butcher considered landing a contingent of marines on October 11 to intimidate 
the crowd, but the available troops and their vehicles had already been emblazoned with 
“UN” insignia.  Thus they would be acting under UN auspices and “violence was the one 
thing that the UN wanted to avoid.”  Similarly, a USACOM representative, well aware of 
the recent events in Somalia, relayed to Pulley that casualties would be unacceptable.78  
Aside from manning its battle stations in self-defense, the closest the Harlan County got 
to deviating from the principle of restraint was to play “a loud and rousing national 
anthem for morning colors” on October 12.79 
The American willingness to emphasize restraint over security was tied to a naïve 
confidence in the Governor’s Island Accords.  Even after the ignominious withdrawal of 
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the Harlan County, President Clinton stated, “I have no intention of sending our people 
there until the agreement is honored.... The Department of Defense and our military 
leaders are convinced that the relatively light arms that our people were supposed to carry 
as advisors are more than adequate to protect themselves as long as the Governor’s Island 
agreement is being honored.”  However, even President Clinton seemed to understand the 
imprudence of taking such a risk, and he added, “But I’m not about to let them land to 
test it.”80  In the case of the Harlan County, restraint and reliance on the likes of Raoul 
Cedras to guarantee one’s security proved to be a poor substitute for an adequately armed 
and organized force.81 
Perseverance   
Given the haste of the withdrawal of the Harlan County, JTF HAG obviously 
failed to adhere to the principle of perseverance.  Even Cedras said, “I’m surprised that 
you didn’t persist.”82  Lambasting the decision, New York Times columnist Anthony 
Lewis claimed, “President Clinton could have ordered an immediate strike.  A small 
invasion force, entirely adequate to round up the military leaders and their thugs, could 
have been quickly assembled.  Congress and the public would have supported that 
response to the deliberate insulting of the United States.  But Mr. Clinton did not act.”83  
Surely the situation was more complicated than Lewis assumes, but Peter Riehm is 
correct in his observation that “the departure of one warship precipitated the hasty exit of 
the entire international presence.”84   Loss aversion, a nebulous foreign policy, and a 
reluctance to commit to yet another long-term nation-building exercise all conspired 
against perseverance in Haiti. 
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What most impacted the principle of perseverance is the fact that the Harlan 
County incident occurred just days after the disastrous Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia.  
Americans were in no mood to suffer casualties in pursuit of uncertain ventures.  Senator 
Robert Dole captured the sentiments of many when he asserted, “The return of Aristide to 
Haiti is not worth even one American life.”  Dole then proposed a resolution to cut off 
funds for US military forces sent to Haiti unless Congress voted to authorize the action, 
an emergency evacuation of Americans was required, or the “national interest” was at 
stake and there was not time to obtain congressional approval.85 
Prospect theory does much to explain the lack of American perseverance after the 
rebuff of the Harlan County.  The theory holds that decision makers do not always seek 
to maximize objective outcomes.  Instead they tend to overvalue losses compared to 
equivalent gains, and become risk-averse in the domain of gains and risk acceptant in the 
domain of losses.86  Thus, especially on the heels of the recent casualties in Somalia, both 
American political and military leaders were motivated more by the negative interest of 
avoiding losses rather than any positive outcome that perseverance in Haiti may have 
promised.  On the other hand, the side that fears significant losses due to inaction, as did 
Cedras and his supporters, will be willing to act in a less restrained manner and assume 
more risks.87  The return of Aristide to power “was fundamentally unacceptable to the 
[Haitian] army.”88  In such a situation, regardless of relative combat power, the junta’s 
willingness to persevere far exceeded that of the US.  This willingness was buoyed by 
observations of the American response to the Battle of Mogadishu. 
Many observers found the ramifications of this lack of perseverance to stretch far 
beyond the Harlan County affair.  Kate Doyle argues, “US policy toward Haiti has 
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consisted of a torrent of good intentions unmatched by courage or political will.  The 
result is a hollow diplomacy, with unsettling implications.”  Doyle cautions that such 
failures do not just “threaten to corrode the reputation of the United States abroad and 
undermine its ability to influence conflicts to come.”  Much more dangerously, she 
contends, the failure of the United States to act decisively in Haiti “touches the heart of 
the future of international affairs: the role of the United Nations, the needs of evolving 
democracies, the interplay of force and suasion.”89 
By the time of the Harlan County debacle, America was already stretched thin 
with nationbuilding activities.  Even as the once hopeful situation in Somalia was turning 
to disaster, there was mounting pressure on the United States to do something to stop the 
violent civil war that was ravaging Bosnia.  In Haiti, “all federal agencies 
acknowledg[ed] that even if military action succeeded in toppling the junta, the 
subsequent chore of nation-building would be fraught with uncertainty and too 
burdensome for the hemisphere's dominant power.”90  When the Governor’s Island 
Accord proved to be empty, the repulse of the Harlan County was a convenient excuse 
not to press matters in Haiti. 
But the United States remained interested in Haiti, by one explanation, simply 
because President Clinton had made it an issue.91  Redoubled pressure from the 
Congressional Black Causus, the persistent refugee problem, an effort to restore 
American credibility, and a genuine humanitarian concern all combined to bring a force 
of over 20,000 troops to the brink of invading Haiti in September 1994.  Backed by this 
credible threat of force, a last minute diplomatic effort by former President Jimmy Carter, 
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Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell succeeded in convincing Cedras to transfer 
power, and the planned invasion became a peaceful entry. 
Still, problems of perseverance plagued the US involvement in Haiti.  To make 
the country a self-sustaining democracy would require the establishment of a stable 
political system, the rule of law, and a freely functioning market economy.  As 
Mandelbaum notes, because of the seriousness of these tasks, the transformation “could 
not be accomplished overnight” and would require “a substantial American 
commitment.”  He laments, “This the Clinton administration was not able to give.”92  
Indeed, the American and UN presence ended in February 1996, and the Haiti of today 
shows little progress for their efforts. 
Conclusion 
 The US intervention in Haiti in 1993 was a failed OOTW.  Other case studies 
such as the Greek Civil War, Nicaragua, and Honduras have suggested that perseverance 
is sustainable when directed toward an objective that is clearly stated and perceived as 
being important to broad US interests.  Like Somalia, Haiti lacked that strong adherence 
to objective, and perseverance could not be maintained when casualties became an issue.  
The US intervention in Haiti supports previous case studies that have suggested a strong 
connection between the principles of objective and perseverance. 
 Also like Somalia, the US intervention in Haiti lacked legitimacy with the host 
nation, and the US forces did not offset the physical threat posed by this condition by 
increased attention to the principle of security.  The UNITAF experience in Somalia had 
shown the futility of exercising restraint in the absence of legitimacy or security.  Both 
Operations Bluebat and Power Pack had demonstrated the value of mitigating uncertainty 
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by strong security.  It was this overwhelming show of force that made restraint possible 
in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic.  In Haiti, planners forfeited security by their 
misplaced reliance on legitimacy and then attempted to exercise restraint without the 
underpinning of either security or legitimacy.  The result, especially considering the 
Harlan County incident's close proximity in time to the Battle of Mogadishu, was a 
strong failure to adhere to perseverance.   
 Operation Bluebat also showed the importance of unity of effort between the 
diplomatic and military actors as well as between the US and a host nation's military.  
The intervention in Haiti failed to establish unity of effort on both these fronts.  In the 
first case, the failure bears a striking resemblance to Beirut where the military was 
committed to a peacekeeping situation that had not been properly structured by the 
diplomatic effort.  In the second case, it is directly attributable to the failure to establish 
legitimacy in the eyes of the junta.    
This analysis reinforces several of the observations from other failed OOTWs.  
Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, and Haiti all have had unsatisfactory adherence to objective, 
legitimacy, and security.  In all cases, these shortcomings led to strong failures to adhere 
to perseverance.  As a negative example, the Harlan County debacle strongly supports 
the utility of the principles of OOTW as a planning and analytical tool and a predictor of 
operational outcome. 
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Table 9  
 
Adherence to Principles of OOTW during US intervention in Haiti 
 
 
 Strong 
adherence 
General 
adherence 
Neutral General 
lack of 
adherence 
Strong lack 
of 
adherence 
Legitimacy     x 
Objective    x  
Perseverance     x 
Restraint  x    
Security     x 
Unity of 
effort 
  x   
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CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION: THE USEFULNESS OF THE PRINCIPLES 
The preceding eight case studies examined adherence to the principles of OOTW in four 
successful and four failed operations.  Table 10 records the findings for the successful 
OOTWs, and Table 11 records the findings for the failures. Depicting the findings in this 
way allows the use of John Stuart Mill’s methods of agreement and difference to 
construct a preliminary model of the relationship between adherence to the principles of 
OOTW and the operation’s outcome.  This exercise also helps identify various 
combinations of principles that may work in concert or serve a “context-setting” function.  
It also represents the beginning of a data base that can be used in future research of a 
larger-n study.   
Table 10  
Summary of Adherence to Principles of OOTW during Successful OOTWs 
 
 Legitimacy Objective Perseverance Restraint Security Unity of 
effort 
Geek Civil 
War 
General 
adherence 
Strong 
adherence 
Strong 
adherence 
General 
adherence
Strong 
adherence
Strong 
adherence 
Lebanon General 
adherence 
General 
adherence 
General 
adherence 
Strong 
adherence
Strong 
adherence
General 
adherence 
Dominican 
Republic 
General 
adherence 
General 
adherence 
Strong 
adherence 
Strong 
adherence
Strong 
adherence
General 
adherence 
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Table 10 (continued). 
Nicaragua/ 
Honduras 
General 
lack of 
adherence 
Strong 
adherence 
Strong 
adherence 
General 
adherence
General 
adherence
Neutral 
 
Successful OOTWs 
The only successful operation that had instances of less than “general adherence” 
to an individual principle was Nicaragua/Honduras, which had a general lack of 
adherence to legitimacy and neutral adherence to unity of effort.  In this case, the issues 
with legitimacy and unity of effort involved US domestic politics rather than interactions 
with the host nation.  They were offset by a strong sense of objective and perseverance 
within the Reagan administration.  The case of Nicaragua and Honduras is useful as 
evidence that it is not necessary to adhere to all of the principles to have a successful 
operation.   
Among the successful OOTWs, the principle of legitimacy reflected the weakest 
level of adherence, with three cases of general adherence and one case of a general lack 
of adherence.  The strongest principles appearing in successful OOTWs were security 
and perseverance.  Adherence to both of these principles was assessed as strong in three 
of the four successful cases.  The principles that showed the most consistently matched 
level of adherence were security and restraint, and objective and perseverance.  In both 
these pairings, three of the four successful OOTWs reflected an identical assessment 
between the two principles, and the fourth was very close.   
While not showing causation, Table 10 suggests a correlation between successful 
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OOTWs and an overall adherence to the principles of OOTW.  It also suggests that there 
may be a relationship between some of the principles. The utility of Table 10 is as a guide 
to surmising if adherence to a principle or combination of principles increases or 
decreases the chances of the OOTW’s success. 
Table 11  
 
Summary of Adherence to Principles of OOTW during Failed OOTWs 
 
 Legitimacy Objective Perseverance Restraint Security Unity of 
effort 
Vietnam General 
lack of 
adherence 
General 
lack of 
adherence 
General   
lack of 
adherence 
Neutral Strong 
lack of 
adherence 
Neutral 
Beirut Strong lack 
of 
adherence 
Strong 
lack of 
adherence 
General   
lack of 
adherence 
General 
adherence 
Strong 
lack of 
adherence 
Strong 
lack of 
adherence 
Somalia  General 
lack of 
adherence 
General 
lack of 
adherence 
Strong lack 
of adherence 
Neutral General 
lack of 
adherence 
General 
lack of 
adherence 
Haiti Strong lack 
of 
adherence 
General 
lack of 
adherence 
Strong lack 
of adherence 
General 
adherence 
Strong 
lack of 
adherence 
Neutral 
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Failed OOTWs 
Referring to Table 11, the only category in which failed operations were assessed 
as having greater than “neutral” adherence to a particular principle was in the category of 
restraint.  Beirut and Haiti reflected general adherence to this principle, and the other two 
cases reflected neutral adherence.   While restraint reflected the greatest level of 
adherence among failed cases, security reflected the most consistent lack of adherence, 
with three cases being assessed as having a strong lack and the other a general lack of 
adherence to this principle.  In fact, the strongest inverse relationship between principles 
in the failed cases was between restraint and security.  The principles of legitimacy, 
objective, perseverance, and security showed the most consistently matched levels of 
adherence among the four failed OOTWs. 
While not showing causation, Table 11 suggests a correlation between failed 
OOTWs and an overall adherence to the principles of OOTW.  It also suggests that there 
may be a relationship between some of the principles. The utility of Table 11 is as a guide 
to surmising if failure to adhere to a principle or combination of principles increases or 
decreases the chances of the OOTW’s failure. 
Crisp Set 
These findings were then used to create a crisp set.  Adherence to each principle 
was assessed on a scale of 0 to 1.0 with 1.0 representing the highest score.  The results 
are depicted in Table 12.  
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Table 12  
 
Crisp Set of Adherence to Principles of OOTW in Selected Cases between 1945 and 1999 
 
 Greek 
Civil 
War 
Lebanon Dominican 
Republic 
Vietnam Nicaragua/ 
Honduras 
Beirut Somalia Haiti 
Legitimacy .8 .7 .7 .3 .3 .1 .3 .1 
Objective 1.0 .7 .8 .3 .9 .1 .3 .3 
Perseverance .9 .7 .9 .3 1.0 .3 .1 .1 
Restraint .8 1.0 1.0 .6 .8 .7 .5 .8 
Security .9 .9 1.0 .1 .8 .1 .3 .1 
Unity of 
effort 
.9 .8 .8 .5 .6 .1 .2 .4 
 
Preliminary Model 
The assessments, along with the case studies, relevant doctrine and literature, and 
logical reasoning, were also used to create a preliminary model that rendered a hierarchy 
of the principles as being objective, perseverance, security, unity of effort, legitimacy, 
and restraint.  Within this hierarchy, the principles were placed into two distinct groups 
based on their demonstrated importance and relationships in the case studies.  Objective, 
perseverance, and security formed one group of “critical principles,” and unity of effort, 
legitimacy, and restraint comprised a “second tier.”  The second tier principles were 
determined to be less important in part because Nicaragua and Honduras, a successful 
OOTW, did not adhere to the principles of legitimacy and unity of effort.  Therefore, 
following Mill’s logic, these particular principles must not be critical to success.1 
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Additionally, the case studies indicated that restraint only contributed to overall success 
in cases in which it was accompanied by strong security.  A detailed explanation of the 
logical process by which the model was developed follows. 
A convincing argument can be made for the primacy of objective in all military 
operations, to include OOTW.  Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote in On War, “No one 
starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his 
mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”2   Based 
on this logic, this study considers objective to be the starting point and foundation of all 
the principles of OOTW.  Various case studies support this theory, including the Greek 
Civil War and Nicaragua/Honduras as positive examples, and Vietnam and Somalia as 
negative ones.  Because the other principles depend on a clear and sound objective, 
objective was determined to be the most important principle.   
Perseverance is closely related to objective, because, as FM 100-5 says, “the 
underlying causes of confrontation and conflict [in an OOTW] rarely have a clear 
beginning or a decisive resolution.”3  Furthermore, it seems that given the American 
military and economic advantage, the country could meet its objective in most situations 
if American willingness to stay the course could be maintained.  In fact, all the successful 
case studies reflected adherence to this principle, and all the failures reflected a lack of 
adherence to it.  Thus, perseverance was determined to be the second most important 
principle. 
Because vital national interests are usually not at stake in most OOTWs, 
perseverance can be as much a function of costs as it is objective.  To this end, security is 
critical because perseverance is highly dependent on keeping US casualties low.  FM 
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100-5 reminds commanders they “must protect their forces at all times.”4  Casualties or 
the fear of casualties was critical to the lack of perseverance in Somalia and Haiti.  
Because of its impact on perseverance and its overall importance, security was 
determined to be the third most important principle.   
Because of the political nature of OOTW, unity of effort is critical between the 
military and a host of other organizations.  This unity of effort must be directed toward a 
common objective.  The cases of Vietnam and Beirut showed the threat a lack of unity of 
effort poses to the critical principle of objective.  Unity of effort, such as with an 
international coalition, also can enhance legitimacy.  The transition of the American 
intervention in the Dominican Republic from a unilateral to an Organization of American 
States action is an example.  However, if a coalition arrangement weakens security, as it 
did in Somalia, the added risk must be carefully considered.  Because of the mixed 
effects of unity of effort, it is considered the fourth most important principle. 
Although domestic legitimacy is of critical importance to any US military action, 
FM 100-5 focuses on this principle as the “willing acceptance” of the US action by the 
host government and people.5  As such, legitimacy contributes to security and was 
determined to be the fifth most important principle.  The cases of Beirut and Somalia 
demonstrate the relationship between a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the host nation 
and the threat to the security of the US force.  For the purposes of this model, the impact 
of domestic legitimacy was considered under the principle of perseverance.   
FM 100-5 notes that a violation of restraint can threaten legitimacy.6  However, 
excessive restraint can negatively impact security, as was most notably demonstrated in 
Beirut.  If, for whatever reason, a violation of restraint does not negatively impact 
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legitimacy, such as in the Greek Civil War, then restraint is not a significant factor.  The 
actual significant factor is legitimacy, however it is achieved.  If, on the other hand, 
excessive restraint negatively impacts security, perseverance is also jeopardized.  
Lebanon and the Dominican Republic showed restraint can be effective in the presence of 
strong security.  Beirut and Somalia demonstrated the inverse.  Haiti suggested for 
restraint to be effective, either legitimacy or security must be present.  Nicaragua and 
Honduras showed restraint can contribute to perseverance by keeping economic and 
human costs low.  Because restraint appears to have no inherently decisive value and is 
so dependent on context, it was determined to be the least important principle. 
Subset/superset Analysis 
The crisp set was then analyzed using the subset/superset function of QCA to 
obtain scores for consistency, coverage, and a combination of consistency and coverage.  
This function analyzes the outcome (success) and its relationship to a necessary condition 
(the principle).  The necessary condition is, by definition, a superset of the outcome, and 
the outcome is a subset of the necessary condition.7  Consistency “measures the degree to 
which solution terms and the solution as a whole are subsets of the outcome.”  Coverage 
“measures how much of the outcome is covered (or explained) by each solution term and 
by the solution as a whole.”8   
The subset/superset analysis supports the utility of the principles of OOTW as a 
planning and analytical tool because the highest combined score for successful OOTWs 
was in those cases where adherence to all six principles was maximized.  Generally 
speaking, combined scores decreased with adherence to a smaller number of principles.  
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The six lowest combined scores occurred when only one of the principles was 
considered.  See Appendix 1 for the complete analysis. 
The rank order of these single principles generated by the subset/superset analysis 
supports the general hierarchy of the model, which predicted objective, perseverance, and 
security as being the three critical principles and unity of effort, legitimacy, and restraint 
comprising the second tier.  Table 13 depicts the subset/superset analysis of the six 
individual principles. 
Table 13   
 
Subset/superset Analysis of Adherence to Principles of OOTW in Cases 1945-1999 
 
 
 Consistency Coverage Combined 
Legitimacy 
0.75756 0.625 0.413758
Objective 
0.772727 0.85 0.467233
Perseverance 
0.813954 0.875 0.494666
Security 
0.857143 0.9 0.514886
Restraint 
0.580645 0.9 0.726074
Unity of effort 
0.72093 0.775 0.419123
 
The subset/superset analysis renders a single principle hierarchy based on 
consistency of security, perseverance, objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, and restraint.  
This analysis differs slightly from the model in that the positions of security and 
objective, and unity of effort and legitimacy are reversed, but the analysis is consistent 
with the model’s assumption of objective, perseverance, and security as the three critical 
principles and the other three as second tier principles. 
Comment [C1]: Empty invisible table was 
deleted here. 
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Analysis of Necessary Conditions 
Because it revealed higher scores when more principles were involved and 
because different combinations of principles rendered different scores, the subset/superset 
analysis was consistent with FM 100-5’s requirement of a “balanced application” of the 
principles rather than any exclusivity or any irrelevance of a particular principle or 
principles.  This idea of balanced application suggests an interaction among the principles 
and the possibility that adherence to certain principles contributes to adherence to others.  
An analysis of necessary conditions was used to examine any potential relationships.  
This test provides data on consistency and coverage.   
Table 14   
 
Analysis of Necessary Conditions Concerning Adherence to Principles of OOTW in 
Selected Successful Cases 1945-1999 
 
 Consistency Coverage 
Legitimacy 
0.625000 0.757576
Objective 
0.850000 0.772727
Perseverance 
0.875000 0.813953
Restraint 
0.900000 0.580645
Security 
0.900000 0.857143
Unity of effort 
0.775000 0.720930
 
If the model is correct, the three principles predicted to be critical (perseverance, 
objective, and security) should be highly consistent in successful OOTWS.  However, the 
actual analysis depicted in Table 14 showed that restraint and security were the most 
consistent principles present in successful OOTWs (0.900), followed by perseverance 
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(0.875) and objective (0.850). This unexpectedly high consistency for restraint can be 
explained by the scores for coverage.  While restraint has the highest consistency score, it 
has the lowest coverage score in successful OOTWs.  Because coverage measures how 
much the principle explains the outcome, this low coverage score for restraint indicates it 
made little contribution to the operation’s success.  This relationship between consistency 
and coverage exists with this principle because restraint was adhered to relatively well in 
all the cases, both the successful and failed ones, but only when it was accompanied by 
security did it contribute to the operation’s success.  This relationship is also present in 
the analysis of the failed cases. 
Table 15 reflects the analysis of necessary conditions in failed OOTWs.  In these 
cases, restraint is also the most consistent variable, with 0.650 consistency.  However, 
unlike the successful cases, where restraint was paired with security as the most 
consistent principle, in the failed cases security was the least consistent principle (0.150 
consistency).  The explanation of this phenomenon is based on Ragin’s notion of 
“context-setting.”  The type of restraint that contributes to successful OOTWs is the type 
of restraint backed by and enabled by a strong security presence.  The type of restraint 
present in failed OOTWs is the restraint engendered by weakness.  The case studies 
imply that the only way that restraint can contribute to success in the absence of security 
is if it is paired with a strong presence of legitimacy.  That was not the case in the failed 
cases.  In fact, legitimacy displayed the second lowest score in failed OOTWs.  An 
OOTW commonly cited as having low security but able to maximize restraint because of 
its legitimacy is the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai.  This 
case should be included in future research of this hypothesis.  
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Table 15   
 
Analysis of Necessary Conditions Concerning Adherence to Principles of OOTW in 
Selected Failed Cases 1945-1999 
 
 
 Consistency Coverage 
Legitimacy 
0.200000 0.242424
Objective 
0.250000 0.7227273
Perseverance 
0.200000 0.186047
Restraint 
0.650000 0.419355
Security 
0.150000 0.142857
Unity of effort 
0.300000 0.279070
 
                  
Fuzzy Sets 
The problem of restraint being dependent on context can be resolved by the 
process of “calibration,” which is a feature QCA uses to determine if one variable set or 
shaped the context for others.9  The model provided a basis for coding each principle 
according to its individual importance and its ability, as predicted in the doctrine and 
literature and demonstrated in the case studies, to influence other principles.  During the 
calibration process, variables are coded with “fully in,” “crossover,” and “fully out” 
values that reflect their significance and membership in the set.  Those values are 
depicted in Table 16. 
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Table 16   
 
Calibrated Values for Principles of OOTW  
 
 Calibration 
(fully in, crossover, 
fully out) 
Legitimacy 
.5, .4, .2
Objective 
.8, .6, .4
Perseverance 
.9, .7, .5
Restraint 
.4, .2, .1
Security 
.7, .5, .3
Unity of effort 
.6, .4, .2
 
Based on this assessment of which principles could be considered context-setting, 
a fuzzy set analysis was conducted, which reflected these calibrations.  The results are 
depicted in Table 17 for failed OOTWs and Table 19 for successful ones. 
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Table 17   
 
Fuzzy Set (Calibrated Values) Analysis of Necessary Conditions Concerning Adherence 
to Principles of OOTW in Selected Failed Cases 1945-1999 
 
 
 Consistency Coverage 
Legitimacy 
0.095000 0.106742
Objective 
0.007500 0.007916
Perseverance 
0.00000 0.000000
Restraint 
0.997500 0.499374
Security 
0.012500 0.012376
Unity of effort 
0.345000 0.258912
 
 
The calibrated results are highly supportive of the model in the failed cases.   The 
three critical principles of perseverance, objective, and security are the three least 
consistent principles by a large margin.  Restraint is nearly 100 percent consistent in 
failed OOTWs, but it is coupled with extremely inconsistent security.  Perseverance is 
completely absent in failed OOTWs, which is intuitive because the OOTW was 
abandoned before the objective was achieved, hence the OOTW being classified as a 
failure. 
Based on this finding, it is must be determined what, then, are the necessary 
conditions for perseverance.  The results are shown in Table 18.  As the model predicted, 
objective and security are necessary.  Restraint is also necessary.  The case studies 
suggest that in this context, restraint is important as a means of avoiding casualties and 
keeping costs low.  The Nicaragua and Honduras case study is the best example of this 
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relationship.  Case studies in which restraint contributed to casualties, such as Somalia 
and Beirut, did not produce perseverance. 
Table 18   
Fuzzy Set (Calibrated Values) Analysis of Necessary Conditions for Principle of 
Perseverance in Selected Failed Cases 1945-1999 
 
 Consistency Coverage 
Legitimacy 
0.761062 0.724719
Objective 
1.000000 0.894459
Restraint 
1.000000 0.424280
Security 
1.000000 0.839109
Unity of effort 
0.988201 0.628518
 
 
The calibrated analysis of necessary conditions in successful OOTWs depicted in 
Table 19 is less definitive.  Rather than the model’s prediction of the criticality of 
objective, perseverance, and security, this analysis showed a relatively tight cluster of the 
consistency scores for restraint, security, unity of effort, and objective, followed by 
perseverance and then legitimacy.  The correlation between security and restraint is 
consistent with other results and therefore unsurprising.  The high presence of objective is 
also consistent with the expectations of the model.  The most surprising result is the high 
consistency of unity of effort.  The model considered unity of effort as most useful in 
contributing to objective.  In fact, an analysis of unity of effort as a necessary condition 
for objective reveals a consistency of 0.989446, which may explain its high score as a 
calibrated value.  Perseverance’s drop in score is best explained by considering 
perseverance as more of a result of adherence to the other principles rather than a 
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principle that creates necessary conditions in and of itself.  This analysis is supported by 
the complete absence of perseverance in failed cases.  As the principles are calibrated, 
this relationship naturally becomes more pronounced.  Legitimacy’s consistently low 
scores were continued after calibration.  The coverage scores reflect the model’s 
prediction of objective, perseverance, and security as the three critical principles. 
Table 19  
 
Fuzzy Set (Calibrated Values) Analysis of Necessary Conditions Concerning Adherence 
to Principles of OOTW in Selected Successful Cases 1945-1999 
 
 
 Calibration Consistency Coverage 
Legitimacy 
.5, .4, .2 0.795000 0.893258
Objective 
.8, .6, .4 0.940000 0.992084
Perseverance 
.9, .7, .5 0.847500 1.00000
Restraint 
.4, .2, .1 1.00000 0.500626
Security 
.7, .5, .3 0.997500 0.987624
Unity of effort 
.6, .4, .2 0.987500 0.741088
 
                       
Conclusions 
The model, the crisp set analysis, and the fuzzy set analysis were consistent in 
which three principles were critical and which three were second tier.  However, there 
were differences in the exact hierarchy within both of these two subsets.  The model 
predicted a hierarchy of objective, perseverance, security, unity of effort, legitimacy, and 
restraint.  The crisp set analysis hierarchy was security, perseverance, objective, 
legitimacy, unity of effort, and restraint.  The fuzzy set hierarchy was perseverance, 
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objective, security, legitimacy, unity of effort, and restraint.  The four results are depicted 
in Table 20. 
Table 20  
Comparison of Hierarchy of Principles among Model, Superset/subset Analysis, Crisp 
Set, and Fuzzy Set 
 
Model Superset/subset 
analysis 
Crisp set Fuzzy set 
Objective 
Security Security Perseverance
Perseverance 
Perseverance Perseverance Objective
Security 
Objective Objective Security
Unity of effort 
Unity of effort Legitimacy Legitimacy
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy Unity of effort Unity of effort
Restraint 
Restraint Restraint Restraint
 
The primacy of security represented in the superset/subset and crisp set analyses 
has implications regarding the importance of casualty aversion.  The model assumed that 
if the objective were important enough to the American public, the desire to achieve that 
object (perseverance) could absorb casualties (security), commensurate with the 
importance of the objective.  The superset/subset and crisp set analyses suggest an 
inverse relationship: A low number of casualties (security) facilitates the willingness to 
continue the expenditure (perseverance) necessary to accomplish the goal (objective). 
The fuzzy set analysis’s emphasis on perseverance is intuitive because the 
calibration reflected the reality that, for an operation to be successful, it had to persevere 
long enough to accomplish its objective.  Otherwise, the only difference between the 
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model and the fuzzy set was the reversed order of legitimacy and unity of effort.  Because 
the model predicted only a marginal difference in the importance of these principles, this 
finding is unremarkable.  The model focused on unity of effort’s ability to facilitate 
objective.  The fuzzy set analysis also reinforces the fact that unity of effort also builds 
legitimacy, as demonstrated in the Dominican Republic with the transition from a US 
unilateral to an OAS operation.  The fuzzy set analysis’s primacy of perseverance also 
would tend to elevate the importance of legitimacy because domestic legitimacy is 
closely tied to the willingness to persevere. 
Recommendations 
This study supports the hypothesis that the balanced application of the principles 
of OOTW is a reliable predictor of an operation’s success or failure.  As a small-n study, 
additional research is required.  This research should use the same methodology to 
expand the data base and test the hypothesis.  If the results continue to show a 
relationship between the principles and the operation’s outcome, the army and joint 
community should reconsider their decision to remove the principles of OOTW from 
their doctrine. 
Of particular note are this study’s findings concerning restraint.  Throughout the 
Cold War, the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway had 
gained a reputation for peacekeeping expertise.  Many observers saw this “Nordic model” 
as providing a blueprint for OOTW in the post-Cold War environment.  However, the 
emphasis on lightly armed forces operating behind a shield of legitimacy and consent did 
not survive the more complicated and less permissive changed situation.  As this reality 
became painfully clear with experiences like Somalia, security considerations gained 
314 
 
 
 
 
ascendancy.10  The results of this study should serve as a warning that restraint’s utility is 
highly dependent on a credible capability, threat, and willingness to use force.  For this 
reason, force planners and commanders should ensure a strong adherence to the principle 
of security. 
This study purposely did not include on-going operations because of the 
impossibility in determining their success or failure.  However, the US interventions in 
Iraq and Afghanistan represent excellent potential case studies, and future researchers 
should include them as soon as possible after their outcome is decided.  Of particular 
interest is exploring the impact of the present lack of consensus on objective as well as 
the impact of economic considerations on perseverance.   
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APPENDIX A 
CRISP SET SUBSET/SUPERSET ANALYSIS 
Terms Consistency Coverage Combined 
 
legit*obj*pers*rest*sec*unity 0.862069 0.625 0.828528
obj*pers*rest*sec*unity 0.878788 0.725 0.828123
obj*pers*rest*sec 0.885714 0.775 0.786043
legit*obj*pers*sec*unity 0.862069 0.625 0.779675
legit*pers*rest*sec*unity 0.862069 0.625 0.779675
legit*obj*pers*rest*sec 0.862069 0.625 0.779675
obj*pers*sec*unity 0.882353 0.75 0.777498
pers*rest*sec*unity 0.878788 0.725 0.768761
legit*obj*rest*sec*unity 0.833333 0.625 0.768079
obj*rest*sec*unity 0.852941 0.725 0.757698
legit*obj*pers*rest*unity 0.806452 0.625 0.75
obj*pers*rest*unity 0.828572 0.725 0.746303
pers*rest*sec 0.888889 0.8 0.724316
obj*pers*sec 0.888889 0.8 0.724316
legit*obj*pers*sec 0.862069 0.625 0.723786
legit*pers*sec*unity 0.862069 0.625 0.723786
legit*pers*rest*sec 0.862069 0.625 0.723786
legit*rest*sec*unity 0.833333 0.625 0.713022
legit*obj*sec*unity 0.833333 0.625 0.713022
pers*sec*unity 0.882353 0.75 0.706404
obj*sec*unity 0.857143 0.75 0.698808
rest*sec*unity 0.857143 0.75 0.698808
obj*rest*sec 0.837838 0.775 0.698637
obj*pers*rest 0.837838 0.775 0.698637
legit*obj*pers*unity 0.806452 0.625 0.696238
legit*pers*rest*unity 0.806452 0.625 0.696238
legit*obj*pers*rest 0.806452 0.625 0.696238
legit*obj*rest*sec 0.806452 0.625 0.696238
obj*pers*unity 0.833333 0.75 0.688415
legit*obj*rest*unity 0.78125 0.625 0.678604
pers*rest*unity 0.828572 0.725 0.678061
legit*pers*sec 0.862069 0.625 0.657603
legit*sec*unity 0.833333 0.625 0.647823
rest*sec 0.853659 0.875 0.64029
pers*sec 0.891892 0.825 0.639272
obj*rest*unity 0.763158 0.725 0.633095
legit*obj*sec 0.806452 0.625 0.632574
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legit*rest*sec 0.806452 0.625 0.632574
legit*pers*rest 0.806452 0.625 0.632574
legit*pers*unity 0.806452 0.625 0.632574
legit*obj*pers 0.806452 0.625 0.632574
obj*pers 0.846154 0.825 0.62552
sec*unity 0.861111 0.775 0.617174
obj*sec 0.842105 0.8 0.616809
legit*obj*unity 0.78125 0.625 0.616553
legit*rest*unity 0.78125 0.625 0.616553
pers*unity 0.833333 0.75 0.601386
pers*rest 0.8 0.8 0.597521
legit*obj*rest 0.757576 0.625 0.596742
obj*unity 0.769231 0.75 0.561995
obj*rest 0.756098 0.775 0.557295
legit*pers 0.806452 0.625 0.552605
legit*sec 0.806452 0.625 0.552605
legit*unity 0.78125 0.625 0.538609
legit*rest 0.757576 0.625 0.521302
legit*obj 0.757576 0.625 0.521302
rest*unity 0.714286 0.75 0.51614
sec 0.857143 0.9 0.514886
pers 0.813954 0.875 0.494666
obj 0.772727 0.85 0.467233
unity 0.72093 0.775 0.419123
legit 0.757576 0.625 0.413758
rest 0.580645 0.9 0.262074
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